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





EMILIUS AND SOPHIA.

VOL. III.

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EMILIUS AND SOPHIA;

OR,

A NEW SYSTEM

OF

EDUCATION.

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH OF

Mr. Jean Jacques ROUSSEAU,

CITIZEN OF GENEVA.

BY THE TRANSLATOR OF *ELOISA.*

VOL. III.

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EMILIUS;

OR,

A NEW SYSTEM

OF

EDUCATION.

CONTINUATION OF BOOK IV.

The Savoyard Curate's PROFESSION *of* FAITH *Continued.*

"IT is pretended that every one contributes to the publick good for his own intereſt; but whence comes it that the virtuous man contributes to it to his prejudice? Can a man lay down his life for his own intereſt? It is certain all our actions are influenced by a view to our own good; but unleſs we take moral good into the account, none but the actions of the wicked can ever be explained by motives of private intereſt. We imagine, indeed, no more will be attempted; as that would be too abominable a kind of philoſophy, by which we ſhould be puzzled to account for virtuous actions; or could extr icate ourſelves out of the difficulty only by attributing them to baſe deſigns and ſiniſter

views, by debaſing a Socrates and calumniating a Regulus. If ever ſuch doctrines ſhould take riſe among us, the voice of nature as well as of reaſon would check their growth, and leave not even one of thoſe who inculcate them the ſimple excuſe of being ſincere.

"It is not my deſign here to enter into ſuch metaphyſical inveſtigations, as ſurpaſs both your capacity and mine, and which in fact are uſeleſs. I have already told you I would not talk philoſophy to you, but only aſſiſt you to conſult your own heart. Were all the philoſophers in Europe to prove me in the wrong, yet, if you were ſenſible I was in the right, I ſhould deſire nothing more.

"To this end you need only to diſtinguiſh between our acquired ideas, and our natural ſentiments, for we are ſenſible before we are intelligent; and, as we do not learn to deſire our own good and to avoid what is evil, but poſſeſs this deſire immediately from nature, ſo the love of virtue and hatred of vice are as natural as the love of ourſelves. The operations of conſcience are not intellectual, but ſentimental; for though all our ideas are acquired from without, the ſentiments which eſtimate them ariſe from within: and it is by theſe alone, that we know the agreement or diſagreement which exiſts between us and thoſe things which we ought to ſeek or ſhun.

"To exiſt is, with us, to be ſenſible; our ſenſibility is inconteſtibly prior to our intelligence, and we were poſſeſſed of ſentiment before we formed

formed ideas. Whatever was the cauſe of our Being, it hath provided for our preſervation in furniſhing us with ſentiments agreeable to our conſtitution, nor can it poſſibly be denied that theſe at leaſt are innate. Theſe ſentiments are, in the individual, the love of himſelf, averſion to pain, dread of death, and the deſire of happineſs. But if, as it cannot be doubted, man is by nature a ſocial Being, or at leaſt formed to become ſuch, his ſociability abſolutely requires that he ſhould be furniſhed with other innate ſentiments relative to his ſpecies: for to conſider only the phyſical wants of men, it would certainly be better for them to be diſperſed than aſſembled.

"Now it is from this moral ſyſtem, formed by its duplicate relation to himſelf and his fellow-creatures, that the impulſe of conſcience ariſes. To know what is virtuous, is not to love virtue. Man has no innate knowledge of virtue, but no ſooner is it made known to him by reaſon, than conſcience induces him to love and admire it: this is the innate ſentiment I mean.

"I cannot think it impoſſible, therefore, to explain, from natural conſequences, the immediate principle of conſcience independent of reaſon; and, though it were impoſſible, it is not at all neceſſary; for ſince thoſe who reject this principle (admitted, however, and acknowledged in general by all mankind) do not prove its non-exiſtence, but content themſelves with affirming it only: when we affirm that it doth exiſt, we

ſtand at leaſt on as good a footing as they; and have beſides that internal teſtimony for us, the voice of conſcience depoſing in behalf of itſelf. If the firſt glimmerings of the underſtanding dazzle our ſight and make objects, appear at firſt obſcure or confuſed, let us wait but a little while till our opticks recover themſelves and gather ſtrength, and we ſhall preſently ſee thoſe ſame objects, by the light of reaſon, to be ſuch as nature at firſt preſented them: or rather let us be more ſimple and leſs vain; let us confine ourſelves to the ſentiments we firſt diſcovered, as it is to theſe our well-regulated ſtudies muſt always recur.

"O Conſcience! Conſcience! thou divine inſtinct, thou certain guide of an ignorant and confined, though intelligent and free Being; thou infallible judge of good and evil, who makeſt man to reſemble the Deity; in thee conſiſt the excellence of our nature and the morality of our actions: without thee I perceive nothing in myſelf that ſhould elevate me above the brutes, except the melancholy privilege of wandering from errour to errour, by the aſſiſtance of an ungovernable underſtanding and unprincipled reaſon.

"Thank Heaven, we are delivered from this formidable apparatus of philoſophy: we can be men without being ſages; without ſpending our days in the ſtudy of morality we poſſeſs, at a cheaper rate, a more certain guide through the immenſe and perplexing labyrinth of human opinions. It is not enough, however, that ſuch a guide

a guide exiſts, it is neceſſary to know and follow him. If he ſpeaks to all hearts, it may be ſaid how comes it that ſo few underſtand him? It is, alas! becauſe he ſpeaks to us in the language of nature, which every thing conſpires to make us forget. Conſcience is timid, ſhe loves peace and retirement; the world and its noiſe terrify her: the prejudices ſhe has been compelled to give riſe to are her moſt cruel enemies, before whom ſhe is ſilent, or avoids their preſence; their louder voice entirely overpowers her's, and prevents her being heard: fanaticiſm counterfeits her nature, and dictates in her name the greateſt of crimes. Thus, from being often rejected, ſhe at length ceaſes to ſpeak to us, and anſwers not our enquiries after being long held in contempt, alſo, it coſts us as much trouble to recall, as it did at firſt to baniſh her from our boſoms.

"How often have I found myſelf fatigued in my reſearches from my indifference! How often hath uneaſineſs and diſguſt, poiſoning my meditations, rendered them inſupportable! My inſenſible heart was ſuſceptible only of a lukewarm and languiſhing zeal for truth. I ſaid to myſelf, why ſhould I take the trouble to ſeek after things that have no exiſtence? Virtue is a mere chimera, nor is there any thing deſirable but the pleaſures of ſenſe. When a man hath once loſt a taſte for the pleaſures of the mind, how difficult to recover it! How much more difficult is it alſo for one to acquire ſuch a taſte, who never poſſeſſed it! If there be

in the world a man ſo miſerable as never to have done an action in his life, the remembrance of which muſt make him ſatisfied with himſelf, that man muſt be ever incapable of ſuch a taſte; and, for want of being able to perceive that goodneſs which is conformable to his nature, muſt of neceſſity remain wicked as he is, and eternally miſerable. But can you believe there exiſts on earth an human creature ſo depraved as never to have given up his heart to the inclinations of doing good? The temptation is ſo natural and ſeductive, that it is impoſſible always to reſiſt it, and the remembrance of the pleaſure it hath once given us, is ſufficient to repreſent it to us ever afterwards. Unhappily this propenſity is at firſt difficult to gratify; there are a thouſand reaſons for our not complying with the dictates of our hearts; the falſe prudence of the world confines our good inclinations to ourſelves, and all our fortitude is neceſſary to caſt off the yoke. To take a pleaſure in virtue is the reward of having been virtuous, nor is this prize to be obtained till it be merited. Nothing is more amiable than virtue, but we muſt poſſeſs it, in order to find it ſuch. When we court at firſt its embraces, it aſſumes, like Proteus in the fable, a thouſand terrifying forms, and diſplays at laſt, its own, only to thoſe who are tenacious of their hold.

" Wavering perpetually between my natural ſentiments, tending to the general good of mankind, and my reaſon, confining every thing to my own, I ſhould have remained all my life in this

this continual dilemma, doing evil yet loving good, in conſtant contradiction with myſelf, had not new knowledge enlightened my heart; had not the truth, which determined my opinions, aſcertained alſo my conduct, and rendered me conſiſtent. It is in vain to attempt the eſtabliſhment of virtue on the foundation of reaſon alone; what ſolidity is there in ſuch a baſe? Virtue, it is ſaid, is the love of order; but can, or ought, this love of order to prevail over that of my own happineſs? Let there be given me a clear and ſufficient reaſon for my giving it the preference. This pretended principle is, at the bottom, only a mere play upon words; as I may as well ſay, that vice alſo conſiſts in the love of order taken in a different ſenſe. There is ſome kind of moral order in every thing that has ſentiment and intelligence. The difference is, that a good Being regulates himſelf according to the general order of things, and a wicked Being, regulates things agreeably to his own private intereſt: the latter makes himſelf the centre of all things, and the former meaſures his radius, and diſpoſes himſelf in the circumference. Here he is arranged, with reſpect to the common centre, as God, and with reſpect to all concentrick circles, as his fellow-creatures. If there be no God, the wicked man only reaſons right, the good man is a mere fool.

" O my child! may you be one day ſenſible how great a weight we are relieved from, when, having exhauſted the vanity of human opinions,

and tafted of the bitterneſs of the paſſions, we ſee ourſelves at laſt ſo near the path to wiſdom; the reward of our good actions, and the ſource of that happineſs we had deſpaired to attain. Every duty preſcribed by the laws of nature, though almoſt effaced from my heart by the injuſtice of mankind, again revived at the name of that eternal juſtice, which impoſed them, and was a witneſs to my diſcharge of them. I ſee in myſelf nothing more than the work and inſtrument of a ſuperior Being, deſirous of, and doing good; deſirous alſo of effecting mine, by the concurrence of my will to his own, and by my making a right uſe of my liberty. I acquieſce in the regularity and order he hath eſtabliſhed, being certain of enjoying one day or other that order in myſelf, and of finding my happineſs therein: for what can afford greater felicity than to perceive one's ſelf making a part of a ſyſtem, where every thing is conſtructed a right? On every occaſion of pain or ſorrow I ſupport them with patience, reflecting that they are tranſitory, and that they are derived from a body which is detached from myſelf. If I do a good action in ſecret, I know that it is nevertheleſs ſeen, and make the conſideration of another life the rule of my conduct in this. If I am ever dealt with unjuſtly, I ſay to myſelf, that juſt Being, who governs all things, knows how to indemnify me. My corporeal neceſſities, and the miſeries inſeparable from this mortal life, make the apprehenſions of death more

more ſupportable. I have hence ſo many chains the leſs to break when I am obliged to quit this mortal ſcene.

" For what reaſon my ſoul is thus ſubjected to the organs of ſenſe, and chained to a body which lays it under ſo much reſtraint, I know not; nor preſume to enter into the decrees of the Almighty. But, I may without temerity form a modeſt conjecture or two on this head. I reflect that, if the mind of man had remained perfectly free and pure, what merit could he have pretended to, in admiring and purſuing that order which he ſaw already eſtabliſhed and which he would lie under no temptation to diſturb? It is true he would have been happy, but he could not have attained that moſt ſublime degree of felicity, the glory of virtue and the teſtimony of a good conſcience; we ſhould in ſuch a caſe have been no better than the angels, and without doubt a virtuous man will be one day much ſuperior. Being united on earth to a mortal body, by ties not leſs powerful than incomprehenſible, the preſervation of that body becomes the great concern of the ſoul, and makes its preſent apparent intereſts contrary to the general order of things, which it is nevertheleſs capable of ſeeing and admiring. It is in this ſituation, that the making a good uſe of his liberty becomes at once his merit and his reward; and that he prepares for himſelf eternal happineſs, in combating his earthly paſſions, and preſerving the primitive purity of his will.

"But even ſuppoſing that in our preſent ſtate of depravity, our primitive propenſities were ſuch as they ought to be, yet, if all our vices are derived from ourſelves, why do we complain that we are ſubjected by them? Why do we impute to the Creator thoſe evils which we bring on ourſelves, and thoſe enemies we arm againſt our own happineſs? Ah! let us not ſpoil the man of nature, and he will always be virtuous without conſtraint, and happy without remorſe! The criminals, who pretend they are compelled to ſin, are as falſe as they are wicked: is it poſſible for them not to ſee that the weakneſs they complain of is their own work; that their firſt depravation was owing to their own will; that by their wilfully yielding at firſt to temptations, they at length find them irreſiſtible? It is true, they now cannot help their being weak and wicked; but it is their fault that they at firſt became ſo. How eaſily might men preſerve the maſtery over themſelves and their paſſions, even during life, if, before their vicious habits are acquired, when the faculties of the mind are juſt beginning to be diſplayed, they ſhould employ themſelves on thoſe objects which it is neceſſary for them to know, in order to judge of thoſe which are unknown; if they were ſincerely deſirous of acquiring knowledge, not with a view to make a parade in the eyes of others, but in order to render themſelves wiſe, good, and happy in the practice of their natural duties! This ſtudy appears

difficult,

difficult, becauſe we only apply to it, after being already corrupted by vice, and made ſlaves to our paſſions. We place our judgement and eſteem on objects before we arrive at the knowledge of good and evil, and then referring every thing to that falſe ſtandard, we hold nothing in its due eſtimation.

"The heart, at a certain age, while it is yet free, arduous, reſtleſs, and anxious after happineſs, is ever ſeeking it with an impatient and uncertain curioſity; when deceived by the ſenſes, it fixes on the ſhadow of it, and imagines it to be found where it doth not exiſt. This illuſion hath prevailed too long with me. I diſcovered it, alas! too late; and have not been able entirely to remove it: no, it will remain with me as long as this mortal body, which gave riſe to it. It may prove as ſeductive, however, as it will, it can no longer deceive me. I know it for what it is, and even while I am miſled by it deſpiſe it. So far from eſteeming it an object of happineſs, I ſee it is an obſtacle to it. Hence, I long for that moment when I ſhall ſhake off this incumbrance of body, and be myſelf, without inconſiſtency or participation with matter, and ſhall depend on myſelf only to be happy. In the mean time, I make myſelf happy in this life, becauſe I hold the evils of life as trifling in themſelves, as almoſt foreign to my being; and conceive at the ſame time that all the real good which may thence be deduced depends on myſelf.

"To anticipate as much as poſſible that deſirable ſtate of happineſs, power, and liberty, I exerciſe my mind in ſublime contemplations. I meditate on the order of the univerſe, not indeed with a view to explain it by vain ſyſtems, but to admire it perpetually, and to adore its all-wiſe Creator, whoſe features I trace in his workmanſhip. With him I am thus enabled to converſe, and to exert my faculties in the contemplation of his divine eſſence: I am affected by his beneficence, I praiſe him for his mercies, but never ſo far forget myſelf as to pray. For what ſhould I aſk of him? That he ſhould for my ſake pervert the order of things, and work miracles in my favour? Shall I, who ought to love and admire above all things that order which is eſtabliſhed by his wiſdom, and maintained by his providence, deſire that ſuch order ſhould be broken for me? No! ſuch a raſh petition would rather merit puniſhment than acceptance. Nor can I pray to him for the power of acting aright: for why ſhould I petition for what he hath already given me? Has he not given me conſcience to love virtue, reaſon to know what it is, and liberty to make it my choice? If I do evil I have no excuſe; I do it becauſe I will; to deſire him to change my will, is to require that of him which he requires of me: this would be to deſire him to do my work, while I receive the reward. Not to be content with my ſituation in the order of things, is to deſire to be no longer a man; it is to wiſh things were otherwiſe conſtituted

ſtituted than they are, to wiſh for evil and diſorder. No, thou ſource of juſtice and truth, God! merciful and juſt! placing my confidence in thee, the chief deſire of my heart is, that thy will be done. By rendering my will conformable to thine, I act as thou doſt, I acquieſce in thy goodneſs, and conceive myſelf already a partaker of that ſupreme felicity, which is its reward.

"The only thing which, under a juſt diffidence of myſelf, I requeſt of him, or rather expect from his juſtice, is that he will correct my errors when I go aſtray. To be ſincere, however, I do not think my judgement infallible: ſuch of my opinions, as ſeem to be the beſt founded, may, nevertheleſs, be falſe; for what man hath not his opinions, and how few are there who agree in every thing? It is to no purpoſe that the illuſions by which I am miſled ariſe from myſelf; it is he alone can diſſipate them. I have done every thing in my power to arrive at truth; but its ſource is elevated beyond my reach: if my faculties fail me, in what am I culpable? It is neceſſary for truth to ſtoop to my capacity."

THE GOOD PRIEST ſpoke with ſome earneſtneſs; he was moved, and I was alſo greatly affected. I imagined myſelf attending to the divine Orpheus, ſinging his hymns and teaching mankind the worſhip of the gods. A number of objections, however, to what he had ſaid, ſuggeſted

geſted themſelves; though I did not urge one, becauſe they were leſs ſolid than perplexing; and though not convinced, I was, nevertheleſs, perſuaded he was in the right. In proportion as he ſpoke to me from the conviction of his own conſcience, mine confirmed me in the truth of what he ſaid.

"The ſentiments you have been delivering (ſaid I to him) appear newer to me in what you confeſs yourſelf ignorant of, than in what you profeſs to believe. I ſee in the latter nearly that theiſm or natural religion which Chriſtians affect to confound with atheiſm and impiety, though in fact diametrically oppoſite. In the preſent ſituation of my mind, I find it difficult to adopt preciſely your opinions, and to be as wiſe as you. To be, at leaſt as ſincere, however, I will conſult my own conſcience on theſe points. It is that internal ſentiment which, according to your example, ought to be my conductor, and you have yourſelf taught me, that, after having impoſed ſilence on it, for a long time, it is not to be awakened again in a moment. I will treaſure up your diſcourſe in my heart, and meditate thereon. If, when I have duely weighed it, I am as much convinced as you, I will truſt you as my apoſtle, and will be your proſelyte till death. Go on, however, to inſtruct me: you have only informed me of half what I ought to know. Give me your thoughts of revelation, the ſcriptures, and thoſe myſterious doctrines, concerning which I have been

in

in the dark from my infancy, without being able to conceive or believe them, and yet not knowing how either to admit or reject them."

"Yes, my dear child (ſaid he) I will proceed to tell you what I think further; I meant not to open to you my heart by halves: but the deſire which you expreſs to be informed in theſe particulars was neceſſary to authoriſe me to be totally without reſerve. I have hitherto told you nothing but what I thought might be uſeful to you, and in the truth of which I am moſt firmly perſuaded. The examination which I am now going to make is very different; preſenting to my view nothing but perplexity, myſteriouſneſs, and obſcurity: I enter on it, therefore, with diſtruſt and uncertainty; I almoſt tremble to determine about any thing, and ſhall rather inform you, therefore, of my doubts than of my opinions. Were your own ſentiments more confirmed, I ſhould heſitate to acquaint you with mine; but in your preſent ſceptical ſituation, you will be a gainer by thinking as I do*. Let my diſcourſe, however, carry with it no greater authority than that of reaſon; for I plainly confeſs myſelf ignorant, whether I am in the right or wrong. It is difficult, indeed, in all diſcuſſions, not to aſſume ſometimes an affirmative tone; but remember that all my affirmations, in treating theſe matters, are only ſo many rational doubts. I leave you to inveſtigate the truth of them;

* This I conceive, is what the good curate means to ſay alſo to the publick.

them; on my part, I can only promiſe to be ſincere.

"You will find my expoſition treat of nothing more than natural religion: it is very ſtrange that we ſhould ſtand in need of any other! By what means can I find out ſuch neceſſity? In what reſpect can I be culpable, for ſerving God agreeably to the dictates of the underſtanding he hath given me, and the ſentiments he hath implanted in my heart? What purity of morals, what ſyſtem of faith uſeful to man, or honourable to his Creator, can I deduce from any poſitive doctrines, that I cannot deduce as well without it, from a good uſe of my natural faculties? Let any one ſhow me what can be added, either for the glory of God, the good of ſociety, or my own advantage, to the obligations we are laid under by nature; let him ſhow me what virtue can be produced from any new worſhip, which is not alſo the conſequence of mine. The moſt ſublime ideas of the Deity are inculcated by reaſon alone. Take a view of the works of nature, liſten to the voice within, and then tell me what God hath omitted to ſay to your ſight, your conſcience, your underſtanding? Where are the men who can tell us more of him than he thus tells us of himſelf? Their revelations only debaſe the Deity, in aſcribing to him human paſſions. So far from giving us enlightened notions of the Supreme Being, their particular tenets, in my opinion, give us the moſt obſcure and confuſed ideas. To the inconceivable

ceiveable myſteries by which the Deity is hid from our view, they add the moſt abſurd contradictions. They ſerve to make man proud, perſecuting, and cruel; inſtead of eſtabliſhing peace on earth, they bring fire and ſword. I aſk myſelf to what good purpoſe tends all this, without being able to reſolve the queſtion. Artificial religion preſents to my view only the wickedneſs and miſeries of mankind.

"I am told, indeed, that revelation is neceſſary to teach mankind the manner in which God would be ſerved; as a proof of this, they bring the diverſity of whimſical modes of worſhip which prevail in the world; and that without remarking that this very diverſity ariſes from the whim of adopting revelations. Ever ſince men have taken it into their heads to make the Deity ſpeak, every people make him ſpeak in their own way, and ſay what they like beſt. Had they liſtened only to what the Deity hath ſaid to their hearts, there would have been but one religion on earth.

"It is neceſſary that the worſhip of God ſhould be uniform, I would have it ſo: but is this a point ſo very important, that the whole apparatus of divine power was neceſſary to eſtabliſh it? Let us not confound the ceremonials of religion with religion itſelf. The worſhip of God demands that of the heart; and this, when it is ſincere, is ever uniform; men muſt entertain very ridiculous notions of the Deity, indeed, if they imagine he can intereſt himſelf in the gown.

gown or caſſock of a prieſt, in the order of words he pronounces, or in the geſtures and genuflexions he makes at the altar. Alas! my friend, where is the uſe of kneeling? Stand as upright as you will, you will be always near enough the earth. God requires to be worſhipped in ſpirit and in truth: this is a duty incumbent on men of all religions and countries. With regard to exterior forms, if, for the ſake of peace and good order, their uniformity be expedient, it is merely an affair of government; the adminiſtration of which ſurely requires not the aid of revelation.

" I did not ſet out, at firſt, with theſe reflections. Hurried on by the prejudices of education, and by that dangerous ſelf-conceit, which ever elates mankind above their ſphere, as I could not raiſe my feeble conceptions to the Supreme Being, I endeavoured to debaſe him to my ideas. Thus I connected relations infinitely diſtant from each other, comparing the incomprehenſible nature of the Deity with my own. I required ſtill further a more immediate communication with the Divinity, and more particular inſtructions concerning his will: not content with reducing God to a ſimilitude with man, I wanted to be further diſtinguiſhed by his favour, and to enjoy ſupernatural lights: I longed for an excluſive and peculiar privilege of adoration, and that God ſhould have revealed to me what he had kept ſecret from others, or that

others ſhould not underſtand his revelations ſo well as myſelf.

" Looking on the point at which I was arrived, at that whence all believers ſet out, in order to reach an enlightened mode of worſhip, I regarded natural religion only as the elements of all religion. I took a ſurvey of that variety of ſects which are ſcattered over the face of the earth, and who mutually accuſe each other of falſehood and errour: I aſked which of them was the right? Every one of them in their turns anſwered *their's*. I and my partizans only think truely; all the reſt are miſtaken. *But, how do you know that your ſect is in the right?* Becauſe God hath declared ſo. *And who tells you God hath declared ſo?* My ſpiritual guide, who knows it well. My paſtor tells me to believe ſo and ſo, and accordingly I believe it: he aſſures me that every one who ſays to the contrary ſpeaks falſely; and therefore I liſten to nobody who controverts his doctrine*.

How,

* All of them, ſays a certain wiſe and good prieſt, pretend that they derive their doctrines not from men, nor from any created Being; but from God. But to ſay truth, without flattery or diſguiſe, there is nothing in ſuch pretenſions: however they may talk, they owe their religion to human means; witneſs the manner in which they firſt adopt it. The nation, country and place where they are born and bred determine it. Are we not circumciſed or baptiſed, made Jews, Turks, or Chriſtians before we are men? Our religion is not the effect of choice: witneſs our lives and manners ſo little accordant to it; witneſs how we act contrary to the tenets of it, on the moſt trifling occaſions.—*Charron, on Wiſdom.*

"How, thought I, is not the truth every where the ſame? Is it poſſible that what is true with one perſon can be falſe with another? If the method taken by him who is in the right, and by him who is in the wrong, be the ſame, what merit or demerit hath the one more than the other? Their choice is the effect of accident, and to impute it to them is unjuſt: it is to reward or puniſh them for being born in this or that country. To ſay that the Deity can judge us in this manner is the higheſt impeachment of his juſtice.

"Now, either all religions are good and agreeable to God, or if there be one which he hath dictated to man, and will puniſh him for rejecting, he hath certainly diſtinguiſhed it by manifeſt ſigns and tokens, as the only true one. Theſe ſigns are common to all times and places, and are equally obvious to all mankind, to the young and old, the learned and ignorant, to Europeans, Indians, Africans, and Savages. If there be only one religion in the world that can prevent our ſuffering eternal damnation, and there be on any part of the earth a ſingle mortal who is ſincere, and is not convinced by its evidence, the God of that religion muſt be the moſt iniquitous and cruel of tyrants. Would we ſeek the truth therefore in ſincerity, we muſt lay no ſtreſs on the place and circumſtance

There is great reaſon to believe that a ſincere profeſſion of faith from the virtuous Divine of Candom would have differed but little from that of our Savoyard curate.

ſtance of our birth, nor on the authority of fathers and teachers; but appeal to the dictates of reaſon and conſcience concerning every thing that is taught us in our youth. It is to no purpoſe to bid me ſubject my reaſon to the truth of things of which it is incapacitated to judge; the man who would impoſe on me a falſehood, may bid me do the ſame: it is neceſſary, therefore, I ſhould employ my reaſon even to know when it ought to ſubmit.

"All the theology I am myſelf capable of acquiring, by taking a proſpect of the univerſe, and by the proper uſe of my faculties, is confined to what I have laid down above. To know more, we muſt have recourſe to extraordinary means. Theſe means cannot depend on the authority of men: for all men being of the ſame ſpecies with myſelf, whatever another can by natural means come to the knowledge of, I can do the ſame; and another man is as liable to be deceived as I am: when I believe, therefore, what he ſays, it is not becauſe he ſays it, but becauſe he proves it. The teſtimony of mankind, therefore, is at the bottom that of my reaſon, and adds nothing to the natural means God hath given me for the diſcovery of the truth.

"What then can even the apoſtle of truth have to tell me, of which I am not ſtill to judge? *But God himſelf hath ſpoken; liſten to the voice of revelation.* That indeed is another thing. God hath ſpoken! This is ſaying a great deal: but to whom hath he ſpoken? *He hath ſpoken*

to

to man. How comes it then that I heard nothing of it? *He hath appointed others to teach you his word.* I underſtand you: there are certain men who are to tell me what God hath ſaid. I had much rather have heard it from himſelf; this, had he ſo pleaſed, he could eaſily have done: and I ſhould then have run no riſk of deception. Will it be ſaid I am ſecured from that, by his manifeſting the miſſion of his meſſengers by miracles? Where are theſe miracles to be ſeen? are they related only in books? Pray, who wrote theſe books?—Men.—Who were witneſſes to theſe miracles? Men.—Always human teſtimony! It is always men, that tell me what other men have told them. What a number of thoſe are conſtantly between me and the Deity! We are always reduced to the neceſſity of examining, comparing, and verifying ſuch evidence. O! that God had deigned to have ſaved me all this trouble! ſhould I have ſerved him with a leſs willing heart?

"Conſider, my friend, in what a terrible diſcuſſion I am already engaged; what immenſe erudition I ſtand in need of to recur back to the earlieſt antiquity; to examine, to weigh, to confront propheſies, revelations, facts, with all the monuments of faith that have made their appearance in all the countries of the world; to aſcertain their time, place, authours, and occaſions. How great the critical ſagacity which is requiſite to enable me to diſtinguiſh between pieces that are ſuppoſititious, and thoſe which

are

are authentick; to compare objections with their replies, tranſlations with their originals; to judge of the impartiality of witneſſes, of their good ſenſe, of their capacity; to know if nothing be ſuppreſſed or added to their teſtimony, if nothing be changed, tranſpoſed, or falſified; to obviate the contradictions that remain, to judge what weight we ought to aſcribe to the ſilence of our opponents, in regard to facts alledged againſt them; to diſcover whether ſuch allegations were known to them; whether they did not diſdain them too much to make any reply; whether books were common enough for our's to reach them; or, if we were honeſt enough to let them have a free circulation among us; and to leave their ſtrongeſt objections in full force.

"Again, ſuppoſing all theſe monuments acknowledged to be inconteſtible, we muſt proceed to examine the proofs of the miſſion of their authours: it would be neceſſary for us to be perfectly acquainted with the laws of chance, and the doctrine of probabilities, to judge what prediction could not be accompliſhed without a miracle; to know the genius of the original languages, in order to diſtinguiſh what is predictive in theſe languages and what is only figurative. It would be requiſite for us to know what facts are agreeable to the eſtabliſhed order of nature, and what are not ſo; to be able to ſay how far an artful man may not faſcinate the eyes of the ſimple, and even aſtoniſh the moſt

moſt enlightened ſpectators; to know of what kind a miracle ſhould be, and the authenticity it ought to bear, not only to claim our belief, but to make it criminal to doubt it; to compare the proofs of falſe and true miracles, and diſcover the certain means of diſtinguiſhing them; and after all to tell why the Deity ſhould chooſe, in order to confirm the truth of his word, to make uſe of means which themſelves require ſo much confirmation, as if he took delight in playing upon the credulity of mankind, and had purpoſely avoided the direct means to perſuade them.

" Suppoſe that the divine Majeſty hath really condeſcended to make man the organ of promulgating its ſacred will, is it reaſonable, is it juſt to require all mankind to obey the voice of ſuch a miniſter, without his making himſelf known to be ſuch? Where is the equity or propriety in furniſhing him, for univerſal credentials, with only a few particular tokens diſplayed before a handful of obſcure perſons, and of which all the reſt of mankind know nothing but by hearſay? In every country in the world, if we ſhould believe all the prodigies to be true which the common people, and the ignorant, affirm to have ſeen, every ſect would be in the right; there would be more miraculous events than natural ones; and the greateſt miracle of all would be to find that no miracles had happened where fanaticiſm had been perſecuted. The ſupreme Being is beſt diſplayed by the

fixed and unalterable order of nature: if there ſhould happen many exceptions to ſuch general laws, I ſhould no longer know what to think; and, for my own part, I muſt confeſs I believe too much in God to believe in ſo many miracles, ſo little worthy of him.

"What if a man ſhould come and harangue us in the following manner:—'I come, ye mortals, to announce to you the will of the moſt high; acknowledge in my voice that of him who ſent me. I command the ſun to move backwards, the ſtars to change their places, the mountains to diſappear, the waves to remain fixed on high, and the earth to wear a different aſpect.' Who would not, at the ſight of ſuch miracles, immediately attribute them to the authour of nature? Nature is not obedient to impoſtors; their miracles are always performed in the highways, in the fields, or in apartments where they are diſplayed before a ſmall number of ſpectators, previouſly diſpoſed to believe every thing they ſee. Who is there will venture to determine how many eye-witneſſes are neceſſary to render a miracle worthy of credit? If the miracles, intended to prove the truth of your doctrine, ſtand themſelves in need of proof, of what uſe are they? There might as well be none performed at all.

"The moſt important examination after all, remains to be made into the truth of the doctrines delivered; for as thoſe, who ſay that God is pleaſed to work theſe miracles, pretend that

the devil ſometimes imitates them, we are not a jot nearer than before, though ſuch miracles ſhould be ever ſo well atteſted. As the magicians of Pharoah worked the ſame miracles, even in the preſence of Moſes, as he himſelf performed by the expreſs command of God, why might not they, in his abſence, from the ſame proofs, pretend to the ſame authority? Thus after proving the truth of the doctrine by the miracle, you are reduced to prove the truth of the miracle by that of the doctrine*, leſt the works

* This is expreſsly mentioned in many places in ſcripture, particularly in Deuteronomy, Chap. xiii. where it is ſaid that, if a prophet, teaching the worſhip of ſtrange Gods, confirm his diſcourſe by ſigns and wonders, and what he foretels comes really to paſs, ſo far from paying any regard to his miſſion, the people ſhould ſtone him to death. When the Pagans, therefore, put the Apoſtles to death, for preaching up to them the worſhip of a ſtrange God, proving their divine miſſion by phropheſies and miracles, I ſee not what could be objected to them, which they might not with equal juſtice have retorted upon us. Now, what is to be done in this caſe? There is but one ſtep to be taken, to recur to reaſon and leave miracles to themſelves: better indeed had it been never to have had recourſe to them, nor to have perplexed good-ſenſe with ſuch a number of ſubtle diſtinctions. What do I talk of ſubtle diſtinctions in chriſtianity! If the reare ſuch, Our Saviour was in the wrong ſurely to promiſe the Kingdom of Heaven to the weak and ſimple? How came he to begin his fine diſcourſe on the mount, with bleſſing the poor in ſpirit, if it requires ſo much ingenuity to comprehend and believe his doctrines? When you prove that I ought to ſubject my reaſon to his dictates, it is very well; but to prove that, you muſt render them intelligible to my underſtanding; you muſt adapt your arguments to the poverty of my genius, or I ſhall not acknowledge you to

works of the devil ſhould be miſtaken for thoſe of the Lord. What think you of this alternative?

" The doctrines, coming from God, ought to bear the ſacred characters of the divinity; and ſhould not only clear up thoſe confuſed ideas which unenlightened reaſon excites in the mind; but ſhould alſo furniſh us with a ſyſtem of religion and morals, agreeable to thoſe attributes by which only we form a conception of his eſſence. If then they teach us only abſurdities, if they inſpire us with ſentiments of averſion for our fellow-creatures, and fear for ourſelves; if they deſcribe the Deity as a vindictive, partial, jealous, and angry Being; as a God of war and of battles, always ready to thunder and deſtroy; always threatening ſlaughter and revenge, and even boaſting of puniſhing the innocent, my heart cannot be incited to love ſo terrible a Deity, and I ſhall take care how I give up my natural religion to embrace ſuch doctrines. Your God is not mine, I ſhould ſay to the profeſſors of ſuch a religion. A Being, who began his diſpenſations with partially, ſelecting one people, and proſcribing the reſt of mankind, is not the common father of the human race; a Being, who deſtines to eternal puniſhment the greateſt part of his creatures, is not that good and merciful God who is pointed out by my reaſon.

be the true diſciple of your Maſter, or think it is his doctrines which you would inculcate.

With regard to articles of faith, my reaſon tells me, they ſhould be clear, perſpicuous, and evident. If natural religion be inſufficient, it is owing to the obſcurity in which it neceſſarily leaves thoſe ſublime truths it profeſſes to teach: it is the buſineſs of revelation to exhibit them to the mind in a more clear and ſenſible manner; to adapt them to his underſtanding, and to enable him to conceive, in order that he may be capable of believing them. True faith is aſſured and confirmed by the underſtanding, the beſt of all religions is undoubtedly the cleareſt: that which is clouded with myſteries and contradictions, the worſhip that is to be taught me by preaching, teaches me by that very circumſtance to diſtruſt it. The God whom I adore is not a God of darkneſs; he hath not given me an underſtanding to forbid me the uſe of it. To bid me give up my reaſon is to inſult the authour of it. The miniſter of truth doth not tyranniſe over my underſtanding, he enlightens it.

" We have ſet aſide all human authority, and without it I cannot ſee how one man can convince another, by preaching to him an unreaſonable doctrine. Let us ſuppoſe two perſons engaged in a diſpute on this head, and ſee how they will expreſs themſelves in the language generally made uſe of on ſuch occaſions.

Dogmatiſt.—Your reaſon tells you that the whole is greater than a part, but I tell you, from God, that a part is greater than the whole.

Rationaliſt.—

Rationaliſt.—And who are you, that dare to tell me God contradicts himſelf? In whom ſhall I rather believe? In him who inſtructs me, by means of reaſon, in the knowledge of eternal truths, or in you who would impoſe on me, in his name, the greateſt abſurdity?

Dogmatiſt.—In me, for my inſtructions are more poſitive, and I will prove to you inconteſtibly that he hath ſent me.

Rationaliſt.—How! will you prove that God hath ſent you to depoſe againſt himſelf? What ſort of proofs can you bring to convince me, it is more certain that God ſpeaks by your mouth than by the underſtanding he hath given me?

Dogmatiſt.—The underſtanding he hath given you! Ridiculous and contemptible man! you talk as if you were the firſt infidel, who ever was miſled by an underſtanding depraved by ſin.

Rationaliſt.—Nor may you, man of God! be the firſt knave whoſe impudence hath been the only proof he could give of his divine miſſion.

Dogmatiſt.—How! can Philoſophers be thus abuſive.

Rationaliſt.—Sometimes, when Saints ſet them the example.

Dogmatiſt.—Oh! but I am authoriſed to abuſe you. I ſpeak on the part of God Almighty.

Rationaliſt.—It would not be improper, however, to produce your credentials before you aſſume your privileges.

Dogmatiſt.—My credentials are ſufficiently authenticated. Both heaven and earth are witneſſes in my favour. Attend, I pray you, to my arguments.

Rationaliſt.—Arguments! why you do not ſure pretend to any! To tell me that my reaſon is fallacious, is to refute whatever it may ſay in your favour. Whoever refuſes to abide by the dictates of reaſon, ought to be able to convince without making uſe of it. For, ſuppoſig that in the courſe of your arguments you convince me, how ſhall I know whether it be not through the fallacy of reaſon depraved by ſin, that I acquieſce in what you affirm? Beſides, what proof, what demonſtration, can you ever employ more evident than the axiom which deſtroys it? It is full as credible that a juſt ſyllogiſm ſhould be falſe, as that a part is greater than the whole.

Dogmatiſt.—What a difference! my proofs admit of no reply; they are of a ſupernatural kind.

Rationaliſt.—Supernatural! What is the meaning of that term? I do not underſtand it.

Dogmatiſt.—Contraventions of the order of nature; propheſies, miracles, and prodigies of every kind.

Rationaliſt.—Prodigies and miracles! I have never ſeen any of theſe things.

Dogmatiſt.—No matter; others have ſeen them

them for you: We can bring clouds of witneſſes—the teſtimony of whole nations.——

Rationaliſt.—The teſtimony of whole nations! Is that a proof of the ſupernatural kind?

Dogmatiſt.—No! But when it is unanimous, it is inconteſtible.

Rationaliſt.—There is nothing more inconteſtible than the dictates of reaſon, nor can the teſtimony of all mankind prove the truth of an abſurdity. Let us ſee ſome of your ſupernatural proofs then, as the atteſtation of men is not ſo.

Dogmatiſt.—Infidel wretch! It is plain the grace of God doth not ſpeak to thy underſtanding.

Rationaliſt.—Whoſe fault is that? Not mine; for, according to you, it is neceſſary to be enlightened by grace to know how to aſk for it. Begin then, and ſpeak to me in its ſtead.

Dogmatiſt.—Is not this what I am doing? But you will not hear: What do you ſay to propheſies?

Rationaliſt.—As to propheſies; I ſay, in the firſt place, I have heard as few of them as I have ſeen miracles. And in the ſecond, I ſay that no phopheſy bears any weight with me.

Dogmatiſt.—Thou diſciple of Satan! And why have propheſies no weight with you?

Rationaliſt.—Becauſe, to give them ſuch weight, requires three things; the concurrence of which is impoſſible. Theſe are, that I ſhould

in the firſt place be a witneſs to the delivery of the propheſy; next that I ſhould be witneſs alſo to the event; laſtly, that it ſhould be clearly demonſtrated to me that ſuch event could not have followed by accident: For though a propheſy were as preciſe, clear, and determinate as an axiom of geometry; yet as the perſpicuity of a prediction, made at random, does not render the accompliſhment of it impoſſible, that accompliſhment, when it happens, proves nothing in fact concerning the fore-knowledge of him who predicted it.——You ſee, therefore, to what your pretended ſupernatural proofs, your miracles, and your propheſies reduce us:—to the folly of believing them all on the credit of others, and of ſubmitting the authority of God ſpeaking to our reaſon, to that of man. If thoſe eternal truths, of which my underſtanding forms the ſtrongeſt conceptions, can poſſibly be falſe, I can have no hope of ever arriving at certitude, and ſo far from being capable of being aſſured that you ſpeak to me from God, I cannot even be aſſured of his exiſtence.—

"You ſee, my child, how many difficulties muſt be removed before our diſputants can agree; nor are theſe all. Among ſo many different religions, each of which proſcribes and excludes the other, one only muſt be true: if, indeed, there be ſuch a one among them all. Now to diſcover which this is, it is not enough to examine that one; it is neceſſary to examine them all, as we ſhould not, on any occaſion whatever, condemn without

without a hearing. It is neceſſary to compare objections with proofs, and to know what each objects to in the reſt, as well as what the others have to offer in their defenſe. The more clearly any ſentiment or opinion appears demonſtrated, the more narrowly it behoves us to enquire, what are the reaſons which prevents its opponents from ſubſcribing to it. We muſt be very ſimple indeed, to think an attention to the theologiſts of our own party ſufficient to inſtruct us in what our adverſaries have to offer. Where ſhall we find divines, of any perſuaſion, perfectly candid and honeſt? Do they not all begin to weaken the arguments of their opponents, before they proceed to refute them? Each is the oracle of his party, and makes a great figure among his own partiſans, with ſuch proofs as would expoſe him to ridicule among thoſe of a different perſuaſion. Are you deſirous of gaining information from books? What a fund of erudition will not this require! How many languages muſt you learn! How many libraries muſt you turn over! And who is to direct you in the choice of the books? There are hardly to be found in any one country the beſt books on the contrary ſide of the queſtion, and ſtill leſs is it to be expected we ſhould find books on all ſides. The writings of the adverſe and abſent party, were they found alſo, would be very eaſily refuted. The abſent are always in the wrong, and the moſt weak and inſufficient arguments laid down with a confident

aſſurance, eaſily efface the moſt ſenſible and valid, when expoſed with contempt. Add to all this, that nothing is more fallacious than books, nor exhibit leſs faithfully the ſentiments of their writers. The judgement which you formed, for inſtance, of the Roman Catholick religion, from the treatiſe of Boſſuet, was very different from that which you acquired by reſiding among us. You have ſeen that the doctrines we maintain in our controverſies with the proteſtants are not thoſe which are taught the common people, and that Boſſuet's book by no means reſembles the inſtructions delivered from the pulpit. To form a proper judgement of any religion, we are not to deduce its tenets from the books of its profeſſors; we muſt go and learn it among the people. Each ſect have their peculiar traditions, their cuſtoms, prejudices, and modes of acceptation, which conſtitute the peculiar mode of their faith; all which ſhould be taken into conſideration when we form a judgement of their religion.

"How many conſiderable nations are there, who print no books of their own, and read none of our's! How are they to judge of our opinions, or we of their's? We laugh at them, they deſpiſe us; and though our travellers have turned them into ridicule, they need only to travel among us, to ridicule us in their turn. In what country are there not to be found men of ſenſe and ſincerity, friends of truth, who require only to know, in order to embrace it? And yet every one

one imagines truth confined to his own particular ſyſtem, and thinks the religion of all other nations in the world abſurd; theſe foreign modes, therefore, cannot be in reality ſo very abſurd as they appear, or the apparent reaſonableneſs of our's is leſs real.

"We have three principal religions in Europe. One admits only of one revelation, another of two, and the third of three. Each holds the other in deteſtation, anathematiſes its profeſſors, accuſes them of ignorance, obſtinacy, and falſehood. What impartial perſon will preſume to decide between them, without having firſt examined their proofs, and heard their reaſons? That which admits only of one revelation is the moſt ancient, and ſeems the leaſt diſputable; that which admits of three is the moſt modern and ſeems to be the moſt conſiſtent; that which admits of two, and rejects the third, may poſſibly be the beſt, but it hath certainly every prepoſſeſſion againſt it; its inconſiſtency ſtares one full in the face.

"In all theſe three revelations, the ſacred books are written in languages unknown to the people who believe in them. The Jews no longer underſtand Hebrew; the Chriſtians neither Greek nor Hebrew; the Turks and Perſians underſtand no Arabick, and even the modern Arabs themſelves ſpeak not the language of Mahomet. Is not this a very ſimple manner of inſtructing mankind, by talking to them always in a language which they do not comprehend? But theſe

books, it will be ſaid, are tranſlated; a mighty pretty anſwer! Who can aſſure me they are tranſlated faithfully, or that it is even poſſible they ſhould be ſo? Who can give me a ſufficient reaſon why God, when he hath a mind to ſpeak to mankind, ſhould ſtand in need of an interpreter?

I can never conceive that what every man is indiſpenſably obliged to know can be ſhut up in theſe books; or that he who is incapacitated to underſtand them, or the perſons who explain them, will be puniſhed for involuntary ignorance. But we are always plaguing ourſelves with books. What a frenzy! Becauſe Europe is full of books, the Europeans conceive them to be indiſpenſible, without reflecting that three fourths of the world know nothing at all about them. Are not all books written by men? How greatly, therefore, muſt man have ſtood in need of them, to inſtruct him in his duty, and by what means did he come to the knowledge of ſuch duties, before books were written? Either he muſt have acquired ſuch knowledge of himſelf or it muſt have been totally diſpenſed with.

We, Roman Catholicks, make a great noiſe about the authority of the church: but what do we gain by it, if it requires as many proofs to eſtabliſh this authority as other ſects require immediately to eſtabliſh their doctrines? The church determines that the church have a right to determine. Is not this a ſpecial proof of its authority?

authority? And yet depart from this, and we enter into endleſs diſcuſſions.

" Do you know many Chriſtians, who have taken the pains to examine carefully into what the Jews have alledged againſt us? If there are a few who know ſomething of them, it is from what they have met with in the writings of Chriſtians: a very pretty manner truely of inſtructing themſelves in the arguments of their opponents! But, what can be done? If any one ſhould dare to publiſh among us ſuch books as openly eſpouſe the cauſe of Judaiſm, we ſhould puniſh the author, the editor, and the bookſeller*. This policy is very convenient, and very ſure to make us always in the right. We can refute at pleaſure thoſe who are afraid to ſpeak.

" Thoſe among us, alſo, who have an opportunity to converſe with the Jews, have but little advantage. Theſe unhappy people know they lie at our mercy; the tyranny we exerciſe over them, renders them juſtly timid and reſerved; they know how far cruelty and injuſtice are compatible with Chriſtian charity: what, therefore,

* Among a thouſand known inſtances, the following ſtands in no need of a comment. The Catholick divines of the ſixteenth century having condemned all the Jewiſh books without exception to be burnt, a learned and illuſtrious theologue, who was conſulted on that occaſion, had very nigh involved himſelf in ruin, by being ſimply of opinion that ſuch of them might be preſerved as did not relate to Chriſtianity, or treated of matters foreign to religion.

fore, can they venture to ſay to us, without running the riſk of incurring the charge of blaſphemy? Avarice inſpires us with zeal, and they are too rich not to be ever in the wrong. The moſt ſenſible and learned among them are the moſt circumſpect and reſerved. We make a convert, perhaps, of ſome wretched hireling, to calumniate his ſect; ſet a parcel of pitiful brokers diſputing, who give up the point merely to gratify us; but while we triumph over the ignorance or meanneſs of ſuch wretched opponents, the learned among them ſmile in contemptuous ſilence at our folly. But do you think that in places where they might write and ſpeak ſecurely, we ſhould have ſo much the advantage of them? Among the doctors of the Sorbonne, it is as clear as day-light, that the predictions concerning the Meſſiah relate to Jeſus Chriſt. Among the Rabbins at Amſterdam, it is juſt as evident they have no relation at all to him. I ſhall never believe that I have acquired a ſufficient acquaintance with the arguments of the Jews, till they compoſe a free and independent ſtate, and have their ſchools and univerſities, where they may talk and diſpute with freedom and impunity. Till then, we can never truely know what they have to ſay.

"At Conſtantinople, the Turks make known their reaſons, and we durſt not publiſh our's: there it is our turn to ſubmit. If the Turks require us to pay to Mahomet, in whom we do not

not believe, the ſame reſpect which we require the Jews to pay to Jeſus Chriſt, in whom they believe as little; can the Turks be in the wrong, and we in the right? On what principle of equity can we reſolve that queſtion, in our own favour?

"Two thirds of mankind are neither Jews, Mahometans, nor Chriſtians, how many millions of men, therefore, muſt there be who never heard of Moſes, of Jeſus Chriſt, or of Mahomet! Will this be denied? Will it be ſaid that our miſſionaries are diſperſed over the face of the whole earth? This, indeed, is eaſily affirmed; but are there any of them in the interior parts of Africa, where no European hath ever yet penetrated? Do they travel through the inland parts of Tartary, or follow on horſeback the wandering Hords, whom no ſtranger ever approaches, and who, ſo far from having heard of the Pope, hardly know any thing of their own Grand Lama? Do our miſſionaries traverſe the immenſe continent of America, where there are whole nations ſtill ignorant that the people of another world have ſet foot on their's? Are there any of them in Japan, from whence their ill behaviour hath baniſhed them for ever, and where the fame of their predeceſſors is tranſmitted to ſucceeding generations, as that of artful knaves, who, under cover of a religious zeal, wanted to make themſelves imperceptibly maſters of the empire? Do they penetrate into the harams of the Aſiatick princes, to preach the

the goſpel to millions of wretched ſlaves? What will become of the women, in that part of the world, for want of a miſſionary to preach the goſpel to them? Muſt every one of them go to hell for being a recluſe?

"But were it true that the goſpel is preached in every part of the earth, the difficulty is not removed. On the eve preceding the arrival of the firſt miſſionary in any country, ſome one perſon of that country expired without hearing the glad tidings. Now what muſt we do with this one perſon? Is there but a ſingle individual in the whole univerſe, to whom the goſpel of Chriſt is not made known, the objection which preſents itſelf, on account of this one perſon, is as cogent as if it included a fourth part of the human race.

"Again, ſuppoſing the miniſters of the goſpel actually preſent and preaching in thoſe diſtant nations, how can they reaſonably expect to be believed on their own word, and that their hearers will not ſcrupulouſly require a confirmation of what they teach? Might not any one of the latter very reaſonably ſay to them, 'You tell me of a God who was born and put to death near two thouſand years ago, at the other end of the world, and in I know not what obſcure town; aſſuring me that all thoſe who do not believe in this myſterious tale are damned. Theſe are things too ſtrange to be readily credited on the ſole authority of a man, who, is himſelf a perfect ſtranger. Why hath your God brought

thoſe events to paſs, of which he requires me to be inſtructed, at ſo great a diſtance? Is it a crime to be ignorant of what paſſes at the Antipodes? Is it poſſible for me to divine that there exiſted in the other hemiſphere, the people of the Jews, and the city of Jeruſalem? I might as well be required to know what happens in the moon. You are come, you ſay, to inform me; but why did you not come time enough to inform my father, or why do you damn that good old man becauſe he knew nothing of the matter? Muſt he be eternally puniſhed for your delay; he who was ſo juſt, ſo benevolent, and ſo deſirous of knowing the truth? Be honeſt, and ſuppoſe yourſelf in my place. Do you think, upon your teſtimony alone, that I can believe all theſe incredible things you tell me, or reconcile ſo much injuſtice with the character of that juſt God, whom you pretend to make known? Let me firſt, I pray you, go and ſee this diſtant country, where ſo many miracles have happened totally unknown here; let me go and be well informed why the inhabitants of that Jeruſalem preſumed to treat God like a thief or a murtherer? They did not, you will ſay, acknowledge his divinity. How then can I, who never have heard of him but from you? You add, that they were puniſhed, diſperſed, and led into captivity; not one of them ever approaching their former city. Aſſuredly they deſerved all this: but its preſent inhabitants, what ſay they of the unbelief and *Deicide* of their prede-

predeceſſors? They deny it, and acknowledge the divinity of the ſacred perſonage juſt as little as did its ancient inhabitants.

'What! in the ſame city in which your God was put to death, neither the ancient nor preſent inhabitants acknowledge his divinity! And yet you would have me believe it, who was born near two thouſand years after the fact, and two thouſand leagues diſtant from the place! Do not you ſee that, before I can give credit to this book, which you call ſacred, and of which I comprehend nothing, I ought to be informed from others, when and by whom it was written, how it hath been preſerved and tranſmitted to you, what is ſaid of it in the country, what are the reaſons of thoſe who reject it, though they know as well as you every thing of which you have informed me? You muſt perceive the neceſſity I am under, of going firſt to Europe, to Aſia, and into Paleſtine, to examine into things myſelf: and that I muſt be an ideot to liſten to you before I have done this.'

"Such a diſcourſe as this, appears to me not only very reaſonable; but I affirm that every ſenſible man ought, in ſuch circumſtances, to ſpeak in the ſame manner, and to ſend a miſſionary about his buſineſs, who ſhould be in haſte to inſtruct and baptize him, before he had ſufficiently verified the proofs of his miſſion. Now I maintain that there is no revelation againſt which the ſame objections might not be made, and that with greater force than againſt Chriſtianity.

Chriſtianity. Hence it follows, that if there be in the world but one true religion, and every man be obliged to adopt it under pain of damnation, it is neceſſary to ſpend our lives in the ſtudy of all religions, to viſit the countries where they have been eſtabliſhed, and examine and compare them with each other. No man is exempted from the principal duty of his ſpecies, and no one hath a right to confide in the judgement of another. The artiſan, who lives only by his induſtry, the huſbandman who cannot read, the timid and delicate virgin, the feeble valetudinarian, all, without exception, muſt ſtudy, meditate, diſpute, and travel the world over in ſearch of truth: there would be no longer any ſettled inhabitants in a country; the face of the earth being covered with pilgrims, going from place to place, at great trouble and expenſe, to verify, examine, and compare the ſeveral different ſyſtems and modes of worſhip to be met with in various countries. We muſt in ſuch a caſe bid adieu to arts and ſciences, to trade, and all the civil occupations of life. Every other ſtudy muſt give place to that of religion; while the man who ſhould enjoy the greateſt ſhare of health and ſtrength, and make the beſt uſe of his time and his reaſon, for the greateſt term of years allotted to human life, would, in the extreme of old age, be ſtill perplexed where to fix; and it would be a great thing after all, if he ſhould learn before

his

his death what religion he ought to have believed and practiſed during life.

" Do you endeavour to mitigate the ſeverity of this method, and place as little confidence as poſſible in the authority of men? In ſo doing you place the greateſt confidence; for if the ſon of a Chriſtian does right, in adopting, without a ſcrupulous and impartial examination, the religion of his father, how can the ſon of a Turk do wrong, in adopting in the ſame manner the religion of Mahomet? I defy all the perſecutors in the world to anſwer this queſtion in a manner ſatisfactory to any perſon of common-ſenſe. Nay, ſome of them, when hard preſſed by ſuch arguments, will ſooner admit that God is unjuſt, and viſits the ſins of the fathers on the children, than give up their cruel and perſecuting principles. Others, indeed, elude the force of theſe reaſons by civilly ſending an angel to inſtruct thoſe, who, under invincible ignorance, lived, nevertheleſs, good moral lives. A very pretty device truely that of the angel! Not contented with ſubjecting us to their machinery, they would reduce the Deity himſelf to the neceſſity of employing it.

" See, my ſon, to what abſurdities we are led by pride, and the ſpirit of perſecution, by being puffed up with our own capacity, and conceiving that we poſſeſs a greater ſhare of reaſon than the reſt of mankind. I call to witneſs that God of peace whom I adore, and whom I would make known to you, that my reſearches have

have been always ſincere; but ſeeing, that they were, and always muſt be, unſucceſsful, and that I was launched out into a boundleſs ocean of perplexity, I returned the way I came, and confined my creed within the limits of my firſt notions. I could never believe that God required me, under pain of damnation to be ſo very learned. I, therefore, ſhut up all my books. That of nature, lies open to every eye: it is from this ſublime and wonderful volume that I learn to ſerve and adore its Divine Authour. No perſon is excuſeable for neglecting to read in this book, as it is written in an univerſal language, intelligible to all mankind. Had I been born in a deſert iſland, or never ſeen a human creature beſide myſelf; had I never been informed of what had formerly happened in a certain corner of the world; I might yet have learned, by the exerciſe and cultivation of my reaſon, and by the proper uſe of thoſe faculties God hath given me, to know and to love him; I might hence have learned to love and admire his power and goodneſs, and to have diſcharged my duty here on earth. What can the knowledge of the learned teach me more?

"With regard to revelation, could I reaſon better or were I better informed, I might be made ſenſible perhaps of its truth and of its utility to thoſe who are ſo happy as to believe it: but if there are ſome proofs in its favour which I cannot invalidate, there appear alſo to me many objections againſt it, which I cannot reſolve.

ſolve. There are ſo many ſolid reaſons both for and againſt its authority, that, not knowing what to conclude, I neither admit nor reject it. I reject only the obligation of ſubmitting to it, becauſe this pretended obligation is incompatible with the juſtice of God, and that, ſo far from its removing the obſtacles to ſalvation, it raiſes thoſe which are inſurmountable by the greateſt part of mankind. Except in this article, therefore, I remain reſpectfully in doubt concerning the ſcriptures. I have not the preſumption to think myſelf infallible: more able perſons may poſſibly determine in caſes that to me appear undeterminable: I reaſon for myſelf, nor for them; I neither cenſure nor imitate them: their judgement may probably be better than mine; but am I to blame that it is not mine?

"I will confeſs to you further, that the majeſty of the ſcriptures ſtrikes me with admiration, as the purity of the goſpel hath its influence on my heart. Peruſe the works of our philoſophers with all their pomp of diction; how mean, how contemptible are they, compared with the ſcripture! Is it poſſible that a book at once ſo ſimple and ſublime ſhould be merely the work of man? Is it poſſible that the Sacred Perſonage, whoſe hiſtory it contains, ſhould be himſelf a mere man? Do we find that he aſſumed the tone of an enthuſiaſt or ambitious ſectary? What ſweetneſs, what purity in his manners! What an affecting gracefulneſs in his delivery! What ſublimity in his maxims! What profound wiſ-

dom in his diſcourſes! What preſence of mind, what ſubtilty, what truth in his replies! How great the command over his paſſions! Where is the man, where the philoſopher who could ſo live and ſo die, without weakneſs and without oſtentation? When Plato deſcribed his imaginary good man * loaded with all the ſhame of guilt, yet meriting the higheſt reward of virtue, he deſcribes exactly the character of JESUS CHRIST: the reſemblance was ſo ſtriking that all the fathers perceived it.

"What prepoſſeſſion, what blindneſs muſt it be to compare the ſon of Sophroniſcus to the ſon of Mary? What an infinite diſproportion there is between them! Socrates, dying without pain or ignominy, eaſily, ſupported his character to the laſt, and if his death, however eaſy, had not crowned his life, it might have been doubted whether Socrates, with all his wiſdom, was any thing more than a vain ſophiſt. He invented, it is ſaid, the theory of morals. Others, however, had before put them in practice; he had only to ſay what they had done, and reduce their examples to precepts. Ariſtides had been *juſt*, before Socrates defined juſtice; Leonidas gave up his life for his country before Socrates declared patriotiſm to be a duty; the Spartans were a ſober people, before Socrates recommended ſobriety: before he had even defined virtue, Greece abounded in virtuous men. But where could JESUS learn, among his compatriots, that pure and

* De Rep. dial. 1.

and ſublime morality of which he only hath given us both precept and example*. The greateſt wiſdom was made known amidſt the moſt bigotted fanataciſm, and the ſimplicity of the moſt heroick virtues did honour to the vileſt people on the earth. The death of Socrates, peaceably philoſophiſing with his friends, appears the moſt agreeable that could be wiſhed for; that of JESUS, expiring in the midſt of agonizing pains, abuſed, inſulted, curſed by a whole nation, is the moſt horrible that could be feared. Socrates, in receiving the cup of poiſon, bleſſed indeed the weeping executioner who adminiſtered it; but JESUS, in the midſt of excruciating tortures prayed for his mercileſs tormentors. Yes, if the life and death of Socrates are thoſe of a ſage, the life and death of JESUS are thoſe of a God. Shall we ſuppoſe the evangelick hiſtory a mere fiction; indeed, my friend, it bears not the marks of fiction; on the contrary the hiſtory of Socrates, which nobody preſumes to doubt, is not ſo well atteſted as that of JESUS CHRIST. Such a ſuppoſition in fact only ſhifts the difficulty without removing it: it is more inconceivable that a number of perſons ſhould agree to write ſuch a hiſtory, than that one only ſhould furniſh the ſubject of it. The Jewiſh authours were incapable of the diction, and ſtrangers to the morality contained in

* See, in his diſcourſe on the mount, the parallel he makes between the morality of Moſes and his own. Matt. v. 21. &c.

in the goſpel; the marks of whoſe truth are ſo ſtriking and inimitable, that the inventor would be a more aſtoniſhing character than the hero. And yet, with all this, the ſame goſpel abounds with incredible relations, with circumſtances repugnant to reaſon, and which it is impoſſible for a man of ſenſe either to conceive or admit. What is to be done amidſt all theſe contradictions? Be modeſt and circumſpect: regard in ſilence what cannot be either diſproved or comprehended, and humble thyſelf before the Supreme Being, who only knows the truth.

"Such is the involuntary ſcepticiſm in which I remain: this ſcepticiſm, however, is not painful to me, becauſe it extends not to any eſſential point of practice; and as my mind is firmly ſettled regarding the principles of my duty, I ſerve God in the ſincerity of my heart: in the mean time I ſeek not to know any thing more than what relates to my moral conduct; and as to thoſe dogmas, which have no influence over the behaviour, and which many perſons give themſelves ſo much trouble about, I am not at all ſollicitous concerning them. I look upon the various particular religions as ſo many ſalutary inſtitutions, preſcribing, in different countries, an uniform manner of publick worſhip; and which may all have their reſpective reaſons, peculiar to the climate, government, genius of the people adopting them, or ſome other motive which renders the one preferable to the other, according to the circumſtance of

time and place. I believe all that are convenient to be good, when God is ſerved in ſincerity of heart. This ſervice is all that is eſſential. He rejects not the homage of the ſincere, under whatſoever form they preſent it. Being called to the ſervice of the church, I comply, therefore, with a ſcrupulous exactneſs, to all the forms it preſcribes in my duty, and ſhould reproach myſelf for the leaſt wilful neglect of them. After having lain under a long prohibition, I obtained, through the intereſt of M. de Mellerade, a permiſſion to re-aſſume the functions of the prieſthood, to procure me a livelihood. I had been accuſtomed formerly to ſay maſs with all that levity and careleſneſs with which we perform the moſt ſerious and important offices after having very often repeated them. Since I entertained my new principles, however, I celebrate it with greater veneration: penetrated by reflecting on the majeſty of the Supreme Being, and the inſufficiency of the human mind that is ſo little able to form conceptions relative to its authour, I conſider that I offer up the prayers of a people under a preſcribed form of worſhip, and therefore carefully obſerve all its rites. I recite carefully; and ſtrive not to omit the leaſt word or ceremony; when I am juſt going to communicate, I recollect myſelf, in order to do it with all thoſe diſpoſitions that the church and the importance of the ſacrament require: I endeavour on this occaſion to ſilence the voice of reaſon before

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the Supreme Intelligence: I ſay to myſelf, who art thou, to preſume to ſet bounds to omnipotence? I reverently pronounce the ſacramental words, and annex to them all the faith that depends on me. Whatever be the truth with regard to that inconceivable myſtery, I am not fearful, therefore, of being charged at the day of judgement with profaning it in my heart.

"Honoured with the miniſterial office, though of the loweſt rank, I will never do, or ſay, any thing that may make me unworthy to fulfil its ſacred functions. I will always inculcate virtue, exhort my auditors to purſue it, and, as far as it is in my power, ſet them an example. It does not depend on me to make their religion amiable, nor to confine the articles of their faith to what is uſeful and neceſſary for all to believe: but God forbid that I ſhould ever preach up the cruel tenets of perſecution; that I ſhould even induce them to hate their neighbours, or to conſign over others to damnation*. Were I, indeed, in a ſuperior ſtation, this reſerve might

* The duty of adopting and reſpecting the religion of one's country does not extend to ſuch tenets as are contrary to moral virtue; ſuch as that of perſecution. It is this horrible dogma which arms mankind inhumanly againſt each other, and renders them deſtructive to the human race. The diſtinction between political and theological toleration is puerile and ridiculous, as they are inſeparable, ſo that one cannot be admitted without the other. Angels themſelves could not live in peace with men whom they regarded as enemies to GOD.

incur cenſure; but I am too inſignificant to have much to fear, and I can never fall lower than I am. But whatever may happen, I will never blaſpheme divine juſtice, nor lie againſt the Holy-Ghoſt.

"I have long been ambitious of the honour of being a paſtor; I am indeed ſtill ambitious, though I have no longer any hopes of it. There is no character in the world, my good friend, which appears to me ſo deſireable as that of a paſtor. A good paſtor is a miniſter of goodneſs, as a good magiſtrate is a miniſter of juſtice. A paſtor can have no temptation to evil; and though he may not always have it in his power to do good himſelf, he is always in his duty when ſoliciting it of others, and very often obtains it when he knows how to make himſelf truely reſpectable. O, that I enjoyed but ſome little benefice among the poor people in our mountains! how happy ſhould I then be! for I cannot but think that I ſhould make my pariſhioners happy! I ſhould never, indeed, make them rich, but I ſhould partake their poverty; I would raiſe them above meanneſs and contempt, more inſupportable than indigence itſelf. I would induce them to love concord, and to cheriſh that equality which often baniſhes poverty, and always renders it more ſupportable. When they ſhould ſee that I was no richer than themſelves and yet lived content, they would learn to conſole themſelves under their lot, and to live contented too. In the inſtructions I ſhould give them, I ſhould be leſs directed by the ſenſe of

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the church than that of the goſpel; whoſe tenets are more ſimple, and whoſe morals more ſublime; that teaches few religious forms and many deeds of charity. Before I ſhould teach them their duty, I ſhould always endeavour to practiſe it myſelf, in order to let them ſee that I really thought as I ſpoke. Had I any proteſtants in my neighbourhood, or in my pariſh, I would make no diſtinction between them and my own flock, in every thing that regarded acts of Chriſtian charity: I would endeavour to make them all equally love each other, regard each other as brothers; reſpecting all religions, and at peace enjoying their own. I conceive that, to ſollicit any one to quit the religion he is brought up in, is to ſollicit him to do wrong, and is of conſequence to do wrong one's ſelf. Let us, therefore, preſerve the publick peace, and wait the progreſs of further information: the laws in every country ſhould be reſpected; we ſhould never diſturb the eſtabliſhed worſhip, nor excite the people to diſobedience; for we know not abſolutely whether it be better for them to change their preſent opinions for others, and we know of a certainty that it is an evil to tranſgreſs the laws.

"Thus, my young friend, have I given you with my own lips, a recital of my creed, ſuch as the Supreme Being reads it in my heart. You are the firſt perſon to whom I have made this profeſſion; you are alſo the only one, perhaps, to whom I ſhall ever make it. So long

as men cheriſh any ſalutary belief at all, we ought not to diſturb the weak, nor excite the doubts of the ſimple, by difficulties which they cannot reſolve, and which diſquiet their minds, without informing their underſtandings. But when once ſcepticiſm hath taken entire poſſeſſion of the mind, we ought to ſave the trunk at the expenſe of the branches; in ſuch a ſtate the agitated and dubious conſciences of men are juſt as I have ſeen your's, almoſt extinct, and require to be awakened and confirmed: to eſtabliſh them on the baſis of eternal truths, it is neceſſary, therefore, entirely to looſen the hold they may ſtill retain of the floating ſeeds of uncertainty.

"You are now arrived at that critical term of life, in which the mind opens itſelf to conviction, in which the heart receives the form and character which it bears during life, whether good or ill. Its ſubſtance grows afterwards hard, and receives no new impreſſions. Now is the time, therefore, to impreſs on your mind the ſeal of truth. If I were more poſitive in myſelf, I ſhould have aſſumed a more deciſive and dogmatical air; but I am a man ignorant and ſubject to errour. What can I do more? I have opened to you my heart, without reſerve: what I have thought certain, I have given you as ſuch; my doubts I have declared as doubts, my opinions as opinions; and have given you my reaſons for both. It remains, now, for you to judge; you have taken time; this precaution

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is wiſe and makes me think well of you. Begin by bringing your conſcience to a ſtate deſirous of being enlightened. Be ſincere with yourſelf. Adopt thoſe of my ſentiments which you are perſuaded are true, and reject the reſt. You are not yet ſo much depraved by vice to run the riſk of making a bad choice. I ſhould propoſe to confer together ſometimes on theſe ſubjects; but as ſoon as ever we enter into diſputes we grow warm; obſtinacy and vanity interfere, and ſincerity is baniſhed. Never diſpute, therefore, with any one, for in ſo doing we neither inform ourſelves nor others. For my own part, it was not till after ſeveral years of meditation that my ſentiments became fixed; theſe, however, I ſtill retain, my conſcience is eaſy and I am content. Were I deſirous to begin a new examination into the truth of theſe ſentiments, I could not do it with a more ſincere love to truth; and my mind, at preſent leſs active, would be leſs in a ſtate to diſcover it. I purpoſe, therefore, to remain as I am, leſt my taſte for contemplation ſhould become inſenſibly an idle paſſion; leſt it ſhould make me indifferent to the diſcharge of my practical duties, and reduce me into my former ſtate of ſcepticiſm, without leaving me force enough to extricate myſelf. Above half my life is already ſpent, the remainder will not afford me time more than ſufficient to repair my errors by my virtues. If I am miſtaken, it is not wilfully. That Being, who ſearches the hearts of men, knows that I

am not fond of ignorance. But under my preſent incapacity to inſtruct myſelf better, the only method that remains for me to extricate myſelf, is a good life; and if out of ſtones God can raiſe up children to Abraham, every man may juſtly hope to be enlightened when he becomes worthy to be ſo.

" If my reflexions ſhould lead you to think as I do, if my ſentiments ſhould be the ſame as your's, and we ſhould both be of the ſame belief, I would give you the following advice—Expoſe yourſelf no more to the temptations of poverty and deſpair; lead no longer a life of ignominy, ſubſiſting, at the mercy of ſtrangers, on the bread of charity. Return to your own country, embrace again the religion of your fathers, adopt it in ſincerity of heart, and give it up no more: it is very ſimple and very pure: of all the religions in the world, I believe it is that which may boaſt the moſt refined and rational ſyſtem of morality. With regard to the expenſes of the journey, give yourſelf no trouble about that; you ſhall be amply provided. Be not abaſhed, alſo, by the falſe ſhame of a mortifying return: we may bluſh at the commitment of a fault, but ought not to bluſh at repairing it. You are as yet at an age wherein every thing is forgiven, but beyond which you cannot proceed to err with impunity. If you attend to the voice of conſcience, a thouſand vain obſtacles will be diſſipated. You will perceive that, in our preſent ſtate of uncertainty, it is an inexcuſeable

cuſeable preſumption to profeſs any other religion than that in which we were educated; and a great errour not to practice ſincerely that which we profeſs. By a different conduct, if we err, we deprive ourſelves of a powerful excuſe at the tribunal of our Sovereign Judge; for will not he rather pardon us the errours in which we were born, than thoſe of which we have ourſelves made choice?

"Preſerve your mind, my ſon, always in a ſtate to wiſh there ſhould be a God, and you will never doubt of his exiſtence. As for the reſt, whatever religion you may embrace, remember that its real duties are independent of human inſtitutions; that an upright heart is the temple of the Divinity; and that in every country, and in every ſect, to love God above all things, and thy neighbour as thyſelf, is the ſummary of the law; remember that no religion upon earth can diſpenſe with the obligations of morality, that nothing is truely eſſential but theſe, that the heart-felt adoration of the Deity is the firſt of theſe obligations, and that without faith there can be no true virtue.

"Avoid all thoſe, who, under pretence of explaining natural cauſes, plant the moſt deſtructive doctrines in the hearts of men; and whoſe apparent ſcepticiſm is an hundred times more dogmatical and affirmative than the deciſive tone of their adverſaries. Under the haughty pretext of being the only perſons who are truely enlightened, honeſt, and ſincere, they

ſubject us imperiouſly to their magiſterial deciſions, and give us, for the true principles of things, only unintelligible ſyſtems, which they have raiſed in their own imaginations. Add to this, that while they overturn, deſtroy, and trample under feet every thing that is reſpectable among mankind, they deprive the afflicted of the laſt conſolation in their miſery; take from the rich and powerful the only check to the indulgence of their paſſions; they eradicate from our hearts the remorſe of guilt and the hopes of virtue; abſurdly boaſting themſelves at the ſame time the friends and benefactors of mankind. The truth, ſay they, can never be hurtful: ſo far I am of their opinion, and this is to me a great proof that what they teach, cannot be true*. Young man, be ſincere without vanity;

* The contending parties reciprocally attack each other with ſo many ſophiſms, that it would be a raſh enterpriſe to undertake to expoſe them all. One of the moſt common on the philoſophical ſide of the queſtion is, to contraſt an imaginary people, ſuppoſed to be all good philoſophers, with another people all bad chriſtians; as if it were more eaſy to make a people true philoſophers than good chriſtians. I know not whether among individuals one be more eaſily met with than the other; but this I know, that when we ſpeak of a whole people, we muſt ſuppoſe that they would as much abuſe a philoſophy without religion as they do a religion without philoſophy; and this conſideration ſeems to me to make a great difference in the queſtion. Bayle has proved very acutely, that fanaticiſm is more pernicious than Atheiſm; and this is not to be diſputed; but he neglected to obſerve what is nevertheleſs true, that fanaticiſm, the ſanguinary

vanity; while you acquieſce in your ignorance you neither deceive yourſelf nor others. If

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and cruel, is a great and animating paſſion; that it elevates the heart of man, and makes him look down with contempt on death; that it is a prodigious ſpring of action, and requires only to be duely regulated in order to produce the moſt ſublime virtues; whereas, on the contrary, irreligon and a philoſophical ſpirit in general, attaches us to life, enervates and debaſes the ſoul, concentrating all our paſſions in ſelf-intereſt, and thus ſapping by degrees the foundations of ſociety. If atheiſm be leſs ſanguinary it is leſs out of a love to peace than from an indifference to virtue; let the world go how it will it little concerns theſe pretended ſages, provided they can loll at eaſe in their cloſets. Their principles do not excite them to ſlaughter mankind, but they prevent them from adding to their number, by corrupting the manners which tend to their increaſe; by detaching themſelves from their ſpecies, and reducing all their affections to a ſelfiſh egotiſm, as fatal to population as to virtue. The indifference of the philoſopher reſembles the tranquillity of a ſtate under a deſpotick government: it is the tranquillity of death, and more deſtructive than war itſelf. Thus fanaticiſm, though more fatal in its immediate effects than what is called the philoſophick ſpirit of the age, is much leſs ſo in its remoter conſequences.

Philoſophy, on its own principles, cannot be productive of any virtue, which does not flow from religion, and religion is productive of many virtues to which philoſophy is a ſtranger. As to practice, it is another thing, and remains to be examined. There is no man who practices in every particular the duties of his religion, when he has one; that is true; the greater part of mankind have hardly any religion at all, and practice nothing of what little they have; this alſo is very true: but after all ſome people have religion, and practice it at leaſt in part; and it is inconteſtible, that motives of

ever you cultivate your talents ſo far as to enable you to publiſh your ſentiments to the world, ſpeak

religion prevent them often from falling into vice, and excite to virtuous and commendable actions, which they had not performed but for ſuch motives. Let a Prieſt be guilty of a breach of truſt; what does this prove but that a blockhead had confided in him? If Paſchal himſelf had done it, this would have proved Paſchal a hypocrite; nothing more.—But a Prieſt!—Well, and what then? Are thoſe who make a traffick of religion the truely religious? The crimes of the clergy by no means prove that religion is uſeleſs, but that few perſons are religious.

Modern governments are undoubtedly indebted to chriſtianity for their moſt ſolid authority, and the rarity of revolutions; it has even rendered them leſs ſanguinary: this is proved by comparing them with the ancient governments. Religion better underſtood hath, by baniſhing fanaticiſm, given a greater mildneſs to chriſtian manners. This alteration is not the effect of letters, for we do not find that wherever literature hath flouriſhed, humanity hath been at all the more reſpected; the cruelty of the Athenians, of the Ægyptians, the Roman Emperours, and the Chineſe are evidence of this. On the other hand, what deeds of charity and mercy have been effected by the goſpel! how many reſtitutions, and reparations, hath not the practice of confeſſion brought about among the Catholicks? Among us, how may reconciliations are effected, how many alms are diſtributed before an approaching communion? Among the Jews, avarice let go its hold, and miſery was baniſhed from among them, on the approach of their Jubilee. Not a beggar was to be ſeen in their ſtreets, as there is not among the Turks, whoſe charitable foundations are innumerable. By the principles of their religion, they are taught to be hoſpitable even to the enemies of it. Chardin tells us that the Mahometans imagine there is a bridge, which they call *Poul-Serrho* thrown

ſpeak from the dictates of your own conſcience, without troubling yourſelf about applauſe. The abuſe of knowledge produces incredulity. The man of ſcience diſdains the ſentiments of the vulgar, and would ever be ſingular in his own. The vanity of philoſophy leads to infidelity, as a blind devotion leads to fanaticiſm. Avoid both extremes, remain ever firm in the way of truth, or in that which appears ſo to you in the ſimplicity of your heart, without ever being drawn aſide by pride or weakneſs. Be not afraid to acknowledge God among philoſophers, nor to ſtand up an advocate for humanity among perſecutors. You may perhaps be thought ſingular, but you will carry about you the innate teſtimony of a good conſcience, which will enable you to diſpenſe with the approbation of men.

over the flames of hell, which they are to paſs at the general reſurrection; and this they cannot do till they have repaired the injuries they have committed. Can I conceive that this bridge which is to repair ſo many iniquities does not actually prevent ſome? Suppoſe we were to deprive the Perſians of this idea, by perſuading them there is no ſuch thing as their *Poul-Serrho*, nor any thing like it, where the oppreſſed ſhall be revenged on their oppreſſors after death; is it not clear that the latter would be very much at their eaſe, and would be freed from the trouble of appeaſing the former? It is, therefore, falſe that this doctrine is not hurtful; and therefore it cannot be true.

Your moral precepts, my philoſopher, are very fine, but pray let me know what ſanction you have for them. Forbear a moment to wander from the point, and tell me plainly what you would ſubſtitute in the place of the *Poul-Serrho*

men. Whether they love or hate you, whether they admire or deſpiſe your writings, it is no matter. Speak what is true, do what is right; for the object of greateſt importance is to diſcharge our duty. Our private intereſt, my child, deceives us; but the hopes of the juſt cannot be deceived."

I HAVE TRANSCRIBED the foregoing tract, not as a rule we ought to follow in matters of religion; but as an example of the manner in which we ought to reaſon with our pupil, in order to prevent his wandering from the method I have endeavoured to eſtabliſh. While we place no confidence in the authority of men, nor are influenced by national prejudices, the light of reaſon can carry us no farther than to the truths of natural religion: to which alſo I confine myſelf in the education of Emilius. If it be needful for him to adopt any other, I have no right to be his director there; he ſhould in this be left to make his own choice.

We labour in concert with nature, and while ſhe is forming the phyſical man, we endeavour to form the moral one; but the degrees of our progreſs are not the ſame. The body is become robuſt and ſtrong, while the ſoul is yet languiſhing and feeble; for, in ſpite of all the efforts of human art, the temperament will always go before the underſtanding. It is to reſtrain the one and incite the other, that our endeavours have

have been hitherto directed, in order that the man ſhould be as uniform and conſiſtent as poſſible. In the developement of his conſtitution, we have diverted his growing ſenſibility, and in cultivating his reaſon have endeavoured to regulate it. The intellectual objects preſented him, have moderated the impreſſions of thoſe which were ſenſible. In recurring to the firſt principle of things, we drew him off from the influence of ſenſe; nor could any method be more ſimple than to elevate him from the ſtudy of nature to the inveſtigation of its Divine Authour.

When we arrived ſo far, we had got new hold of our pupil; we had ſecured new means of making way to his heart. He ſaw not till then his intereſt in being virtuous, in extending his views to the good of others, and, without being compelled to it by laws, in being juſt to God and himſelf; in doing his duty, even at the peril of his life, and in cheriſhing virtue, not only for the ſake of any moral order preferable to the love of himſelf, but for the ſake of the Authour of his being; a love conſiſtent with that he bears to his own perſon, and for the ſake of enjoying, at length, that laſting happineſs, which a good conſcience, and the contemplation of a Supreme Being, promiſe him in another life, after having well employed the preſent. If we throw aſide theſe conſiderations, I ſee nothing but injuſtice, hypocriſy, and falſehood among mankind; private intereſt, which in their mu-

tual intercourſe is neceſſarily uppermoſt, teaching them to hide the deformity of vice by the maſk of virtue. Let all mankind contribute to my happineſs at the expenſe of their own; let every thing be made ſubſervient to my purpoſes, let all mankind periſh, in pain and miſery, to ſpare me for a moment the uneaſineſs of deſire or hunger. Such is the language of every reaſoning infidel. Yes, I will maintain it all my life, that whoever ſaith in his heart, there is no God, and ſpeaks otherwiſe, is either a liar or a fool.

I perceive, reader, let me do what I will, that you and I ſhall never behold Emilius in the ſame light: you will always imagine him to be like other young people, giddy, petulant, flighty, running from one entertainment or amuſement to another, without ſettling to any thing. You ſmile at my making a young man, in the moſt unruly ſtate of his paſſions, a contemplative philoſopher and a ſober theologiſt: you will be apt to ſay, this viſionary is conſtantly in purſuit of chimeras; in deſcribing a pupil educated in his manner, he does not model a real, but creates an imaginary being. He deduces an example merely from his own brain, and while he conceives himſelf purſuing the track of nature, at every ſtep departs from it. On my part, again, in comparing my pupil with your's, I hardly ſee any thing in which they agree. Being educated ſo differently, it would be almoſt a miracle, if they reſembled each

each other in any circumſtance. As Emilius hath paſſed his infancy in the enjoyment of all that liberty which your pupils take in their youth, he begins in his youth to make uſe of that rule, to which they are made to ſubmit when children: this rule hence becoming their plague, they conceive a diſtaſte for it, and perceive in it only the laſting tyranny of their preceptors: they imagine themſelves ſtill in a ſtate of childhood, unleſs they are permitted to throw off all kind of reſtraint;* and when permitted to do this indemnify themſelves for the long conſtraint they have lain under, as a priſoner, whoſe irons are juſt knocked off, joyfully ſtretches and exerciſes his limbs.

Emilius, on the contrary, is ambitious of becoming a man, and ſubjecting himſelf to the yoke of his growing reaſon: his body, already formed, no longer ſtands in need of the ſame degree of action, but begins to affect reſt, while his mind, as yet but half diſplayed, makes its efforts to expand itſelf, in its turn. Thus in arriving at the age of reaſon, your pupils enter upon an age of licentiouſneſs, and mine on the age of diſcretion.

Would you know whether, in this reſpect, he or they purſue beſt the order of nature? Conſider

* No perſons regard a ſtate of infancy with ſo much contempt as thoſe who are juſt riſen out of it, as there is no country where rank is more ſcrupulouſly diſtinguiſhed than in thoſe where the inequality is not very great, and every one is conſtantly afraid of being confounded with his inferior.

ſider the difference between thoſe who are more or leſs removed from it. Obſerve the young people among the peaſants, and ſee if they are as petulant as your's in town.' "During the infancy of ſavages (ſays M. Le Beau) they are obſerved to be always active, and employed in various kinds of bodily exerciſes; but they no ſooner attain the age of youth, than they become tranquil and contemplative: applying themſelves afterwards only to ſerious diverſions or games of hazard*." Now Emilius, having been brought up in the uſe of the ſame freedom as young peaſants or ſavages, ought accordingly to take the ſame turn as they, in growing up. All the difference between them is, that inſtead of his acting only with a view to his amuſements or nouriſhment, he hath acquired, together with his labours and diverſions, the advantage of reflexion. Arrived, therefore, by ſuch means to this term, we find him properly diſpoſed for that to which I introduce him; thoſe objects of reflexion which I preſent to him, excite his curioſity; becauſe they are not only beautiful in themſelves, but alſo becauſe they are new, and at the ſame time ſuch as he is able to comprehend. On the contrary, fatigued and wearied out with your inſipid lectures, your tedious morals, and endleſs catechiſms, can it be otherwiſe expected than that your youth ſhould refuſe to give any attention to ſubjects which have been made ſo diſagreeable; to thoſe heavy documents they

* Adventures du Sieur le Beau.

they have been ſo conſtantly plagued with, and even to meditations on the Authour of their being, who hath by ſuch means been made an enemy to their pleaſures? They have conceived a diſguſt and averſion for all theſe topicks, and require ſomething new to awaken their curioſity and fix their attention; they muſt be no longer talked to about things they were told of when children. Such is the caſe with my pupil; as he becomes a man, I ſpeak to him as a man, and yet the topicks of our converſation are new: thus, for the very ſame reaſon that they are diſguſting to others, they ſhould be pleaſing to him.

In this manner you ſee the double advantage my pupil gains in point of time, by my retarding the progreſs of nature, to the improvement of his reaſon: but have I, in fact, retarded that progreſs? No, I have only hindered the imagination from accelerating it; I have only prevented by precepts of a different kind, thoſe premature inſtructions he might otherwiſe receive. When borne along by the torrent of cuſtom on one ſide, to guide him the contrary way, by a different force, is not to thruſt him out of his place, but to keep him in it.

At length nature's time arrives; it is neceſſary it ſhould. As men die, it is neceſſary that children ſhould be begotten; for the continuation of our ſpecies and the preſervation of the order of things. When by the tokens I have already deſcribed, you foreſee the critical moment nigh, give

give up for ever your former manner of converſing with him. He is ſtill indeed your ſcholar, but no longer your pupil. He is your friend; he is a man; treat him, therefore, for the future as ſuch.

What! muſt I give up my authority over him, when it is the moſt neceſſary? Muſt I abandon the adult to himſelf at the time when he is leaſt able to conduct himſelf, and is the moſt liable to be led aſtray? Muſt he be deprived of my authority over him, when he ſtands in the moſt need of it?—Your authority! Who hath told you to renounce your authority? I do not know that, till this moment, you have had any over him. Hitherto you have been able to obtain nothing of him, except by cunning or force. Authority, the law of duty, has been unknown to him. But you have now many and various means of engaging his heart—Reaſon, friendſhip, gratitude, and a thouſand other motives of affection, ſpeak to him a language he cannot miſunderſtand. Vice hath not as yet rendered him deaf to their voice. He is as yet ſuſceptible only of natural paſſions. The principal of all theſe, that of ſelf-love, attaches him to you; and he is confirmed in that attachment by habit. If a tranſient fit of paſſion detach him for a moment, his regret brings him inſtantly back again; the ſentiment which binds him to you is alone permanent; the others are tranſitory and mutually efface each other. Suffer him not to become corrupted, and he will be always docile;

docile; he begins not to be intractable till he is already ſpoiled.

I confeſs that, if you directly oppoſe his growing deſires, and fooliſhly treat the new inclinations he perceives within himſelf as criminal, you will not be long attended to; but as ſoon as you reject my method I do not pretend to anſwer for the conſequence. Remember always that you are the aſſiſtant of nature, and you will never be her enemy.

But what method you will ſay muſt be taken? There is but one alternative, either to favour his propenſities or to oppoſe them; either to be his tyrant or his pander; and both are ſo dangerous in their conſequences, that there is ſufficient reaſon to heſitate in the choice.

The firſt expedient that offers to obviate this difficulty, is to marry him as ſoon as poſſible; this is undoubtedly the moſt certain and moſt natural one. I doubt much, however, whether it be the beſt, or the moſt uſeful. I ſhall give my reaſons for this hereafter: in the mean time I agree, that young people ſhould be married as ſoon as they arrive at a marriageable age; but this term may be anticipated; we render it frequently premature, whereas we ought to defer it to years of greater maturity.

If nothing more was required than to liſten to propenſities and follow certain indications, the matter might be ſoon determined; but there are ſo many contradictions between the rights of nature and the laws of ſociety, that, in order to

reconcile them, we muſt make uſe of perpetual ſhifts and tergiverſations: a great deal of art is required to prevent ſocial man from becoming altogether artificial.

I imagine, for the reaſons before given, that by the means already preſcribed, and others of a ſimilar nature, we might extend the ignorance of the deſires and purity of the ſenſes till the age of twenty: this imagination is ſo well grounded, that in ſome nations a young man who ſhould part with his virginity before that age would be eſteemed infamous; and authours very juſtly obſerve that ſuch people are remarkable for ſtrong conſtitutions, and a numerous offſpring, owing to their continence in youth.

This term may even be ſtill prolonged, and it is not many ages ago ſince nothing was more common, even in France itſelf. Among other notorious examples was that of Montagne's father, a man not leſs upright and conſcientious than of a ſtrong and healthy conſtitution, who proteſted he was married, a true bachelor, at the age of thirty-three, after having ſerved ſeveral years in the wars in Italy; and we may ſee, in the writings of his ſon, what vigour and gaiety the father preſerved when upwards of ſixty. The contrary opinion certainly riſes more from our manners and prejudices, than from a knowledge of the ſpecies in general.

I may lay aſide, therefore, entirely the example of our young people, as they prove nothing with regard to thoſe who are educated in a different

ferent manner. The term of nature not being ſo certainly fixed on this head, as that it may not be accelerated or retarded, I conceive I may, without treſpaſſing againſt her laws, ſuppoſe Emilius to have reached this term, through my means, in his primitive innocence; and that I ſee this happy term nearly at an end. Surrounded with perils daily increaſing, do what I will, he will ſoon eſcape me. On the firſt occaſion (and this occaſion will ſoon happen) he will follow the dictates of inſtinct; and it is an hundred to one but he ruins himſelf. I have ſeen and reflected too much on men and manners, not to know the great influence of this moment over the remainder of his life. If I diſſemble and pretend to ſee nothing of this change, he will take the advantage of my weakneſs; thinking himſelf able to deceive, he will deſpiſe me; and I ſhall become an accomplice in his ruin. If I endeavour to reſtrain him, I ſhall find it too late; he will liſten to me no longer; I ſhall become diſagreeable to him, troubleſome, and inſupportable; and he will not be long before he finds means to get rid of me. I have then but one reaſonable method to take; and that is to render him accountable for his actions to himſelf; to guard him at leaſt againſt unforeſeen errours, and to expoſe to him the dangers by which he is ſurrounded. Hitherto I have reſtrained him, by means of his ignorance; at preſent I muſt make uſe of his knowledge to that end.

Theſe

Theſe new inſtructions are important; it is neceſſary, therefore, to examine things more deeply. It is now the time for me to give him up, as it were, my accounts; to ſhow him what hath been the employment both of his time and mine; to make known to him what he is and what I am, what we have each been doing, and the obligations we are under to each other. I ſhould now make known to him the ſeveral moral relations he ſtands in to the world, all the engagements he hath contracted, thoſe which have been contracted with him; the degree to which he is arrived in the progreſs of his faculties, what remains for him to make, the difficulties he will find therein, the means of ſurmounting ſuch difficulties; as well thoſe in which I may ſtill aſſiſt him, as thoſe which he muſt for the future encounter by himſelf; in ſhort, he ſhould be made fully acquainted with his critical ſituation, the dangers that ſurround him, and all thoſe ſubſtantial reaſons which ought to engage him to look carefully to himſelf before he gives himſelf up to his growing deſires.

Remember that to conduct a grown perſon requires we ſhould take contrary methods to thoſe we employed in conducting an infant. Heſitate not to inſtruct him in thoſe dangerous myſteries which you ſo long and ſo carefully kept ſecret from him. Since he muſt be acquainted with them ſome time or other, it is beſt that he ſhould not learn them of others, nor

nor diſcover them himſelf, but of you alone: ſince he will be obliged to enter hereafter into the combat, it is proper, for fear of a ſurpriſe, that he ſhould be made acquainted with his enemy.

Thoſe young people who are found intelligent in theſe matters, without our knowing how they come by their knowledge, never acquire it with impunity. Such indiſcreet inſtruction, as it could not have a virtuous object, defiles at leaſt the imagination of thoſe who receive it, and diſpoſes them to the vices of thoſe who impart it. Nor is this all; domeſticks too often inſinuate themſelves, by ſuch means, into the good-will of children, gain their confidence thereby, and repreſent their governour as a peeviſh, ill-natured tyrant; and make it the favourite topick of their private converſation to plot againſt him. When a pupil has made ſuch a kind of confidence, his tutor may withdraw; he can be no longer of any uſe.

But wherefore ſhould a child make choice of ſuch confidents, unleſs on account of the tyranny of thoſe who take care of his education? Why ſhould he hide any thing from them, if he were not reduced to it? Why ſhould he complain of them to others, if he had no ſubject of complaint? His governour is naturally his firſt confident; we ſee by the eagerneſs with which he runs to tell him his thoughts, that he imagines his very thoughts imperfect, till he has imparted them to his governour. Be aſſured

that if a child hath no reaſon to fear your checks or reprimands, he will tell you every thing, and that he is to be truſted with nothing he ought to keep ſecret from you, when we are certain he will keep nothing from you.

What makes me place the greater confidence in my method, is, that in tracing its effects as exactly as poſſible, I ſee no ſituation in the life of my pupil, that does not place him in a favourable view. In the midſt even of thoſe tranſports, into which the force of temperament may hurry him, and wherein, revolting againſt the hand that would reſtrain him, he begins to ſpurn againſt my influence; even in thoſe agitations, and fits of paſſion, I trace his primitive ſimplicity: his heart, as undepraved as his conſtitution, knows not the diſſimulation of vice; neither reproaches nor contempt have rendered him mean or cowardly; nor hath the baſeneſs of fear taught him to diſguiſe his ſentiments. He poſſeſſes all the indiſcretion of innocence, is ſincere without ſcruple, and knows not as yet the uſe of deceit. There paſſes not an emotion in his mind, which is not to be learned from his lips or his eyes; ſo that the ſentiments he entertains are not unfrequently ſooner known to me than to himſelf.

So long as he continues thus freely to open to me his mind, and to take pleaſure in diſcloſing to me his thoughts, I have nothing to fear; but if he becomes more timid and reſerved; if I perceive in his converſation, the firſt embarraſſment

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of baſhfulneſs and ſhame; inſtinct already diſplays itſelf, there is not a moment to loſe, but if I do not ſpeedily inſtruct him, he will ſoon acquire information in ſpite of me.

It is poſſible that ſome of my readers, though they ſhould adopt my ideas, will think that nothing more is meant by ſuch inſtruction, than the taking an opportunity of mentioning the ſubject in converſation, and that then the whole buſineſs is done. The human heart is not to be governed, however, in ſo eaſy a manner. What may be ſaid will ſignify nothing, unleſs a proper preparation be made for the hearing it. The ſoil muſt be plowed before it is ſown: the plants of virtue alſo are difficult to rear, their ſeeds requiring long cultivation in order to make them take root. One great reaſon why preaching is in general ſo uſeleſs, is becauſe ſermons are delivered indiſcriminately before all ſorts of people, without diſcretion or choice. How can the ſame ſermon be thought equally proper to a number of auditors of different diſpoſitions, underſtandings, humours, ages, ſexes, ranks, and opinions? There are not two perſons perhaps in the whole, to whom, what is thus indiſcriminately delivered to all, is properly adapted: add to this that our diſpoſitions and affections are ſo inconſtant, that there are not two moments in a man's whole life, in which the ſame diſcourſe would make exactly the ſame impreſſion on him. Judge then, whether at a time when the irritated paſſions impoſe on the un-

derſtanding, and tyrannize over the will, it be proper to inculcate the ſober maxims of prudence. Never go to reaſon, therefore, with young people, even when arrived at the age of reaſon, till you have firſt prepared them properly to hear it. Moſt of the leſſons which are thrown away are loſt more through the fault of the maſters than through that of their diſciples. The pedant and the preceptor teach nearly the ſame things; but the firſt teaches them at random; and the laſt only when he is ſure they will have their effect. Perſons who walk in their ſleep often tread ſecurely on the edge of a precipice, from which they would fall headlong if they were ſuddenly awaked. So hath my Emilius eſcaped many unſeen dangers, in his ſleep of ignorance; if I awaken him, however, on a ſudden, he might be totally loſt. Let us endeavour, therefore, to get him firſt away from the edge of the precipice, and then we may ſhow it more ſecurely at a diſtance.

Reading, ſolitude, and leiſure, with an effeminate and ſedentary life, ſpent among the women and young perſons, afford thoſe dangers which are moſt to be feared at his age. I would divert his attention to other ſenſible objects; and, by giving another turn to his thoughts, wean him from that which they now might have begun to take: it is by exerciſing him in ſome laborious employment that I would check the activity of his imagination. When the hands are employed

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in labour the imagination is at reſt; when the body is wearied with fatigue, the heart is not readily inflamed by the paſſions. But the readieſt and eaſieſt precaution is, to bear him off from local danger. I take him away, therefore, from town, and from objects of temptation. This, however, is not enough: in what deſert, in what ſavage aſylum will he be ſecure from thoſe dangerous images which will purſue him? It is nothing to ſeparate him from dangerous objects, unleſs I can alſo baniſh the ideas of them from his remembrance, unleſs I can hit upon the art of detaching him from them entirely, and, in a manner, alſo, from himſelf; I might otherwiſe as well leave him where he was.

Emilius has learnt a trade; this, however, is not our preſent reſource, he alſo loves and underſtands agriculture; but the employment of agriculture is not ſufficient in the preſent caſe. The occupations he is verſed in are too eaſy and familiar, ſo that by amuſing himſelf with them, he is in a manner doing nothing; he will be thinking of other things, and his head and hands never labour in concert. He muſt be engaged in ſome other occupation, that will be intereſting on account of its novelty, that will keep up his attention, and induce his application to it; an occupation he will be paſſionately fond of, and to which he will entirely devote himſelf. Now the only one that appears to me likely to be attended with all theſe circumſtances is hunting. If hunting be in any caſe an innocent amuſe-

ment, if it be at any time a proper exerciſe for men, it is in the preſent caſe that we ſhould have recourſe to it. Emilius is poſſeſſed of every qualification proper for this exerciſe; he is robuſt, agile, patient, and indefatigable. There can be no doubt that he will ſoon acquire a taſte for it; that he will purſue it with the ardour natural to his age; and forget, at leaſt for a time, thoſe dangerous propenſities which ariſe from a life of ſoftneſs and effeminacy. The chaſe hardens the heart as well as the body, and accuſtoms us to blood and cruelty. Diana is deſcribed as an enemy to love; the allegory is very juſt; the languiſhing ſentiments of that paſſion take their riſe only in ſoftneſs and repoſe; violent exerciſes ſuppreſs all tender ſentiments. The lover and the hunter are ſo differently employed amidſt woods and foreſts, that the ſame objects excite very different ideas.

The refreſhing ſhades, the ſecret bowers, and pleaſing retreats of the former, are only feeding-places, holds, and ſhelter for game, with the latter. Where the one hears nothing but the voice of the nightingale and the ſinging of birds, the other is thinking of the noiſe of the horns, and cry of the dogs: the one thinks of nothing but nymphs and dryads, the other of nothing but huntſmen, hounds, and horſes. Walk out into the fields with two ſuch different perſons, and you will preſently diſcover, by their diſcourſe, that the earth doth not preſent the ſame ſcene to

both, and that their ideas have as different a turn as their inclinations and pleaſures.

I can comprehend how thoſe different taſtes ſometimes unite, and in what manner a time is found for all things. But the paſſions of youth do not thus divide themſelves; give them but one occupation they are fond of, and every thing elſe is preſently forgotten. The variety of our deſires ariſes from that of our knowledge, and the firſt modes of pleaſure we are acquainted with are, for a long time, thoſe only which we purſue. Not that I would have the youth of Emilius ſpent entirely in the purſuit of game, nor do I take upon me to juſtify, in any caſe, that ferocious amuſement; it is ſufficient for me that it may ſerve ſo far to ſuſpend a more dangerous paſſion, as to make him calmly attend to my diſcourſe about it, and to give me time to deſcribe without exciting it.

There are ſeaſons in human life ſo intereſting as never to be forgotten. Such is to Emilius that of the inſtructions I am ſpeaking of; which ſhould influence his conduct all the reſt of his life. One of the miſtakes of the preſent age is to be too abſtracted in our reaſoning, as if men were nothing but intelligence. In neglecting the language of the ſigns which ſpeak to the imagination, we loſe the moſt emphatical of all languages. The impreſſions made by words are always ſlight, and we ſpeak to the heart much better by means of the eyes than of the ears. By endeavouring to attribute every thing to rea-

ſon, we have reduced our precepts into mere words, we have laid no ſtreſs on actions. Reaſon is not an active faculty; it may ſometimes reſtrain, but ſeldom excites, and never inſpires us to do any thing great. To be always reaſoning is the folly of little minds. Great ſouls ſpeak a different language—the language which perſuades and excites to action.

I obſerve that, in theſe modern ages, men have no other influence over each other than what ariſes from power or intereſt; whereas the ancients effected great things by the powers of perſuaſion, becauſe they did not neglect the language of the ſigns. All conventions were made with great ſolemnity, in order to render them inviolable: before the eſtabliſhment of the civil powers, the Gods were the magiſtrates of mankind; it was in their preſence that individuals made their treaties, alliances, and promiſes: the face of the earth was the book wherein they preſerved their archives: the rocks, trees, and ſtones conſecrated by theſe acts, and rendered reſpectable to uncivilized man, were the leaves of this book, ever open to the publick eye. The well dug in ratification of oaths, the oak of Mamre, the hill of the covenant; theſe were the ſimple, but auguſt monuments of the ſacred nature of contracts: no ſacrilegious hand was lifted againſt theſe monuments; and the good faith of mankind was better ſecured by the force of theſe mute witneſſes than they now are by all the vain rigour of the laws.

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In their governments, the pomp of royal power ſtruck awe into the ſubject. The external marks of dignity, the throne, the ſceptre, the purple robe, the crown, the diadem, were looked upon as things ſacred; the perſon adorned with them was held in reverence, and though without ſoldiers to enforce his commands, he had only to ſpeak, in order to be immediately obeyed. Whereas at preſent, when monarchs affect to throw off theſe marks of dignity*, what is the conſequence of it but contempt? The majeſty of kings has no influence on the minds of their people; they are obeyed only becauſe of their troops, and the regard of their ſubjects ariſes only from the fear of puniſhment. Kings no longer take the trouble to wear the diadem, nor their nobles their reſpective marks of diſtinction; but they muſt have numerous hands in readineſs to ſee their orders executed. However

* The Romiſh clergy have very judiciouſly preſerved theſe marks, and, after their example, ſome republicks; among others that of Venice. Hence the Venetian government, notwithſtanding the fall of that ſtate, is ſtill in poſſeſſion of its ancient Majeſty, and of all the affection and adoration of its people; ſo that next to the Pope adorned with his Tiara, there is not a monarch or potentate on earth ſo much reſpected as the Doge of Venice, without power or authority, but rendered reſpectable by wearing a woman's night-cap under his ducal coronet. The ceremony of the Bucentaur, ſo much ridiculed by ſuperficial witlings, would alone animate the Venetian populace to ſhed the laſt drop of their blood, in defenſe of their tyrannical government.

flattering this may ſeem, it is eaſy to ſee that in the end this change is by no means to their intereſt.

What the ancients effected by the power of eloquence is really amazing; but this eloquence did not conſiſt only in ſtudied harangues; the orator being never ſo powerfully perſuaſive, as when he ſpoke the leaſt. The moſt pathetick language is not that of words but of ſigns; it does not ſpeak of things but exhibits them. The object which we preſent to the ſight ſtrongly affects the imagination, excites the curioſity, keeps the mind in ſuſpenſe concerning what is going to be ſaid, and very often ſpeaks ſufficiently of itſelf alone. Did not Thraſibulus and Tarquin in cutting off the heads of poppies, Alexander in clapping his ſeal on the lips of his favourite, and Diogenes in walking before Zeno, ſpeak more expreſſively than if they had made each a tedious harangue? What circumlocution had been neceſſary to convey all the meaning of thoſe ſimple actions! Darius, entering Scythia with his army, received, from the King of that country, a bird, a frog, a mouſe, and five arrows. The ambaſſadour, who brought them, delivered his preſent and returned without ſpeaking. In our times ſuch a meſſenger would paſs for a fool; this terrible harangue, however, was in thoſe days well underſtood, and Darius made the beſt of his way into his own country. Had a letter or verbal meſſage been ſent inſtead of theſe emblems; the more menacing the terms

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the leſs terrible it would have appeared: it would have been looked upon as a bluſtering rhodomontade, which Darius would only have laughed at.

How attentive were the Romans to the language of ſigns! They wore garments peculiar to their different ranks and ages; they had their togæ, and diſtinguiſhing ornaments of various kinds, their roſtrums, their lictors, their faſces, their crowns, ovations, triumphs, &c. All was parade and ceremony; and all had its effect on the minds of the citizens. It was of no little conſequence to the ſtate that the people ſhould aſſemble in one certain place rather than in any other; that they ſhould be in view, or not in view, of the capitol; that they ſhould deliberate on particular days, &c. Perſons accuſed of crimes and canditates for favour wore diſtinct habits; the warriors boaſted not of their exploits, they ſhowed their wounds. Let us ſuppoſe one of our modern orators haranguing the people on the aſſaſſination of Cæſar, and endeavouring to excite them to revenge his death; he would doubtleſs expatiate on the horrour of the deed, and give a pathetick deſcription of his bleeding wounds and lifeleſs corpſe. Mark Anthony, however, though not deficient in verbal elocution, did nothing of all this: he brought and placed before them the dead body itſelf. What Rhetorick!

But this digreſſion leads me inſenſibly from my ſubject, as many others have done before,

and my ramblings are too frequent to admit them to be long. To return, therefore, to my ſubject.

Never enter into formal abſtract argumentation with youth. Inveſt reaſon with a body, if you would render it perceptible to their view. Let the language of the underſtanding be enforced by that of the heart, in order to excite their attention. Cold and unintereſting arguments, I ſay again, may determine our opinions, but they cannot determine our actions; they may induce us to believe, but not to act; we demonſtrate what ought to be thought, and not what ought to be done. If this be true, with reſpect to mankind in general, it is ſtill more ſo with regard to young people, as yet under the influence of their ſenſations, and who do not reflect ſo much as they conceive.

I ſhall take particular care, therefore, even after having made the neceſſary preparation I have been ſpeaking of, not to break abruptly into the apartment of Emilius; to hold a long diſcourſe with him on the ſubject I would inſtruct him in. I ſhall begin with him by working firſt on his imagination, fixing upon the time, place, and circumſtances the moſt favourable to the impreſſions I ſhould be deſirous to make on him; I ſhould ſummon all nature in a manner, to be witneſs to our converſation; I would even call upon the Supreme Being to confirm the truth of my diſcourſe; I would make him the judge between Emilius and me; I would mark

mark the place, the rocks, the woods, and ſurrounding hills, as monuments of the engagements between us; I would aſſume in my looks, my accent, and geſture, all that ardour and enthuſiaſm, with which I would endeavour to inſpire him. I would then ſpeak, and he would hear me; I ſhould be moved, and he would be no leſs affected. In appearing penetrated with a ſenſe of the ſacred nature of my obligations, I would render his more reſpectable; I would enforce my arguments with affecting images; I would not tire him out with diffuſe and frigid maxims, but addreſs him in the utmoſt warmth of affection: my arguments, indeed, ſhould be grave and ſententious, but my heart will be fuller than it ever was before. In ſuch a ſituation it is, that I ſhall declare to him what I have done for him: and in that ſhall make him look upon himſelf as made for me; he will ſee, in the tenderneſs of my affection, the reaſon of all my ſollicitude. What ſurpriſe! what agitation ſhall I put him in, by changing all at once my language towards him! Inſtead of contracting his mind, by ſpeaking to him always of his own intereſt, I ſhall hereafter only ſpeak to him of mine, which will affect him ſtill more. By this method I ſhall fire his young heart with all thoſe ſentiments of friendſhip, generoſity, and gratitude which I have planted therein, and which it is ſo delightful to cultivate. I will preſs him to my heart, and tenderly weeping over him, ſay—Thou art my all, my child; thou art my own work,

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and on thy happineſs mine depends; if thou ſhouldſt fruſtrate my hopes, thou wilt rob me of twenty years of my life, and wilt bring my grey hairs with ſorrow to the grave.—It is thus that young perſons may be rendered attentive, and that we deeply impreſs on their minds the remembrance of what is ſaid to them.

I have hitherto endeavoured to give examples of the manner in which a preceptor ought to convey inſtructions to his diſciple on difficult occaſions. I have ſtrove ſeveral times to do the ſame on the preſent; but, after ſeveral attempts, am obliged to renounce it; convinced that the French language is too quaint and prudiſh to ſupport, in a book, the ſimplicity of the primary inſtructions to be given on certain ſubjects.

The French tongue, it is ſaid, is the chaſteſt of all others; for my part, I think it the moſt obſcene; the chaſtity of a language appearing to me not to conſiſt in the ingenious evaſion of groſs expreſſions, but in the not having them to avoid. For to avoid them, it is requiſite we ſhould think of them; and there is no language in which it is more difficult to avoid the indecency of ambiguous expreſſions, than it is in the French. The reader, ever more ingenious in the diſcovery of obſcene meanings than the writer in avoiding ſuch expreſſions, is often ſcandalized at the moſt innocent. How can any thing paſs through unchaſte ears without contracting ſomething of their impurity? A people, modeſt in their manners, have, on the contrary, proper

proper terms for every thing; and theſe terms are always modeſt, becauſe they are always modeſtly employed. It is impoſſible to conceive a language more modeſt than that of the Bible, and that preciſely, becauſe it is the moſt ſimple. To render the ſame expreſſions immodeſt, we have only to tranſlate them into French. What I ſhould ſay on this occaſion to Emilius, would convey no unchaſte or immodeſt idea to his ears; but, that it ſhould appear equally modeſt to the reader, it is neceſſary he ſhould have a mind as chaſte as that of Emilius.

I cannot help thinking that ſome judicious reflexions, on the real purity of diſcourſe and the falſe delicacy of vice, might be uſeful in thoſe moral converſations to which this ſubject would naturally tend; for in learning the language of modeſty, we ought alſo to learn that of decorum; and it is very neceſſary that he ſhould know why theſe two languages are ſo widely different. However this be, I maintain that, inſtead of thoſe idle precepts, with which we are prematurely dunning the ears of youth, and which they only laugh at, when they would have been ſeaſonable, we ſhould wait, and prepare them, for the proper time to inculcate them; that we ſhould then diſcloſe to them the laws of nature in all their truth and ſimplicity; at the ſame time annexing to ſuch inſtruction the ſanction of thoſe laws, in the moral and phyſical evils, which the breach of them inflicts on the delinquents; that, in ſpeaking to them

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of the inconceiveable myſtery of generation, we ſhould ſpeak alſo of that charm which the Authour of nature has annexed to that act; of that exclusive attachment which renders it ſo delightful; of the obligations of fidelity; of the modeſty attending it, and enhancing every charm; that in ſpeaking to them of marriage, we ſhould not only deſcribe it as the moſt delightful of all kind of ſociety, but as the moſt inviolable and ſacred of all contracts: we ſhould on this ſubject enforce all thoſe reaſons which render this tie ſo reſpectable with all mankind, and bring a curſe and contempt on every one who violates the marriage bed. We ſhould give them a true and ſtriking deſcription of the horrours of debauchery, its ſtupid debaſement, and the inſenſible declivity by which the firſt act conducts to the ſucceeding, and at length involves every one, who treads that ſlippery path, in ruin. By demonſtrating to them, I ſay, that health, ſtrength, courage, virtue, love itſelf, and all the bleſſings of life, depend on our regard to chaſtity; I maintain that we ſhall render it amiable, and make them not leſs deſireable of learning by what means to preſerve it; for chaſtity is ever reſpected ſo long as it is preſerved, and is never deſpiſed but when it is loſt.

It is not true that vicious inclinations are invincibile, and that we are incapable of ſubduing them, while we are not habituated to their gratification. Aurelius Victor tells us, that many perſons were ſo tranſported with the love

of

of Cleopatra, that they would willingly have ſacrificed their lives for a night's enjoyment of her; nor is the truth of it impoſſible, while they were in the height of their infatuation. But let us ſuppoſe that the moſt violent of theſe men, one the leaſt capable of ſubduing his paſſions, ſaw before him the apparatus of his torture; being aſſured of periſhing thereby in a quarter of an hour; he would not only become in a moment ſuperior to the ſtrongeſt temptations; but it would coſt him very little trouble to reſiſt them: the ſhocking image which accompanied them would divert his mind from them, and permit him to recover himſelf. It is the indifference only of our will which occaſions our weakneſs; we are always ſtrong enough to perform what we ſtrongly deſire. *Valenti nihil difficile* Did we but deteſt vice as much as we love life we ſhould as eaſily abſtain from committing an agreeable crime, as from a mortal poiſon, that ſhould be known to lie concealed in delicious viands.

Whence comes it not to be eaſily ſeen, that, if the leſſons which are given to a young man on this ſubject, are of no effect? It is owing to their not being proper for his age, and that it is always neceſſary to clothe reaſon in ſuch forms as will make it intereſting. Speak to him with ſolemnity when it is neceſſary; but let every thing you have to ſay be ſo far attractive as to engage his attention. Oppoſe not his deſires with moroſeneſs; ſtifle not his imagination but

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cheriſh it, leſt it ſhould engender monſters. Speak to him freely of the pleaſures of love, and our intercourſe with women; let him find in your converſation that complacence which is flattering to his young heart; ſpare no pains to induce him to make you his confident, as by that means only you can ever be truely his maſter: when you have done this alſo, you need not be apprehenſive that he will be tired of your converſation; he will be for making you talk to him more than you will be inclined to do.

For my part, if I have taken the neceſſary precautions preſcribed by theſe maxims, and ſhould hold with Emilius ſuch diſcourſe as is proper at this juncture, I have not the leaſt doubt, that he will of himſelf attain the point to which I would conduct him; that he will be eager to place himſelf under my guardianſhip; and that with all the ardour peculiar to his years, and with a ſenſe of the dangers by which he is ſurrounded, he will thus apply to me for protection. "O, my friend, my maſter, and protector! reſume, I pray you, that authority which you are deſirous of reſigning at a time when it is moſt neceſſary for you to exert it. You have hitherto had no power over me but what took its riſe from my weakneſs; you have it now from my voluntary ſubmiſſion; which will render it but the more ſacred. O defend me from the numerous enemies by which I am encompaſſed; and particularly from thoſe deceitful ones which I carry about me; watch over your work, that I may yet

yet remain worthy of you. I will be ever obedient to your laws; or if I diſobey, it muſt be in ſpite of myſelf; preſerve me free, by protecting me from my paſſions, which would enſlave me; prevent me from being ſubjected to their tyranny, and compel me to ſuſtain the maſtery over them, by not obeying my ſenſes, but my reaſon."

When you have brought your pupil to make this conceſſion (and if you do not, it is your own fault) be careful how you take him at his firſt word; leſt, if ever your authority ſhould ſeem too harſh or ſevere, he ſhould think himſelf entitled to caſt it off, under pretence of his having been ſurpriſed into ſubmiſſion. This then is the proper time for gravity and reſerve, ſuch a behaviour will alſo impreſs him the more, as it will be the firſt time you ever aſſumed it with him.

You will do well to ſay to him—"You are very ready, young man, to enter into difficult engagements; it is proper, however, that you be made acquainted with their nature before you form them: you know not with what impetuoſity the paſſions hurry ſuch young men as you, into the abyſs of vice, under the appearance of pleaſure. You have not, I know, ſo baſe a mind as ever to break your faith with me; but how often will you not repent the having given it me! How often will you not curſe the man who loves you, when, to ſnatch you from the evils that threaten you, he will find himſelf obliged

obliged to wound you to the very heart! As when Ulyſſes, charmed by the Syrens, cried out to his conductors to looſen his bonds, ſo will you, ſeduced by the charms of pleaſure, wiſh to break thoſe ties by which you are reſtrained; you will importune me with your complaints: you will reproach me for my tyranny, even when I am the moſt tenderly concerned for your welfare; while I am ſtudying only your happineſs, I ſhall incur your hate. O, my Emilius, I ſhall never be able to ſupport the pain of being hateful to you! I ſhould even purchaſe your happineſs too dear at this price. Do not you ſee, my dear friend, that in obliging yourſelf to obey me, you oblige me to govern you, to diſregard my own happineſs by devoting myſelf to your's, to regard neither your complaints nor your diſpleaſure, and to oppoſe inceſſantly both your deſires and my own? You impoſe on me a more heavy yoke than you bear yourſelf. Before we ſubmit ourſelves to ſuch conſtraint, let us conſult our own ſtrength; let us both take time to reflect on this matter; remembering that thoſe who are the ſloweſt to promiſe, are the moſt certain to keep their word."

Remember alſo yourſelf, well-meaning preceptor! that the more difficulty you make to enter into ſuch an engagement, the more eaſy you render its execution. It is neceſſary that a young man ſhould be ſenſible that he undertakes a great taſk, and that you alſo engage in a much greater. When the time comes that he

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ſhall have ſigned the contract, if I may ſo expreſs myſelf, you may change your tone: make your government as eaſy, as you have repreſented it ſevere. You may ſay to him—"My young friend, you want experience, but I have taken care that you ſhould not want underſtanding. You are now in a capacity to judge of the motives of my conduct; to which end you need only wait till your paſſions ſubſide. Begin, however, always by your obedience, and afterwards require of me a reaſon for my commands: I ſhall be ever ready to do this, when you are in a ſituation to underſtand me; nor ſhall I ever be afraid to ſubmit any affair between us to your deciſion. You promiſe to be tractable, and I promiſe you never to make uſe of your docility, unleſs to make you the happieſt of mankind. Your ſecurity in my promiſe, is the life you have hitherto led. Find me any other perſon of your age, who hath paſſed his days ſo agreeably as you have done, and I will then venture to promiſe nothing."

After having thus eſtabliſhed my authority, my firſt care ſhould be to prevent the neceſſity of making uſe of it. I would ſpare no pains to gain ſtill further on his confidence, in order to render myſelf the friend of his heart and the arbiter of his pleaſure. So far from oppoſing the inclinations natural to his years, I would conſult them in order to become their maſter: I would enter into his views, that I might be the better able to direct his actions; nor would I be

anxious

anxious to ſecure his diſtant happineſs, at the expenſe of the preſent. It is not my deſign that he ſhould be only once happy, but that he ſhould, if poſſible, be always ſo.

It is uſual with thoſe who would ſecure youth from the ill conſequences of their paſſions, to ſet that of love in a criminal light, to repreſent it as a ſentiment not to be cheriſhed by young people; juſt as if it were a paſſion to be gratified only by the old. None of theſe deceitful leſſons, to which the heart conſtantly gives the lie, can be perſuaſive. Conducted by a more certain inſtinct, a young man ſmiles in ſecret at ſuch gloomy maxims, in which he nevertheleſs pretends to acquieſce, and only waits for an opportunity to prove them of no effect. Such a proceeding, in tutors, is directly contrary to nature. By following an oppoſite method, I ſhall arrive more certainly at the end we both aim at. I ſhall not be afraid to cheriſh that agreeable ſentiment he is ſo choice of; I ſhall deſcribe it, as it really is, to be the ſupreme happineſs of life; and in ſo doing encourage him to indulge it. In giving him to underſtand alſo what additional charms the union of hearts confers on the pleaſures of ſenſe, I ſhall raiſe in him a diſguſt of licentious pleaſures; and even, while I encourage him to be amorous, make him prudent.

How confined a capacity is that which only diſcovers in the growing deſires of a young man, an obſtacle to the prudential leſſons of reaſon!

For my part, they preſent to me the true means of rendering him docile to thoſe very leſſons. We can have no hold of the paſſions, but by means of the paſſions themſelves; it is by their own power we muſt oppoſe their tyranny, and it is always in nature herſelf, that we muſt ſeek the proper inſtruments to regulate her work.

Emilius was not made to live always alone: as a member of ſociety, he muſt diſcharge the obligations he lies under to it. Formed to live among mankind, it is requiſite he ſhould know them. Of man, in general, he is not ignorant; it remains for him, therefore, to become acquainted with individuals. He knows what is done in the world; it remains for him to know how to live in it. It is time to give him an external view of that grand machine, with the operations of whoſe ſecret ſprings he is already ſo well acquainted. He will no longer regard it with the ſtupid admiration of an ignorant novice; but with the diſcernment of a juſt and clear underſtanding. His paſſions, doubtleſs, will ſometimes miſlead him; for where is the man who is not ſometimes miſled by his paſſions? But he will not, at leaſt, be miſled by thoſe of others: if he regards them at all, it will be with the eye of a philoſopher, without being ſeduced either by example, or by prejudice.

As there is one age proper for the ſtudy of the ſciences, ſo there is another for acquiring a knowledge of the manners of the world. Whoever is brought acquainted with theſe too young, adopts

adopts them all his life, without choice or reflexion; and though not inſufficiently, yet it is always without knowing what he is about. But he who, in ſtudying manners, enters into the reaſons and motives of them, adopts them with more diſcernment, and conſequently with more grace and propriety. Give me a child of twelve years of age, perfectly ignorant of every thing, and at fifteen I will return him to you as learned as any that you may have earlier inſtructed, with this difference, that the learning of your's will lie altogether in his memory, and the knowledge of mine in his judgement. In the ſame manner, introduce a youth of twenty years of age to the world; if well conducted there, he will, in a year's time, be rendered more amiably and judiciouſly polite, than if he had been accuſtomed to publick life from his infancy: for the former being in a capacity to trace the motives for the reſpective behaviour of perſons of different ranks, ages, and ſex, will be able to reduce good manners to a ſyſtem, and extend its principles to unforeſeen caſes and circumſtances; whereas, the other, having no other rule than common practice, if he ſhould ever happen to ſtumble on any new ſituation, would be immediately embarraſſed and know not how to behave.

The young ladies in France are all educated in convents till the time of their marriage. Do we ſee that they are then obliged to take any extraordinary pains to adopt the manners, which

are, nevertheleſs, to them ſo very new? or are the Pariſian ladies to be charged with a ſtiff and embarraſſed air, or with being ignorant of the cuſtoms of the polite world, becauſe they were not introduced to it in their infancy? This is one of the prejudices of people in high life, who, knowing nothing of greater importance than this frivolous ſcience, miſtakenly imagine young perſons cannot be initiated therein too early.

It is certain, however, that they ſhould not, on the other hand, neglect ſuch accompliſhments too long. Thoſe who have ſpent their younger days altogether at a diſtance from the great world, will never ſhake off that air of embarraſſment and conſtraint, which ever attends a clowniſh behaviour; nor will they, by any future commerce with the world, be capable of diveſting themſelves of that impropriety of manners and converſation, which are only rendered the more ridiculous by our efforts to get rid of them. Every kind of inſtruction hath its proper ſeaſon to be choſen, and its peculiar inconveniences to be avoided. It is peculiarly on the preſent occaſion that care ſhould be had to both theſe circumſtances.

When, according to my method, the ſame means anſwer ſeveral ends, and I avoid one inconveniency even in the prevention of another, I conclude I am always right, and that ſuch method is a very good one. What it ſuggeſts to me at preſent I think confirmed by expe-

rience. If I were to be auſtere and contradictory with my pupil, I ſhould forfeit his confidence, and he would ſoon hide his inclinations from me. If, on the contrary, I were to be complaiſant and eaſy, or wilfully to ſhut mine eyes, of what advantage would my guardianſhip be to him? I ſhould in that caſe only give a ſanction to his licentiouſneſs and quiet his conſcience at the expenſe of my own. Were I to introduce him to the world, on the ſole plan of inſtructing him, he would ſoon acquire more knowledge, perhaps, than I ſhould chooſe. If I ſhould prevent his ever ſeeing the world, what would he have learned of me! Every thing, perhaps, except that art, which is the moſt neceſſary, as well for the man as the citizen, the art of living among his fellow-creatures. If I ſhould direct his application to objects of diſtant utility, they would not be at all engaging, as he is intereſted in nothing but the preſent moment: again, if I content myſelf with only directing his amuſements, of what ſervice am I to him? He grows enervated but acquires no information.

I ſhall, therefore, do none of theſe; having one expedient that will anſwer all occaſions. "Your heart (ſay I to him) young man, requires a companion; let us go in ſearch of one that is proper for it: we ſhall not, perhaps, eaſily find her, as true merit is rare, but let us not be impatient, or diſcouraged by diſappointments. Doubtleſs there is ſuch a perſon in the world,

and we ſhall find her in the end, or at leaſt one that nearly approaches what we ſeek." With this flattering object in view, I introduce him to the world, what need have I to ſay any thing more? Do not you ſee clearly that in this I have done every thing?

I leave you to imagine whether, in deſcribing the miſtreſs I deſign for him, I ſhall not be able to engroſs his attention; whether I ſhall not be able to render thoſe qualities he ought to admire truely amiable, and diſpoſe all his ſentiments to the propriety of what he ought to ſeek or ſhun? I muſt be the moſt incapable of all rhetoricians if I do not make him paſſionately in love, without knowing with whom. It is nothing at all to the purpoſe, that the object I deſcribe is imaginary; it is ſufficient that it ſerve to diſguſt him with thoſe which might otherwiſe actually tempt him: it is ſufficient that the compariſons he will be led to make, induce him to prefer the chimerical object to thoſe which are real: for what is true love in itſelf but chimera and illuſion? We love the image in our fancy much more than the object to which it is applied. Were we to ſee the object of our paſſion ſuch as it really is, there would be at once an end of love. The perſon frequently remains the ſame though our paſſion decays, but we no longer view it in the ſame light. The veil of deluſion falls off and love takes its flight. Now, in forming an imaginary object, I am free to make what com-

pariſons I pleaſe, and can eaſily prevent the illuſion of thoſe which are real.

I would not, however, have a young man, for this reaſon, deceived, by placing before him a model of perfection which cannot exiſt; but I ſhould make choice of ſuch defects in his miſtreſs as would be agreeable to him, and would ſerve to correct his own. Neither would I have even the impoſition paſſed on him, of telling him the object deſcribed really exiſted: but if he was delighted with the copy, he would ſoon wiſh for the original. From wiſhing any thing to be and ſuppoſing it, is an eaſy tranſition; this is the caſe with ſome artful deſcriptions, which, by means of a few ſtriking touches, give to the imaginary object a greater appearance of reality. I would go ſo far as to give his imaginary miſtreſs a name; I would ſay to him laughing, let us call your future miſtreſs Sophia: Sophia is a lucky name, and though ſhe ſhould not happen to be of that name, ſhe will at leaſt be worthy of it; we will, therefore, give her the honour of it before-hand. After having ſaid thus much, without either affirming or denying her exiſtence, if her name ſhould now and then ſeem to eſcape you by chance, his ſuſpicions on this head will be confirmed; and he will believe that you keep the perſon of his intended miſtreſs a ſecret from him, and that at a proper time he ſhall be brought acquainted with her. If once he arrive ſo far, and a proper choice is made of thoſe features it may be expedient

ent to diſplay, all the reſt is eaſy; he may be ventured into the world without danger: defend him only from his ſenſual appetite, his heart is ſecure.

But whether he realiſes the model, I have rendered ſo amiable, or not, yet if ſuch model be well executed, he will be no leſs ready to attach himſelf to whatever may reſemble it, and to avoid what is different, than if it were a real object. How efficacious muſt be this method, to preſerve his heart amidſt the dangers to which his perſon is expoſed; to reſtrain his paſſions by the force of his imagination, and to detach him above all from thoſe well-bred females, who ſet ſo great a value on their politeneſs, and teach a young man good breeding at the expenſe of his integrity! Sophia is ſo modeſt! with what an eye muſt he regard their advances? Sophia hath ſo much ſimplicity! how can he poſſibly admire their affectation? His notions of female merit are too different from what he ſees, for the latter ever to prove very dangerouſly ſeductive.

All thoſe who ſpeak of the government of children, adopt nearly the ſame maxims and prejudices, becauſe they make but imperfect obſervations, and ſtill more inconcluſive reflexions. It is neither the conſtitution nor the paſſions that are the firſt ſeducers of youth, it is opinion and manners. Nay, I could prove this to be true, even with regard to the boys who are educated in colleges, and the girls who are brought up in convents; the firſt leſſons which

both attend to, being thoſe of vice; nature doth not corrupt them, but example. But we ſhall leave theſe to their own depraved manners, which are incorrigible. I ſpeak here only of a domeſtick education. Take a young man, modeſtly educated in his father's houſe in the country, and examine him the moment he arrives at Paris: you will find in him juſt notions of moral virtue and decency, and a will as undepraved as his underſtanding. You will find that he holds vice in contempt, and conceives an averſion to debauchery. At the mention of a proſtitute, you will read in his looks the effects of innocence. I maintain it that no ſuch youth could prevail on himſelf to enter alone the miſerable habitations of thoſe abandoned wretches, even though he knew their uſe, and felt them neceſſary.

Examine the ſame young man, however, ſix months after, and you will hardly know him again. His libertine diſcourſe and licentious manners would be apt to make you miſtake him for another perſon, if the pleaſantry with which he rallies his former ſimplicity, and his bluſhes on being put in mind of it, did not evince him to be the ſame, and that he is aſhamed of it. How ſoon and ſurpriſingly is he new modelled! What can be the cauſe of ſo great and ſudden an alteration? Can it be the progreſs of temperament? Would not this have made the ſame progreſs in the houſe of his father? And yet he ſurely would not there have acquired

acquired the ſame manners or maxims! Is it owing to the firſt gratification of the paſſions? that hath a contrary effect. In the firſt indulgence of theſe, we are timid and reſtleſs, preferring ſecreſy and ſilence to noiſe and boaſting. Our firſt pleaſures are ever kept concealed; that modeſty which ſeaſons their delight hides them from the world: the firſt miſtreſs we enjoy makes us fearful and not impudent. Taken up entirely by a ſituation ſo new to him, the anxious youth enjoys it by himſelf, and is ever apprehenſive of loſing it. If he be boaſtful and loud, he is neither paſſionate nor tender; the more he avows, the leſs is his enjoyment.

A different manner of thinking only hath effected this difference of behaviour. His heart is ſtill the ſame; but his opinions are altered. His ſentiments, more ſlow to change, will, indeed, be perverted in time, and then he will be totally corrupted. He is hardly entered upon the world, before he is ſubjected to a ſecond education, directly contradictory to the firſt; by which he is taught to deſpiſe what he before eſteemed, and to eſteem what he deſpiſed: he is taught to regard the leſſons of his parents and tutor as pedantick jargon, and the duties they inculcated as a puerile morality which he ought to diſdain when he is grown up. He thinks himſelf obliged in honour to alter his conduct; he becomes licentious without deſires, and impudent through falſe modeſty. He ridicules virtue and decorum before he can take

pleaſure in vice, and piques himſelf on his debaucheries before he is actually debauched. I ſhall never forget the frank confeſſion of a young officer in the Swiſs guards, who was always greatly diſguſted with the riotous pleaſures of his comrades, and yet durſt not abſent himſelf from their parties for fear of their raillery. "I uſe myſelf to them (ſaid he) againſt my inclination, as a man learns to chew tobacco; I may thus probably acquire a taſte for them in time, one muſt not be always a child."

Thus it is leſs from ſenſuality than from vanity that we ought to guard a young man on his entrance into the world; he is more ſubſervient to the inclinations of others than to his own; ill example making more libertines than a paſſion for the ſex.

This being granted me, I may aſk if there be a young man in the world better armed againſt whatever may attack his manners, ſentiments, and principles, than mine? Is there any one more capable to withſtand the torrent? Againſt what temptation is he not in a ſtate of defenſe? If his deſires lead him to the ſex, he finds not what he ſeeks, and his heart, already engaged, is his ſecurity. If his appetites are urgent, where will he gratify them! The horrour of adultery and debauchery keep him at an equal diſtance from the married woman and common ſtrumpet: and it is always by one of theſe that youth are firſt debauched. A marriageable young girl may be a coquet; but ſhe will

will not be abandonedly impudent; ſhe will not throw herſelf into the arms of a young man, who might marry her if he thought her modeſt and prudent; beſides ſhe will always have ſomebody to keep an eye on her conduct. Emilius, on his ſide alſo, will not be entirely left to himſel; both at leaſt will be under the reſtraint of the fear and ſhame inſeparable from their firſt deſires; they will not proceed at once to the greateſt familiarities, and they will not have time to approach them by degrees without obſtacles. To be able to act otherwiſe, he muſt have taken leſſons of his comrades, and have learnt of them to laugh at reſerve, and become inſolent after their example. But what young man is leſs liable to be miſled by example than Emilius? who can be leſs liable to be perverted by raillery than he, who hath no prejudices of his own, and who regards ſo little the prepoſſeſſions of others? I have laboured twenty years to arm him againſt the force of ridicule; it will require, therefore, ſome time, at leaſt to make him the dupe of it: ridicule is with him the argument of fools, and nothing renders a man ſo inſenſible to raillery, as to be above the influence of prejudice. Inſtead of pleaſantries, they muſt attack him with reaſons; and when they come to thoſe, I am in no fear leſt any young witlings ſhould carry off my pupil; conſcience and truth are both too ſtrongly on my ſide. But, if prejudice ſhould interfere, an attachment of twenty years is ſtill

ſomething even in that light: he will never be made to believe that I have only been teizing him with futile inſtructions; and with an upright and ſuſceptible heart, the voice of a true and faithful friend is able to prevail over the clamours of twenty ſeducers. As in ſuch a caſe, nothing more would be requiſite than to ſhow they deceive him, and that in pretending to treat him as a man, they really treat him as a child, I ſhould always affect ſimplicity as well as gravity and preciſion in my arguments; in order that he might perceive it is really I, who treat him as a man. I ſhould ſay to him—"You ſee it is your intereſt as well as mine, that influences me, and that as I have no intereſt ſeparate from your's, I can have no other motive for what I adviſe: but what motive have theſe young people, in perſuading you to adopt their notions? Doubtleſs they are ſtriving to ſeduce you; they can have no regard either for your perſon or your intereſt; their only motive muſt be a ſecret malice at ſeeing you more reſpectable than themſelves; they would debaſe you to their mean ſtandard, and reproach you for being governed only, that they may have the government of you themſelves. Can you think to be a gainer by ſuch a change? Is their wiſdom ſo much ſuperior, or is their attachment of a day's ſtanding ſtronger than mine? To give any weight to their raillery, it is neceſſary that we ſhould be able to give ſome to their authority; and what experience have they to raiſe

their maxims above our's? They only imitate other licentious fools, as they would have you in turn imitate them. In caſting off the pretended prepoſſeſſions of their fathers, they only ſubject themſelves to thoſe of their comrades. I do not ſee what they get by this conduct, but I know they certainly forfeit two great advantages by it, that of paternal affection, whoſe counſels are ſo tender and ſincere; and that of experience, enabling us to judge from what we know; for fathers have been children, and children have not been fathers.

"Do you believe, however, that theſe young people are ſincere in their fooliſh maxims? No, my dear Emilius, they deceive themſelves in order to deceive you; they are not conſiſtent with their own principles. Their hearts give them conſtantly the lie, and ſometimes their lips. You ſhall hear one of them turn every thing that is modeſt and virtuous into ridicule, who would be driven to deſpair if his wife ſhould adopt the ſame licentious principles. Another will carry his libertiniſm ſo far, as to care little about the manners of the woman he is going to marry, or ſtill more infamous, thoſe of the wife he hath already married; but urge him further, ſpeak to him of his mother, and ſee if he will conſent as readily to paſs for the baſtard ſon of an adultereſs, for the uſurper of the name and eſtate of a family to which he hath no right! Who is there among them would conſent that his own daughter ſhould be diſhonoured, as he

would diſhonour the daughter of another? There is not one of them, who would not be ready to take away your life, ſhould you put in practice, upon him thoſe principles which he endeavours to inculcate. Hence you may ſee clearly their inconſiſtency, and that not one of them really believes what he ſays. Such are my reaſons, my dear Emilius; weigh their's, if they pretend to any, and compare both. Should I, after their example, make uſe of contempt and raillery, you would ſee them afford a fairer ſubject for ridicule than myſelf. But I am not afraid of ſtanding the teſt of a ſerious examination. The triumph of the jeſter is but of a ſhort duration; the truth will remain, when their abſurd laughter is ſilenced."

You cannot imagine that Emilius at twenty years of age ſhould be ſo docile as I ſuppoſe him! How different are your notions and mine! For my part I cannot conceive how he ſhould be docile when but half that age; for what influence can you then have over him? It hath coſt me fifteen years labour to eſtabliſh ſuch an influence. I did not educate him at that early period, I was then only preparing him for education. He is at preſent ſo well prepared as to have acquired docility; he can diſtinguiſh the voice of friendſhip, and knows how to be obedient to reaſon. I leave him, it is true, the appearance of independence; but he was never ſo completely ſubſervient; he is now obedient becauſe he is deſirous to be ſo. Till I could gain the

the aſcendancy over his will, I remained the maſter of his perſon, and quitted him not a moment. At preſent, I leave him ſometimes to himſelf, becauſe my influence over him is conſtant and perpetual. On quitting him, I embrace him, and ſay, with an air of confidence, "Emilius, I truſt you with my friend, I give you up to his honeſt heart, and doubt not but he will account for you."

Virtuous affections are not to be depraved in a moment, when they have received no previous alteration; nor are the principles immediately deduced from the firſt dictates of reaſon to be eradicated without time. If I obſerve that any change in either is the conſequence of my abſence, it will never be ſo long, nor will he be ſo far capable of concealing its effects from me, as that I ſhall not perceive the danger before the evil, and be in time to prevent it. As we are not totally depraved at once, ſo we learn not all at once to diſſemble: if ever any man was a bad diſſembler alſo, Emilius is ſuch; having never in his life had a ſingle occaſion to diſſemble.

By theſe and other ſimilar means, I imagine Emilius ſo well guarded from foreign objects and vulgar maxims, that I had much rather ſee him in the midſt of a circle of the worſt company in Paris, than alone in his chamber, given up to all the reſtleſſneſs and inquietude of his age. Do what we will, of all the enemies that can attack a young man, the moſt dangerous, and that alone from which we cannot ſeparate

him, is himſelf: this enemy, however, is dangerous only through our own fault; for, as I have often ſaid, it is the imagination that inflames the paſſions. Our ſenſual deſires are not, properly ſpeaking, phyſical neceſſities; nay, it is not true that they are any real neceſſities at all. If no laſcivious object had ever preſented itſelf to our ſight, if no immodeſt idea had ever entered the mind, this pretended neceſſity had, in all probability, never been felt; and we ſhould have remained chaſte without temptations, without reſiſtance and without merit. We know not what imperceptible fermentations, certain ſights and ſituations excite in the blood of youth, without their being able to account for that firſt inquietude, which does not eaſily ſubſide, nor remain long before it is again excited. For my own part, the more I reflect on this important criſis, and its attendant cauſes, the more I am perſuaded that if a man were brought up in a deſert, without books, without information, and without women, he would die immaculate though he ſhould live to the age of Methuſalem.

But we are not ſpeaking here of a ſavage of this kind. In educating a man among his equals, and for ſociety, it is impoſſible, it is even improper, to keep him always in this ſalutary ignorance; and the greateſt misfortune attending wiſdom, is to be wiſe by halves. The remembrance of objects once ſtriking, and the ideas of things already acquired, attend us in our retirement, and people our retreats with images more

ſeductive than the objects themſelves; rendering ſolitude as fatal to him, who carries with him ſuch company, as it is ſalutary to thoſe who are perfectly alone.

Watch carefully, therefore, over a young man; he will guard himſelf againſt external danger, but it is you who muſt guard him againſt himſelf. Be never abſent from him, night nor day; ſleeping conſtantly in the ſame chamber. Put no confidence in inſtinct, when you have once exceeded its bounds. Inſtinct is a ſafe guide when it proceeds alone, but becomes ſuſpicious when mixed with human prejudices and cuſtoms; it muſt not be deſtroyed, but regulated; and that, perhaps, is more difficult than to ſuppreſs it entirely. It would be extremely dangerous for it to teach your pupil the means of amuſing his paſſions, and ſupplying the opportunities of gratifying them; ſhould he once acquire the knowledge of this deſtructive ſupplement, he would be utterly undone. His body and mind would from that time become enervated, carrying to the grave the deplorable effects of a moſt pernicious habit, the moſt fatal indeed that a young man can be ſubject to. Doubtleſs it would be better for him even to —. If the impetuous deſires of a vigorous conſtitution become invincible, I ſay, my dear Emilius, I pity you; but I ſhould not heſitate a moment what to adviſe; I would not permit the intention of nature to be altogether eluded. If you muſt be under the ſubjection of a tyrant, I ſhould give the preference

ference to that from which I might be able to deliver you. Whatever happens, I ſhall be better able to ſave you from the women than from yourſelf.

Till a youth arrives at the age of twenty years his body is growing, and ſtands in need of all its ſubſtance; continence during that interval is preſcribed by nature; if he neglects her preſcriptions herein, it is at the expenſe of his conſtitution. After this term, continence becomes a moral duty; it is of uſe to teach us the command over ourſelves and our appetites; but moral duties have their modifications, their rules, and their exceptions. When human weakneſs renders an alternative inevitable, of the two evils we are to prefer the leaſt; and in every caſe it is better to commit a fault, than to contract a vicious habit.

You are to obſerve, reader, that I am not now ſpeaking of my own pupil, but your's; his paſſions, which you have ſuffered to ferment, are now become your maſters; yield, therefore, openly to their ſuperiority, without diſguiſe. If you know how to diſplay this ſubmiſſion in its full light, he will be leſs proud than aſhamed of it, and you may ſecure to yourſelf, by artful management, the right of conducting him when going aſtray, ſo far at leaſt as is neceſſary to make him avoid the moſt dangerous precipices. It is requiſite that the diſciple ſhould take no ſtep without his maſter's knowledge; and it is better that a governour ſhould approve of a fault and

and be deceived in his own judgement, than that he ſhould be deceived by his pupil, and the fault committed unknown to him. Whatever tutor conceives he ought to wink at any thing, will find himſelf very ſoon obliged to ſhut his eyes entirely; the toleration of one abuſe brings on another, and before we reach the laſt link of that chain, we ſhall have ſubverted all order, and brought every moral obligation into contempt.

Another errour in tutors which I have conſtantly oppoſed, but of which little minds will never correct themſelves, is the affectation of magiſterial dignity, and the pride of paſſing for a faultleſs character in the eyes of their pupils. This method is very wrong. It is ſtrange they do not ſee that, by thus endeavouring to eſtabliſh their authority, they deſtroy it; that in order to gain attention to what is ſaid, the ſpeaker muſt deſcend to the perſons he addreſſes, and that, in order to engage the human heart, he muſt be himſelf a man. Theſe faultleſs perſonages are neither affecting nor perſuaſive, ſo that their diſciples always object that it is eaſy for them to oppoſe thoſe paſſions they do not feel. Keep not your own foibles too much a ſecret from your pupil, if you have a mind to cure him of his. Let him obſerve in you the ſame ſtruggles he experiences in himſelf; let him learn to overcome himſelf by your example, and not have it to ſay, with other young people, "theſe old folks, vexed that they are no longer young, want

want to treat us, that are young, like themſelves; and, becauſe they have no deſires, they make a crime of our's."

Montagne ſays, he one day aſked M. de Langey, how many times he had been drunk for the King's ſervice, during his negociations in Germany? In the ſame manner, I would aſk the tutor of a young gentleman, how often he had been in a brothel, for the ſervice of his pupil? How often? No: I miſtake. If the very firſt time doth not deprive the young libertine of the deſire of ever entering ſuch a place again; if remorſe and ſhame be not the conſequence; if he doth not come and pour into your boſom a torrent of tears; give him up at once; he is no better than a monſter, or you no better than an ideot; you can never be of any ſervice to him. We ſhall paſs over theſe dangerous expedients, however, as having nothing to do with our ſyſtem of education.

What precautions you will ſay are to be taken with a young man of a good family, before he is expoſed to the corrupt manners of the age! Theſe precautions are doubtleſs laborious and troubleſome; but they are indiſpenſible: it is the neglect of them that is ſo ruinous to all our youth: it is owing to the debaucheries of their earlier years that men are ſo much degenerated, and that we ſee them what they at preſent are. Baſe and cowardly even in their vices, they betray that littleneſs of ſoul, which ariſes from the early debilitation of the body; and have hardly

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ſo much life in them as to move about. The pitiful refinement of their thoughts diſplays the ſuperficiality of their minds; they are ſtrangers to grand or noble ſentiments, and poſſeſs neither ſimplicity nor vigour. Abject in every thing, and mean as they are wicked, they have not the courage even to be great in their wickedneſs. Such are the deſpicable race of mortals that compoſe the majority of our youth; ſo that ſhould there be one among them who hath lived temperate and ſober, who hath preſerved himſelf, from the contagion of example, he will, at thirty years of age, be able to cruſh the whole tribe of inſects, and become their maſter with leſs trouble than it coſt him to remain his own. Emilius may be ſo, if he will; but he will diſdain them too much even to hold them in ſubjection.

At preſent, behold my pupil entering on the world, not with a view to diſplay his ſuperiority, but to acquire a knowledge of life, and to find out a companion worthy of him. Whatever be his rank, or to whatever ſociety he is firſt introduced, his outſet will be modeſt and ſimple: God forbid he ſhould be ſo unhappy as to diſtinguiſh himſelf at firſt above his equals: the qualifications which ſooneſt ſtrike us are not thoſe of Emilius; he neither poſſeſſes nor deſires to poſſeſs them. He has too little value for even the judgement of mankind to ſet any on their prejudices; and he is never deſirous they ſhould eſteem before they know him.

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In his behaviour he is neither baſhful nor vain, but ingenuous and ſincere; he knows no reſtraint nor diſguiſe; acting with the ſame freedom in the midſt of an aſſembly as if he were alone. But is he on this account rude, diſdainful, or inattentive to others? Quite the contrary: if in a life of ſolitude he ſhould give himſelf no concern about others, is that a reaſon he ſhould do ſo when living amongſt them? He does not, indeed, affect to prefer them to himſelf in his behaviour, becauſe he really does not ſo in his heart; but then he as little affects an indifference which is equally foreign to it: if he knows nothing of the formalities of artificial good-breeding, he hath all the natural politeneſs of humanity. He cannot bear to give any one pain; at the ſame time he will offer no one his place out of mere ceremony, though he will very readily give it up out of good-nature, if he ſees any one neglected and thinks him mortified by ſuch neglect; for it would hurt Emilius leſs to remain ſtanding, by choice, than to ſee any one elſe remain ſo on compulſion.

Although Emilius hath no eſteem for mankind in general, he doth not ſhow any contempt for them, becauſe he laments and pities them. As he cannot give them a taſte for what is really eſtimable, he leaves them to the contented enjoyment of their own opinions, leſt if he ſhould deprive them of their imaginary pleaſures, he ſhould only make them ſtill more unhappy. He is, therefore, prone neither to diſputation

nor

nor contradiction; on the other hand, alſo, he is neither complaiſant nor ceremonious; he gives his own opinion without controverting that of others; becauſe he prefers liberty to every thing, and accounts freedom one of his moſt valuable privileges.

He ſpeaks little, becauſe he does not covet the notice and attention of others; for the ſame reaſon it is, that his diſcourſe is never uſeleſs nor frivolous. Emilius knows too much to be a great talker. Much ſpeaking ariſes either from a pretenſion to wit, or from the great conſequence in which we hold mere trifles, fooliſhly believing other people think as much of them as we do. The man who knows things ſo well, as to hold them in due eſtimation, never ſpeaks too much; he judiciouſly eſtimates alſo the attention which is paid him, and the intereſt his hearers may have in his diſcourſe. Generally ſpeaking, thoſe people who know little talk much, and thoſe who know much talk little: it is natural for a blockhead to think the little he knows important, and to tell it to all the world. But the man of knowledge does not open his packet ſo readily: he hath too much to ſay, and is ſenſible that much more may be ſaid after him; he, therefore, remains ſilent.

So far from being offended at the manners of others, Emilius very readily conforms to them; not with a view to appear verſed in the cuſtoms of the world, or to give himſelf an air of politeneſs; but, on the contrary, merely to avoid rendering

dering himſelf diſtinguiſhed or particular; being never ſo much at his eaſe, as when no notice is taken of him.

At his firſt entrance in the world, he is doubtleſs an abſolute ſtranger to its cuſtoms: he is on this account, however, neither timid nor baſhful. If he doth not thruſt himſelf forward in company, it is not through the effect of embarraſſment, but becauſe, he muſt be unnoticed himſelf, if he would take notice of others: and as to what he may himſelf be thought of, he is under no concern about it, nor is he, in the leaſt afraid of being ridiculed. Being hence always tranquil and indifferent, he is never under the perplexity of a falſe modeſty. Whether he is himſelf regarded or not, he does every thing in the beſt manner he is able; and being always at liberty to obſerve the actions of others, he acquires their manners with a facility, which the ſlaves of prejudice have not to boaſt. It may be affirmed that he will ſooner learn the cuſtoms of the world, for the very reaſon that he thinks them of ſo little importance.

Be not deceived, however, by the complacence of his looks, to compare him with the civil young foplings of the age. He is reſolute, but not ſelf-ſufficient; his manners are free, but not ſupercilious; an air of inſolence belongs only to ſlaves; independence is a ſtranger to affectation: I never ſaw a man of a truely proud mind betray it in his behaviour: this affectation is peculiar to the vain and abject, who have no

other

other means of exerting authority. I remember ſomewhere to have read, that a foreigner coming one day into the dancing-ſchool of the celebrated Marcel, the latter aſked him what countryman he was. "I am an Engliſhman," replied the ſtranger. "You an Engliſhman! (returned the dancing maſter) impoſſible! Can you be a native of that iſland, whoſe natives ſhare in the publick adminiſtration, and conſtitute a part of the legiſlature? No, Sir, that downcaſt look and ſhuffling gait betray you to be the titled ſlave of ſome petty German elector."

I know not whether this concluſion diſplayed any great knowledge, in the true relation between internal character and exterior deportment. For my own part, who have not the honour to be a dancing-maſter, I ſhould have drawn a very different one. I ſhould have ſaid, "This Engliſhman is no courtier, I have never heard that courtiers have a downcaſt look and ſhuffling gait: but a man may ſeem aukward and timid in a dancing-ſchool who would appear quite the contrary in the Houſe of Commons." Marcel muſt ſurely have taken all his own countrymen for ſo many ancient Romans!

When we love others we are deſirous of being reſpected by them: Emilius reſpects his fellow-creatures, and, therefore, is deſirous of pleaſing them. The like reaſon prevails ſtill in a greater degree in regard to the fair ſex. His age, his morals, his deſign, all concur to increaſe that

that deſire in reſpect to them. I ſay, his morals; for theſe contribute not a little; men of good morals are the true admirers of the women. They may not have the ſame jargon of gallantry, but their aſſiduities are more ſincere and tender. I ſhould know a man of good morals, in the company of a young woman, from an hundred thouſand debauchees in the ſame ſituation. Judge then what Emilius ought to be, with a conſtitution unblemiſhed, and ſo many motives to reſtrain it. He will, no doubt, be often timid and embarraſſed in the company of the ladies: this embarraſſment, however, will not diſpleaſe them, as the leaſt coquettiſh among them too often take a pleaſure in obſerving and increaſing it. Again, his ſollicitude will take a different form according to the age and circumſtance of the parties: thus he will be more modeſt and reſpectful in the company of married women, and more lively and tender in that of the young and unmarried. He never loſes ſight of the object of his reſearches, and beſtows accordingly the greateſt attention on ſuch things as call it to mind.

Nobody can be more exact in the obſervance of every thing that is dictated by nature, or even of every thing relative to the good order of ſociety; but he will prefer the firſt always to the laſt, and will ſhow a greater reſpect to a private perſon, if older than himſelf, than he would even to a magiſtrate of his own age. As he is at preſent, therefore, moſt commonly the youngeſt perſon

perſon in the company, he is conſtantly one of the moſt modeſt; and that not from the vanity of appearing humble, but from a natural ſentiment, ſupported by reaſon. He will have none of thoſe impertinent pretenſions to the knowledge of the world, which excite young coxcombs, by way of amuſing the company, to interrupt, and talk louder than perſons much older and wiſer than themſelves. He will not, on his part, authoriſe the anſwer that was given by an old gentleman to Louis XV. who aſked him which he preferred, the laſt age or the preſent? "Sire, I ſpent my youth, in paying a reſpect to old men; and I am obliged to paſs my age, in paying a reſpect to children."

Having a ſoul ſuſceptible and tender, but eſtimating nothing by the ſtandard of common opinion, although he loves to give pleaſure to others, he gives himſelf no concern to be held in conſideration by them. Hence it follows, that, being more affectionate than polite, he will never give himſelf the airs of pride or affectation, and that he will be more touched by one cordial embrace, than by a thouſand encomiums. For the ſame reaſons, he will not be negligent of his carriage or behaviour; nay, he may even take ſome pains in dreſs; not with a view, however, to be thought a man of taſte, but to render his perſon the more agreeable; he will never have recourſe to the gilt frame, nor will any mark of wealth ever defile his garment.

It is eaſy to be ſeen that nothing of all this requires me to diſplay a parade of precepts; it being only an effect of his former education. A great myſtery is made of the cuſtoms of the world, as if we ſhould not naturally fall into thoſe cuſtoms at a proper age; or as if the firſt rules of good-breeding were not deduced from ſincerity and good-nature. True politeneſs conſiſts in teſtifying our benevolence for mankind; it diſplays itſelf of its own accord where it exiſts: it is for thoſe only, who have it not, to learn the art of counterfeiting its appearances.

"The moſt unhappy effect of faſhionable politeneſs, is that it teaches us the art of diſpenſing with the virtues it imitates. Let us be educated to cheriſh the principles of benevolence and humanity, and we ſhall have politeneſs enough, or ſhall ſtand in no need of it.

"If we ſhould not have that which is accompanied by the Graces, we ſhould have that which beſpeaks the honeſt man and the good citizen; we ſhould ſtand in no need of having recourſe to the falſehood of appearances.

"Inſtead of being artificially complaiſant in order to pleaſe, it will be ſufficient to be good; inſtead of being falſe, and flattering the foibles of others, it will be enough to be indulgent to them.

"Thoſe with whom we proceed, alſo, in this manner, will be neither vain nor depraved by

by it: they will become only grateful and corrected."

It ſeems to me, that if any method of education can be productive of the politeneſs here required by M. Duclos, it is that which I have here been tracing.

I own, nevertheleſs, that, from being taught maxims ſo very different to thoſe which generally prevail, Emilius will never behave altogether like the reſt of the world; and, indeed, God forbid he ever ſhould; but in whatever he differs from others, he will be neither diſagreeable nor ridiculous; his ſingularity will be apparent, but never troubleſome. Emilius will be, if you will have him ſo, an agreeable ſtranger. His ſingularities will be, at firſt, overlooked, on the ſuppoſition of his *improving himſelf*; and when you are afterwards accuſtomed to his behaviour, and ſee it is not changed, you will overlook it alſo, with obſerving, that *it is his way*.

He will not be courted and entertained as an agreeable man, but he will be loved and reſpected without your knowing why. Nobody will compliment his wit, but every one will be ready to make him the umpire between thoſe who are allowed to have the moſt. As he is not perpetually hunting after new ideas, he does not pique himſelf upon his genius. I have made him ſenſible that all the ideas which are ſalutary, and truely uſeful to mankind, are the moſt obvious; that theſe, at all times, form the real

bonds of ſociety, and that it belongs to ſuperiour geniuſes to diſtinguiſh themſelves only by notions pernicious to themſelves, and fatal to mankind. Such a manner of diſtinguiſhing himſelf, therefore, doth not excite his emulation. He knows where he ought to look for his own happineſs, and in what he may contribute to the happineſs of others. The ſphere of his knowledge extends no farther than to what is profitable. His path is ſtrait and well-bounded; being under no temptation alſo to leave it, he remains unobſerved in the number of thoſe who purſue the ſame tract. Emilius is a man of common-ſenſe, and deſires to be nothing more; you may think to depreciate him by ſuch an appellation; he will always think himſelf honoured by having it beſtowed on him.

Although the deſire of pleaſing doth not henceforward permit him to be abſolutely indifferent about the opinion of others, he lays no other ſtreſs on ſuch opinion than as it relates immediately to himſelf, without taking any notice of thoſe arbitrary eſtimations, which have no other foundation than faſhion or prejudice. He will be ambitious to acquit himſelf well of every thing he attempts; and even to acquit himſelf better than any one elſe. At running he will be more ſwift, at wreſtling more active and ſtrong, at work more dexterous, and at games of ſkill more artful; but he ſtudies little thoſe advantages which are very obvious in themſelves, or require confirmation from the judgemen

judgement of others, ſuch are thoſe of having more wit than another, of being more eloquent, more learned, and the like; and ſtill leſs is he covetous of thoſe which are not immediately attached to his perſon, as the advantage of a more illuſtrious birth, of being thought more wealthy, of appearing more important, or impoſing on the world by ſplendour and magnificence.

As he loves mankind, becauſe they are his fellow-creatures, he will have the greateſt eſteem for thoſe who moſt reſemble himſelf; and judging of that reſemblance from a conformity of taſte in reſpect to moral objects, he will be very glad alſo to be approved by them, in every thing regarding his moral character. He will not ſay, indeed, I rejoice that I am approved by them, but I rejoice that what I have done well meets with their approbation: I am glad that thoſe who honour me, do themſelves honour in ſo doing; while they continue to judge ſo ſenſibly, it is a deſireable thing to obtain their eſteem.

In ſtudying mankind from their manners in the world, in the ſame manner as he did heretofore from their paſſions in hiſtory, he will meet with frequent opportunities of reflecting on thoſe things which flatter or diſguſt the human heart. Hence he will begin to philoſophiſe on the principles of taſte, a ſtudy properly adapted to this æra of his life.

The more refined and abſtracted, the more falſe are our definitions of taſte. Taſte is nothing more than the faculty of judging what is pleaſing or diſpleaſing to the majority. Depart from this definition, and we no longer know what taſte is. It does not hence follow that the majority are perſons of taſte; for notwithſtanding the majority judge ſenſibly of every object, there are few perſons who judge in the ſame manner on all; and although the concurrence of the more general modes of taſte conſtitutes a good one, there are but few perſons of taſte; as there are but few beautiful perſons, notwithſtanding the aſſemblage of the moſt common features conſtitutes beauty.

It muſt be obſerved, that we are not here ſpeaking of what we love becauſe it is uſeful to us, or hate becauſe it is hurtful. Taſte is exerciſed only on matters indifferent, or at moſt barely amuſing; and not on thoſe which depend on our neceſſities: taſte is not required to judge of the latter; appetite and inclination are ſufficient. This it is that renders the deciſions of pure taſte ſo difficult, and as they ſeem to me ſo arbitrary; for ſetting aſide inſtinct, which determines it, I can ſee no motive for its deciſions. We ought further to diſtinguiſh between the rules of taſte in morals, and in phyſicks. Thoſe of the latter appear to be abſolutely inexplicable; but it is proper to obſerve that moral conſiderations enter into every thing that depends on imitation

imitation*: thus we ſometimes account for beauties which appears to be phyſical, and really are not ſo. I may add, that taſte has its local regulations which makes it dependent, in a thouſand inſtances, on climate, manners, and government; that it has others which depend on age, ſex, and character; and that it is in theſe matters that there is no diſputing about taſte.

Taſte is natural to all mankind; but they have it not univerſally in the ſame proportion; it does not diſplay itſelf equally in individuals, and it is in all ſubject to alteration from various cauſes. The proportion of our taſte depends on that of our natural ſenſibility; its form and cultivation depend on the ſocieties we have lived in, or company we have kept. In the firſt place, it is neceſſary to live in a very numerous ſociety, in order to make many compariſons—Secondly, it is requiſite they ſhould be ſocieties of diſſipation and amuſement; for in thoſe of buſineſs, men are governed not by pleaſure but profit—In the third place, there either ſhould not be too great an equality of condition in ſuch ſocieties, or the influence of cuſtom ſhould be moderate, or pleaſure ſhould be more prevalent than vanity: for otherwiſe the mode ſuppreſſes taſte, and the object of reſearch is not that of pleaſure but of diſtinction.

In the latter caſe it is no longer true that a good taſte is that of the majority. And why ſo?

* This is proved in an Eſſay on the Principles of Harmony, inſerted in the collection of my writings.

Becauſe its object is changed. The multitude have no longer a judgement of their own; they judge only after others whom they think more enlightened than themſelves; they approve, not what is deſerving, but what is already approved. In all times and places, let every man judge for himſelf; and what appears to him moſt agreeable will have the plurality of ſuffrages.

No artiſt can execute any thing beautiful but by imitation. All the models of true taſte are to be found in nature. The farther we depart from this maſter the more prepoſterous are our deſigns; as, in that caſe, we deduce our models from ſuch objects as happen to delight us; and the beauty of imagination, ſubject to prejudice and caprice, is nothing more than that which pleaſes thoſe who direct us.

The directors of our taſte are the connoiſſeurs, the great and the wealthy; and theſe are directed by their intereſt or their vanity; the latter to make a diſplay of their riches, and the former to make a profit, by inducing us to new modes of expenſe. By this means luxury eſtabliſhes its influence, and makes us admire whatever is difficult or coſtly; the pretended beautiful, ſo far from imitating nature, being eſteemed ſuch only becauſe it is unnatural. Thus luxury and bad taſte are inſeparable: for wherever the taſte be coſtly it is falſe.

It is particularly in the connection between the ſexes that our taſte, whether good or bad, is formed; its cultivation being the neceſſary effect

of

of the object of that connexion. But the facility of enjoyment leſſens the deſire of pleaſing: the taſte of courſe degenerates; and this appears to me another very plain reaſon why good taſte depends ſo much on good morals.

Conſult the taſte of the women in matters merely phyſical, or thoſe which depend on the judgement of the ſenſes: conſult that of the men in morals, or thoſe matters which depend more on the underſtanding. Were the women ſuch as they ought to be, they would confine themſelves to things of which they were competent judges, and their judgement would be always right; but ſince they have ſet themſelves up for criticks and arbiters in literature, they no longer know any thing. The authours who conſult our learned ladies in the compoſition of their works, are ſure to be ill-adviſed, as the beaus who conſult them about their clothes, are as ſure to be ridiculouſly dreſſed. I ſhall have occaſion, by and by, to ſpeak of the real talents of the ſex, of the manner of cultivating them, and of thoſe things on which their deciſions ought then to be attended to.

Such are the elementary conſiderations, which I lay down as principles, in reaſoning with my Emilius, on a ſubject that is far from being indifferent to him in his preſent circumſtances, and to the reſearch he is now employed in: and, indeed, to whom ſhould ſuch a ſubject be indifferent? The knowledge of what is agreeable or diſagreeable to mankind is not only neceſſary to

him who ſtands in need of them, but alſo to him who is deſirous of being uſeful to them: it is neceſſary to know how to pleaſe, in order to be uſeful to mankind; and the art of writing agreeably is far from being an uſeleſs ſtudy, when it is employed in recommending the voice, of truth.

If, in order to cultivate the taſte of my pupil, I had it in my power to make choice of a country where the cultivation of taſte was juſt commenced, or of another where it was already degenerated, I would follow the contrary order, beginning with the laſt and ending with the firſt. My reaſon for this conduct is, that taſte degenerates through an exceſſive delicacy, which renders us ſenſible of many things, of which the generality of mankind are not ſuſceptible: this delicacy leads to the ſpirit of diſcuſſion; the more we refine upon objects the more they multiply; this refinement rendering the ſenſe more delicate and leſs uniform.

In this caſe there ariſe as many different taſtes as perſons; while in our diſputes about the preference of them, learning and philoſphy diſplay themſelves; and thus it is we are taught to think. Refined obſervations can never be made but by perſons of extenſive knowledge, in as much as they ſucceed to all others; and the attention of thoſe people who are but little accuſtomed to numerous ſocieties is taken up by the more obvious and ſtriking. There is not at preſent a civiliſed place in the world, perhaps, where

where ſo bad a taſte prevails in general as at Paris. It is in this capital, nevertheleſs, that good taſte is cultivated; there appearing few books held in any eſtimation in Europe, whoſe authours have not formed their taſte at Paris. Thoſe who imagine it ſufficient to read the books which are written there, are miſtaken; there is much more to be learned from the converſation of authours than from their books; and even authours themſelves are not thoſe perſons of whom the moſt is to be learned. It is the ſpirit of ſociety which ſets thinking minds at work, and extends their views as far as they can go. If you have the leaſt ſpark of genius, go and ſpend a year at Paris; you will ſoon arrive at all you are capable of being, or you will never come to any thing.

We may learn to think juſtly in places where a bad taſte prevails; but we muſt not think in the ſame manner as thoſe who have ſuch a bad taſte; and it is very difficult to abſtain from this, when we reſide long among them. We ought to improve by their means the faculties of thinking, without employing thoſe faculties in the ſame manner. I ſhall be cautious, therefore, not to poliſh the taſte of Emilius till it alter its form: but, when once he has acquired a ſenſibility refined enough to perceive and compare the different taſtes of others, I ſhall bring him back to the moſt ſimple object, in order to confirm his own.

I ſhall go farther ſtill, in order to preſerve his taſte from being depraved by example; holding with him, even amidſt the tumult of diſſipation, ſuch uſeful converſation, and directing it to ſuch pleaſing objects, that it cannot fail of being rendered both amuſing and inſtructive. This is the time for reading, and making choice of entertaining books. This is the time to teach him how to analyſe a fine diſcourſe, and make him ſenſible of the beauties of eloquence and diction. To acquire the languages merely for their own ſake is a trifle; their uſe is not ſo important as is generally imagined, the ſtudy of them, however, leads to a knowledge of grammar in general. To underſtand the French perfectly we ought to learn Latin; we ought to ſtudy and compare the one with the other, to comprehend the rules of the art of ſpeaking.

We may add to this, that there is a certain ſimplicity of taſte, which affects the heart, and is to be found only in the writings of the ancients. We find them replete with knowledge, and ſound in judgement, as well in treating of rhetorick, poetry, and all kinds literature, as they are in hiſtory itſelf. Our modern authours, on the contrary, make uſe of many words and ſay but little. To make their judgement perpetually a law for us, is not the way to form our's. The difference between the ancient and modern taſte is evident in all publick monuments and even on the tombs. Our's are covered with

eulogiums

eulogiums, on their's we read nothing but facts:

Sta, viator, Heroem calcas.

Had I even found this epitaph on an ancient monument, I ſhould immediately have gueſſed it to have been modern; for nothing is ſo common as heroes among us, and nothing was ſo rare among the ancients. Inſtead of telling us the man was a hero, they would have ſimply related his actions. Compare the epitaph of an hero with that of even the effeminate Sardanapalus:

I built TARSUS *and* ANCHIALE *in a day, and now I am dead.*

Which of theſe two epitaphs, in your opinion, is the moſt expreſſive? The inflated ſtyle of our ſtatuaries is good for nothing but to puff up pigmies. The ancients deſcribed men of their natural ſize, and we ſee they were men. When Xenophon did honour to the memory of thoſe warriours who were ſlain by treachery in the retreat of the ten thouſand, he ſays, "*they died irreproachable in war and friendſhip.*" and this is all: this laconick and ſimple eulogy may ſerve to ſhow the ſentiments of which the writer's heart was full; and indeed that reader is to be pitied who is inſenſible to the beauty of this encomium.

The following inſcription was cut on a marble at the ſtraits of Thermopylæ:

"*Go, traveller, and ſay at* SPARTA, *that we periſhed here, in obedience to her laws.*"

It

It is obvious enough that the academy of inſcriptions had no hand in this compoſition. I am much miſtaken if my pupil, who ſets ſo little value on words, does not ſoon remark this difference; and if it doth not influence him in his choice of books. Tranſported with the manly eloquence of Demoſthenes, he will ſay, this was an orator; whereas in reading Cicero, he will ſay, this was a lawyer.

Emilius will, in general, have more taſte for the ancient writers than for the moderns: were it for no other reaſon than that the ancients, being the firſt, are the neareſt to nature, and their genius is more peculiarly their own. Whatever may have been ſaid by La Motte and the Abbé Terraſſon, there is no real progreſs in the underſtanding of the human ſpecies, becauſe what we gain on one ſide we loſe on the other; and becauſe individuals all ſet out from the ſame point, and the time which is taken up in learning what others have thought being deduced from that they ſhould have employed in learning to think for themſelves, they poſſeſs more acquired knowledge and leſs force of genius or capacity of reaſoning. Our minds, like our hands, are accuſtomed to do every thing by means of implements, and nothing of themſelves. Fontenelle uſed to ſay, that the famous conteſt concerning the ſuperiority of the ancients and the moderns, was nothing more than a diſpute whether the trees were formerly of a larger ſize than they are at preſent. But if cultivation

cultivation was ſuppoſed to have changed their magnitude, this diſpute was by no means ſo impertinent as he meant to inſinuate.

Having thus made my pupil recur to the genuine ſources of pure literature, I next give him a view of its muddy ſinks and ſewers, in the repoſitories of modern compilers; in journals, tranſlations, and dictionaries. He juſt caſts an eye over theſe, and throws them aſide, never to take them up again. For the ſake of diverting him, I bring him acquainted with the pompous tranſactions of our academies; leading him to obſerve that each individual of which they are compoſed, is ever more ingenious and uſeful alone, than as a member of thoſe learned bodies; hence he naturally concludes what is the utility of all theſe fine eſtabliſhments.

I carry him to the theatres, not to ſtudy morals, but taſte; for there it particularly diſplays itſelf to thoſe who are capable of reflexion. You have nothing to do, I tell him, with morality here; this is not the place in which to learn it. The ſtage was not erected for the promulgation of truth, but to flatter and amuſe; there is no ſchool in the world where the art of pleaſing, and of captivating the human heart, is better taught. The ſtudy of the theatre leads to that of poetry; as they have exactly the ſame object. If he hath but the leaſt taſte for this art, with what pleaſure will he ſtudy the languages of the poets, the Greek, the Latin, and the Italian! Theſe ſtudies will afford him

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amuſements ſubject to no reſtraint; for which reaſon he will only make the greater progreſs therein; they will prove moſt delightful at an age, and in circumſtances, in which the heart is ſo warmly intereſted in all kinds of beauty formed to affect it. Imagine to yourſelf on one ſide my Emilius, and on the other a young graduate of the college, reading the fourth book of the Æneid, or Tibullus, or the banquet of Plato. What a difference between them! How greatly will the heart of the one be moved by circumſtances that do not at all affect the other! Stop, my dear youth! throw aſide your book; I ſee you are too much affected: I would have you pleaſed with the language of love, but not ſeduced by it; be ſuſceptible, but be prudent: if you are but one of theſe, you are nothing.

But whether Emilius ſucceeds or not in the cultivation of the dead languages, the Belles-Lettres, or poetry, it is of little conſequence. He will be no leſs reſpectable if he knows nothing of all theſe things, nor doth his education depend on ſuch frivolous acquiſitions.

My principal object, in teaching him to be ſenſible of, and to admire, the truely beautiful of every kind, is to fix his taſte and affections, to prevent his natural inclinations from being perverted, and to hinder him from ſeeking thoſe means of happineſs in his wealth which he ought to find in himſelf. I have ſaid elſewhere, that taſte is nothing more than the art of being ſkilled in trifles, and this is very true; but as the

the ſatisfaction of life depends on an aſſemblage of trifles, this art is far from being unimportant: it is, indeed, by this art we are taught to enjoy all the real happineſs in our power. I do not here mean the happineſs attendant on moral virtue, which depends on the good diſpoſition of the mind, but only that which is merely voluptuous and ſenſual, abſtracted from prejudice and opinion.

Permit me, reader, the better to explain this idea, to diſmiſs Emilius for a moment (his heart being too pure to ſerve as a rule for others) and to deduce from myſelf an example, more perceptible, and better adapted to the manners of the world.

There are ſome ſtations in life which ſeem to change the very natures, whether for the better or worſe, of thoſe who fill them. A poltroon, for inſtance, becomes a brave fellow, by entering into the regiment of Navarre: nor is it only in the military order that men acquire the ſpirit of the community, or that ſuch acquirement is for the better. I have ſhuddered an hundred times to think that, if I had the misfortune to fill to-day a certain poſt in a certain country, I ſhould almoſt inevitably prove to-morrow a tyrant, an oppreſſor, a deſtroyer of the people, hurtful to my ſovereign, and, by my office, an enemy to humanity, to juſtice, and to every kind of virtue.

In the ſame manner, if I were rich, I ſhould have taken all thoſe ſteps which were neceſſary for

for me to become ſo: I ſhould be, therefore, inſolent and mean, ſenſible and tender of myſelf alone, pityleſs and hard-hearted to the reſt of mankind, a diſdainful ſpectator of the miſeries of the vulgar; for I ſhould give no other appellation to the indigent, that it might be forgotten that I was formerly of the ſame claſs. In a word, I ſhould make my fortune the inſtrument of my pleaſures, which would entirely engage my attention; and ſo far I ſhould reſemble the reſt of the wealthy part of the world.

There is one thing, however, in which I think I ſhould differ from them greatly; that is, I ſhould be more ſenſual and voluptuous than ambitious and vain, and ſhould give myſelf up to the luxury of eaſe, more than to that of oſtentation. I ſhould even be aſhamed to make too great a parade of my wealth, and ſhould think I always heard the envious man, whom I mortified by my ſplendour, whiſpering in the ear of his neighbour—*How fearful is that knave leſt he ſhould not be taken for what he is!*

From amidſt that immenſe profuſion of earthly bleſſings which preſent themſelves, I would make choice of ſuch as were the moſt agreeable, and the moſt eaſily to be appropriated to myſelf. To this end, the firſt uſe of my wealth, would be to purchaſe liberty and leiſure; to which I ſhould add health, if health were to be bought; but as health is not to be purchaſed but by temperance, and, as without health we

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can have no true enjoyment of life, I ſhould live temperate from motives of ſenſuality.

I would always remain as near to nature as poſſible, in order to gratify the ſenſes ſhe hath beſtowed on me; being well aſſured that the more natural were my enjoyments, the more I ſhould find them real. In the choice of objects for imitation, I ſhould take thoſe of nature always for models; in the gratification of my appetites nature ſhould have always the preference; in matters of taſte I ſhould conſult her ever; and as for my viands, I ſhould always prefer thoſe which nature hath the beſt prepared, and that paſs through the feweſt hands in coming to our tables. I ſhould prevent the adulterations of artifice by rendering them uſeleſs to my gratification. My groſs and childiſh epicuriſm would not enrich my proveditor, nor ſhould I give its weight in gold for poiſon inſtead of wholeſome food. My table ſhould not be ſpread with covers of magnificent traſh and foreign carrion: I would even be laviſh of my own trouble to gratify my ſenſuality, as even the trouble I ſhould take on ſuch occaſions would be in itſelf a pleaſure, and would enhance that which was to come. If I had an inclination to taſte the product of a diſtant part of the world, I would rather go thither after them, like Apicius, than have them brought to me: for the moſt exquiſite of foreign viands always want a ſauce which is not imported with them, nor can be prepared for them by any cook whatever;

whatever; *viz.* the air of the climate that produces them.

For the ſame reaſon, I ſhould not follow the example of thoſe who never enjoy themſelves where they are, and ſet the ſeaſons always at variance, and climates at variance with the ſeaſons; who, requiring ſummer in the winter, and winter in the ſummer, go to Italy to ſhiver with cold, and to the north to be burned up with heat; without reflecting that, while they think to avoid the rigour and exceſs of the ſeaſons, they always feel them moſt in thoſe places where nature has not taught the inhabitants to guard againſt them. For my own part, I ſhould either remain always in one place, or take directly the contrary method: I would enjoy what was moſt agreeable to the ſeaſon, and what was peculiar to the climate; I ſhould enjoy a multiplicity of pleaſures and cuſtoms, all different from each other, and yet agreeable to nature: I would go and ſpend the ſummer in Naples and the winter in Peterſburg; ſometimes fanned by the ſoft breezes as I lay reclined in the cooling grots of Tarentum; at others fatigued with dancing amidſt the illuminations of a palace of Ice in Ruſſia.

I would, as well in the ſervice of my table, as in the ornaments of my apartments, imitate in a ſimple manner the varieties of the ſeaſons, and partake of the pleaſures of each without anticipating the ſucceeding. There is ſome difficulty, but no taſte, in thus diſturbing the order

order of nature, in wreſting from her thoſe involuntary productions which ſhe yields with regret, and which, having neither ſubſtance nor flavour, cannot be nouriſhing to the ſtomach, or pleaſing to the palate. Nothing can be more inſipid than thoſe productions of nature which are forced and out of ſeaſon; thus it is, at an immenſe expenſe, that a wealthy Pariſian is capable, by means of furnaces and hot-beds, to furniſh his table the whole year round with taſteleſs fruits and inſipid vegetables. With what pleaſure can I eat cherries when it freezes, or melons in the depth of winter, when my palate neither wants moiſture nor refreſhment? Can I prefer the roaſted cheſnut, in the burning heat of ſummer, to currants, ſtrawberries, and other cooling fruit, which the earth affords me without any trouble? To cover our chimney-pieces in the month of January with forced vegetation, with pale and ſcentleſs flowers, is not ſo much to add charms to winter as to rob the ſpring; it is to deprive ourſelves of the pleaſure of traverſing the woods, in ſearch of the firſt violet, of eſpying the opening bud, and crying out in a tranſport of joy: "Mortals, ye are not abandoned, nature lives anew!"

In order that I might be well ſerved I would have few domeſticks; this has been already ſaid, and will bear again repeating. A citizen hath more ſervice done him by a ſingle foot-boy, than a duke by the half-ſcore gentlemen that ſurround him. I have thought an hundred times

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of the advantage of having my bottle and glaſs placed beſide me on the table, that I may drink when I pleaſed, whereas at a table beſet with numerous attendants the call to drink might be twenty times repeated before I ſhould quench my thirſt. Every thing that is done for us by others is always ill done, however they manage it: for this reaſon I would never ſend to my tradeſmen, but go myſelf. I would do this, indeed, for various reaſons: firſt, becauſe I would not have them treat with my ſervants before they had treated with me; and further, that I might make a better choice of the commodities I ſhould buy, and not pay ſo dear for them: I would go among theſe ſort of people alſo for the ſake of an agreeable exerciſe, and to ſee a little what was doing out of my own houſe; I ſhould in this find ſome recreation, and ſometimes improvement; in ſhort, I would amuſe myſelf thus, were it for no other reaſon than the barely moving about; this would be always ſomething gained; a too ſedentary life makes us liſtleſs and low-ſpirited; local-motion is a good remedy againſt this evil. Beſides this, porters and footmen are very bad interpreters; I would not have theſe people always between me and the reſt of the world; nor would I go about every where in a carriage, as if I were fearful of being accoſted in the ſtreet. The horſes of a man who makes uſe of his legs are always ready: if they are fatigued or ſick, he knows it before any one elſe; and is not obliged

obliged to ſtay at home under that pretence, when his coachman hath a mind to make holiday: when he is abroad, alſo, he is not liable to have his patience wearied out by accidents, or to remain blocked up by carriages when he is in haſte to be gone. In ſhort, if no one can ſerve us ſo well as ourſelves, were we as powerful as Alexander, and richer than Crœſus, we ought not to admit of the ſervices of others, except in thoſe things we cannot perform ourſelves.

I would not chooſe to inhabit a palace, for in this palace I ſhould occupy but one apartment: whatever is common belongs to nobody, and the apartments of my ſervants would be as ſtrange to me as the houſes of my neighbours. The Aſiaticks, though very voluptuous, are all lodged in houſes ſimply furniſhed. They regard life as a journey, and their habitations as inns. This conſideration weighs but little with wealthy Europeans, who furniſh out their houſes as if they were to live in them for ever: I have a different reaſon which would produce the ſame effect. It would ſeem to me, that the eſtabliſhing myſelf with ſo much parade in one place, would be in a manner to baniſh myſelf from every other, and to keep me a priſoner in my own palace. Is not the world itſelf a palace noble enough? and is it not at the ſervice of the wealthy whenever they pleaſe to enjoy it. *Ubi bene, ibi patria*; this is the rich man's motto. He is at home wherever money

will paſs, and he can convey his ſtrong-box. Wherefore, then, ſhould he circumſcribe himſelf by walls and gates, as if he were never to go out of them! Doth an epidemical diſeaſe, a war, or a rebellion drive me from one place, I go on to another, and find my houſe arrived there before me. Why ſhould I take the trouble to build a houſe for myſelf, when there are houſes built for me in every part of the world? Why ſhould I, who am ſo eager to live, make ſo much preparation for the future enjoyment of what I may poſſeſs to-day? It is impoſſible to make our lives agreeable by continually acting inconſiſtently with ourſelves. Empedocles thus reproached the Agrigentines for their eager purſuit of pleaſures, as if they had not a day to live; and for building houſes and palaces, as if they ſhould never die.

Beſides, to what purpoſe ſhould I have ſo large an houſe, having ſo few people to inhabit it, and fewer things to put in it? My furniture ſhould be as ſimple as my taſte; I would have neither a gallery of pictures, nor a library; particularly if I loved reading and underſtood painting; as I ſhould then know that all ſuch collections muſt be imperfect, and that their deficiencies would give us more chagrin than the having nothing of them at all. In this particular, it is well known that abundance occaſions want; a circumſtance that every maker of collections muſt have experienced. The real connoiſſeur, therefore, ſhould never make

ſuch collections: thoſe who know how to make uſe of a cabinet themſelves never keep one to ſhow to others.

Gaming is not a proper amuſement for a rich man; it is the reſource of thoſe who have nothing to do: and I ſhould be too much employed in my pleaſures to have time to throw away to ſo little purpoſe. As I am ſolitary and poor, I never play, except ſometimes at cheſs, and even that is too much: if I were rich, I ſhould play ſtill leſs, and then only for trifling ſums, that I might not ſee others diſſatisfied at loſing, or be ſo myſelf. The intereſt we take in play, loſing its motive in a rich man, can never be converted into a paſſion unleſs in minds of a wrong or degenerate turn. The profits which may accrue to a rich man from play are always leſs affecting than the loſſes he ſuſtains: he runs the riſk alſo on the whole to be rather a loſer than a gainer; ſo that no man who reaſons rightly, can become very fond of an amuſement, wherein the chances of every kind are againſt him. Whoever gratifies his vanity by the advantages of fortune, may employ thoſe advantages in objects much more pleaſing: nor are they leſs remarkable in the loweſt play than in the higheſt. A taſte for gaming is indeed the fruit of avarice and indolence, and is the product only of vacant minds; I imagine myſelf poſſeſſed, therefore, of ſentiment and knowledge enough to diſpenſe with ſuch a ſubſtitute. We ſeldom ſee thinking perſons very fond of play, which

either ſuſpends that habit or gives it a turn to dry calculations; thus one uſe and perhaps the only one that is conſequent on a taſte for the ſciences, is that of checking in ſome degree this ſordid paſſion. Such perſons chooſe rather to be employed in proving the utility of play than in playing themſelves. For my part, I ſhould oppoſe it even among the gameſters, and ſhould have more pleaſure in laughing at them when they loſt, than in winning their money.

I ſhould be the ſame in private life as in my commerce with the world, deſiring that my fortune ſhould contribute to make every one about me eaſy, and prevent a ſenſe of their inequality of condition. The glitter of dreſs, is, in many reſpects, inconvenient. To preſerve as much freedom as poſſible in thoſe I converſed with, I would always go dreſſed in ſuch a manner as to ſeem always in my place, in whatever rank of men I ſhould be engaged: and to be particularly diſtinguiſhed among none, I would ſo chooſe my garb that without affectation, or change of perſonage, I could paſs equally unnoticed in a club of common tradeſmen, or in an aſſembly of the beſt company. By this method, being maſter of my own conduct, I am within reach of the pleaſures and amuſements of every ſtation. It is ſaid there are ſome ladies who ſhut their doors againſt perſons plainly dreſſed, and admit nobody without lace; I would, therefore, ſpend my days elſewhere, but if thoſe ladies were young

young and pretty, I might ſometimes put on lace to ſpend an evening with them.

The only rules for the choice of company would, with me, be mutual attachment, and conformity of taſte and character: I ſhould indulge myſelf in the pleaſures of ſociety, alſo, as a man, but not as a rich one: I would never ſuffer them to be vitiated by the principles of intereſt. If my opulence ſhall have left me any humanity, my benevolence would be extenſive: but I would have a ſociety about my perſon and not a retinue—a company of friends and not dependents: I ſhould not chooſe to be the patron of my gueſts, but their hoſt. Independence and equality would give to my connexions all the candour of benevolence, and where neither duty nor intereſt ſhould enter into conſideration, friendſhip and pleaſure only would be our law.

A man cannot purchaſe a friend or a miſtreſs. It is indeed eaſy enough to procure women for money; but this is not the way to acquire the love of any. So far is love from being bought or ſold, that money infallibly deſtroys it. Whoever pays, though he were the moſt amiable of men, cannot be long the object of affection, were it for no other reaſon than that he pays. It will not be long before he pays for ſome other, or rather another will be paid for with his money? by which double connexion, formed by intereſt and debauchery, without love, without honour, and without true

pleaſure, the faithleſs, mercenary, and wretched woman, treated in the ſame manner by the favourite who receives, as ſhe herſelf treats the fool who beſtows, remains thus acquitted between both. It would doubtleſs be agreeable to be liberal towards a beloved object, if ſuch liberality were not liable to be converted into hire. I know but one way to indulge it, therefore, toward a miſtreſs, without putting an end to her affection; and that is to give her up every thing, and to depend afterwards on her bounty. It remains only to know where is the woman with whom ſuch a proceeding would not be extravagant.

The lover who pretended to enjoy Lais without her having any enjoyment of him, talks idly. That enjoyment which is not reciprocal is nothing; it is at moſt only the enjoyment of the ſex, but not of the individual. Now where the moral pleaſures of love do not exiſt, why ſhould ſuch a mighty affair be made of the reſt? Nothing is more eaſy to acquire than ſuch a brutal ſatisfaction, and a poor mule-driver hath more opportunities of being happy in this reſpect than a monarch.

Oh! that one could but ſufficiently diſplay the inconſiſtency of vice, and ſhow, when it obtains what it wiſhed for, how much it is diſappointed! Whence can ariſe our cruel avidity to corrupt innocence, to make a victim of a young object we ought to protect, and whom by that firſt ſtep we plunge into a gulf of miſery

miſery, from which death only can relieve her? Whence but from brutality, vanity, and folly? The pleaſure taken in it is not that of nature, but of prejudice: and that of the meaneſt of prejudices, as it ariſes from a contempt of ourſelves. He who is ſenſible of his being the moſt contemptible of mankind, is afraid of riſking a compariſon with others, and, therefore, would be the firſt, in order to be leſs odious. It is remarkable that perſons the moſt eager after this imaginary enjoyment, are never the moſt amiable or young; ſuch as are themſelves capable of giving delight, and who might be more excuſable for being nice and difficult. No, the man who hath the advantage of perſon, merit, and ſenſibility, is not afraid of the experience of his miſtreſs; juſtly confident of himſelf, he ſays to her—"You are not ignorant of pleaſure, but no matter; my heart promiſes you ſuch as you have never experienced."

But an old ſatyr, accuſtomed to debauchery, in every reſpect diſagreeable, both in perſon and manners, incapable as unworthy of pleaſing any woman who is acquainted with others, conceives he may make himſelf amiable to an innocent girl, in profiting by her inexperience, and being the firſt to excite in her the emotions of nature. His only hope is to pleaſe by the circumſtance of novelty; this is inconteſtibly the ſecret motive of this fantaſtical deſire: but he is miſtaken, the horrour and diſguſt he excites are no leſs natural than the emotions he attempts

to raiſe. He is miſtaken alſo even in his ridiculous attempts: the ſame nature takes care to vindicate her rights; every girl, who ſets herſelf to ſale, is already given away; and having beſtowed herſelf, agreeably to her own choice, hath made the very compariſon of which the dotard of a purchaſer is afraid. He purchaſes, therefore, an imaginary pleaſure, and is not held the leſs in abhorrence.

For my own part, whatever alteration wealth would make in me, there is one circumſtance on which I ſhould never change. Though I ſhould poſſeſs neither virtue nor humanity I ſhould retain at leaſt ſome taſte, feeling, and deſicacy, which would hinder me from exhauſting my wealth, like a dupe, in hunting after chimeras, and from thowing away my money and time in getting myſelf abuſed and laughed at by children. If I were young, I ſhould purſue the pleaſures of youth: and as I would enjoy them voluptuouſly, I ſhould not purſue them in the manner of the wealthy. If I were rich and of the ſame age as I am, the caſe would be different; I would prudently confine myſelf to pleaſures adapted to my years; I would cheriſh my taſte for thoſe I could ſtill enjoy, and ſuppreſs thoſe inclinations which would ſerve only to torment me. I would never ſubject my grey beard to the diſdainful railleries of young wenches: I could never bear to ſee my careſſes make them turn away with diſguſt, to give them occaſion to tell ridiculous

culous ſtories at my expenſe, or to imagine them deſcribing the fumbling efforts of the old ape, by way of avenging themſelves for having endured them. If, indeed, my ill-reſiſted habits ſhould at any time convert my ancient deſires into real wants, I might poſſibly ſatisfy them; but it would always be attended with ſhame and confuſion. The neceſſity ſhould not give riſe to a paſſion; I would get rid of it as well as I could, and there it ſhould end; I would no more make my weakneſs a matter of employment, nor have on any occaſion more than one witneſs to my folly. Human life affords other pleaſures when this is exhauſted; in our vain purſuit of thoſe that eſcape us, we deprive ourſelves, therefore, of thoſe which remain. Let us vary our taſte with our years, nor tranſpoſe the ages any more than the ſeaſons. We ſhould at all times be conſiſtent with ourſelves, and never counteract nature; ſuch vain efforts only wearing out life, and preventing our enjoyment of it.

The multitude, who lead active lives, are never weary of themſelves: if their amuſements are not much diverſified, they are taken but ſeldom; their long intervals of labour and fatigue give them a higher reliſh for the pleaſures of an holiday. As for the rich, their great misfortune is ſpleen and uneaſineſs: in the midſt of all their expenſive amuſements, ſurrounded as they are by numerous flatterers or attendants, all contributing to their pleaſure,

they pine away their lives in diſcontent; the women, in particular, being at a loſs to employ or divert themſelves, are devoured by it, under the name of the vapours: which ſometimes degenerates into an horrible diſeaſe, depriving them not only of their reaſon, but their lives. For my own part, I know no ſituation in life ſo miſerable as that of a fine woman at Paris, except it be that of the agreeable coxcomb her follower; who, from the vanity of being thought ſucceſsful in his amours, ſupports the tedious length of the moſt melancholy days that ever were paſſed by an human creature.

The mode, decorum, and ceremony, which ariſe from luxury and politeneſs, confine the courſe of life within the moſt inſipid round of uniformity. The pleaſure, we are deſirous of appearing to enjoy in the ſight of others, is loſt both to them and to ourſelves *. Men are never ſo ridiculous as when they act from eſtabliſhed forms; he, who knows how to vary his ſituation

* Two ladies of faſhion, at Paris, in order to be thought fond of taking much amuſement, laid themſelves under a voluntary injunction of never going to bed till five o'clock in the morning. In the depth of winter, therefore, their ſervants were often kept waiting for them in the ſtreets; having enough to do to keep themſelves from freezing. On entering, however, one evening, or rather one morning, into the apartment where theſe two ladies, ſo fond of amuſement, paſſed away their hours without counting the clock, they were found, both together, without any other company, faſt aſleep, each in her eaſy chair, by the fire ſide.

ſituation and his amuſements, will efface to day the impreſſion he made yeſterday; he is looked upon as nobody perhaps by others: but he enjoys himſelf, being entire and independent in all times and places. My only ſettled mode ſhould be this: in every ſituation and circumſtance not to trouble myſelf about other people, and to employ every day by itſelf, as if it were independent on the preceding or following. As with the crowd, I ſhould be one of the crowd, ſo in the country I ſhould be always a ruſtick; and when I talked about huſbandry, the peaſants ſhould not laugh at me. I would not go to build a town in the fields; or require, in the corner of ſome diſtant country, to have a view of the Thuilleries from my apartment. On the ſide of a pleaſant hill, well ſhaded with trees, I would have a little white houſe with green window ſhutters, which I would make my rural habitation. To have it thatched with ſtraw, it would be beſt for all ſeaſons: I ſhould, however, magnificently prefer, not the cold and dull-looking ſlates, but tiles, becauſe they have a neater and livelier aſpect than thatch, and beſides that the houſes in my country are covered with nothing elſe, ſo that they would remind me a little of the happy days of my youth. The area before my door ſhould be full of poultry, and in the ſtabling ſhould be ranged proper ſtalls for my cows, as I am extremely fond of milk. My garden ſhould be calculated entirely for the uſe of the kitchen; and inſtead

of a park I would have a pretty orchard; the fruits of which ſhould be at the ſervice of every one who pleaſed to gather them. I would not be ſo niggardly magnificent as to plant ſuperb eſpaliers, which every one would be afraid to touch. This petty prodigality, however, would not be very coſtly, becauſe the aſylum I ſhould make choice of, ſhould be ſituated in ſome diſtant province of plenty and poverty, where money is ſufficiently ſcarce and proviſions proportionably cheap.

There would I get together a company of friends, more ſelect than numerous, ſuch as loved pleaſure and underſtood it: of women, who could riſe from the ſofa, to join in the amuſements of the country, and to take up ſometimes, inſtead of cards and counters, the hay-makers rake and the baſket of the fruit-gatherers. There ſhould all the affected airs of the town be laid aſide, while becoming real villagers we ſhould find ſuch a numerous diverſity of amuſements, as would only ſerve to puzzle our choice in the evening, which to partake of the next day. Exerciſe and employment would thus give us new appetite and new taſtes: our meals would be all entertainments, and their plenty would pleaſe more than their delicacy. Chearfulneſs, ruſtick labour, and rural ſports are the beſt cooks in the world, and high-ſeaſoned ragouts appear very ridiculous to thoſe who begin their labour with the riſing ſun. My table ſhould be ſerved alſo with

with no more order than elegance; I would make every place occaſionally my dining-room, ſitting down ſometimes to meals in the garden, ſometimes on board a boat, and at others under a ſpreading tree: at others again I would dine at a greater diſtance from my houſe, by the ſide of a clear ſpring, on the freſh graſs, under a tuft of alders and filberds; a joyous troop of gueſts bringing along, in chearful proceſſion, the apparatus of the feaſt: the green turf ſhould ſerve us both for table and chairs, the borders of the fountain for a buffet, and the neighbouring trees ſhould furniſh the deſert. Our viands ſhould be ſerved up without order, appetite eaſily diſpenſes with ceremony: while every one, profeſſing openly to love himſelf beſt, is not at all offended that each helps himſelf as ſoon as he can, and to what he moſt likes. From this cordial and moderate familiarity would ariſe a pleaſant conteſt, equally free from rudeneſs and conſtraint; a hundred times more delightful and amicable than the affected forms of ceremony. We would have no impertinent footman watching our behaviour, criticiſing on our converſation, counting the morſels we put into our mouths, amuſing themſelves with making us wait for drink, and grumbling at our ſitting too long at dinner. We would be our own ſervants, in order to be our own maſters; each would be ſerved by all the reſt; the time would paſs away imperceptibly, our repaſt would afford us alſo repoſe and ſhould laſt as long as the burning heat of day. If any peaſant

ſant ſhould happen to paſs by, returning from his work, with the implements of his labour on his ſhoulder; I would chear his honeſt heart by a civil ſalutation, and a cup or two of generous wine. This condeſcenſion would make him ſupport his poverty more chearfully, and would give me the ſatisfaction of perceiving myſelf ſtill actuated by the principles of humanity.

If at any time the country-people were aſſembled at their rural feſtivals, I would be one of the firſt to join them with my little company: if any marriage ſhould be ſolemniſed in my neighbourhood, as I ſhould be known to love mirth and rejoicing, I ſhould be invited to the wedding. On this occaſion, I ſhould make the good people ſome preſent, ſimple as their condition; and ſhould receive a return of ineſtimable value, little known to my equals, in frankneſs and true pleaſure. I would ſup with them chearfully at one end of their long table, join in the burthen of an old ruſtick ſong, and dance in their barn, with greater ſatisfaction than I ſhould at the politeſt aſſembly.

Hitherto, it may be ſaid, every thing goes on bravely; "But what would you do about hunting? Can you live in the country and not hunt?" I underſtand you; I have as yet only deſcribed a farm, and in that was certainly wrong. I ſuppoſed myſelf rich, I ſhould, therefore, have pleaſures that are excluſive and deſtructive; this is quite another affair, I muſt have manors, woods, keepers, homage, incenſe, and holy water.

Very

Very well; but theſe manors will have neighbours jealous of their privileges, and poſſibly deſirous of uſurping thoſe of others: our keepers may go to quarrelling, and perhaps their maſters too: hence will ariſe diſcontent, animoſities, and law-ſuits. Theſe things are not very agreeable. My tenants will not look on with pleaſure and ſee their corn deſtroyed by my hares or wild-boars. As they dare not kill them, they will of courſe drive them away; and thus, having ſpent their days in cultivating their lands, they will be obliged to ſpend the night in guarding them: they will have their drums, their horns, and their bells; this noiſe will of conſequence diſturb my ſleep. I ſhall dream of the wretchedneſs of theſe poor people, and ſhall not be able to help reproaching myſelf. Had I the honour, indeed, to have been born a prince, all this would not affect me; but being only an upſtart of acquired wealth, I ſhould have an heart a little plebeian.

But this is not all; plenty of game would tempt thieves and encroachers; I ſhould ſoon have theſe to puniſh; I ſhould ſtand in need of priſons, jailers, and executioners; all which appears to me very cruel. The wives of the wretched culprits would beſiege my gates, and importune me with their cries; or elſe I muſt have them driven away and ill-treated. On the other hand, the poor people, who were no poachers, and whoſe crops have been injured by the game, would come to make their complaints likewiſe: the one would be puniſhed

for having deſtroyed the game, and the other ruined for having ſpared it; what a melancholy alternative! I ſhould ſee nothing on every ſide but objects of miſery; I ſhould hear nothing but ſighs and complaints: it appears to me that this would greatly diminiſh the pleaſure of ſacrificing hares and partridges at one's eaſe.

Would you diſengage your pleaſures from their attendant pains, take none that are excluſive; the more you make others partakers of them, the more pure and refined are they to yourſelf. I would fix my reſidence, therefore, in a country where every one ſhould be at liberty to ſhoot and hunt at pleaſure, and where I could have the amuſement without ſo much trouble. The game might not be here ſo plenty indeed, but more addreſs would be required to put it up, and it would afford more pleaſure in the chaſe. I ſhall ever remember the tranſports my father uſed to experience, on ſhooting the firſt partridge in the ſeaſon, and the joy he once felt on finding an hare, which he had been in ſearch of the whole day. Yes, I will maintain it that my father, though alone, with his dog and gun, tired with fatigue, and his fleſh torn with thorns and briars, uſed to return home at night, with his little prey, more contented with his day's ſport, than all your hunters of quality, who mounted on good horſes, and followed by attendants with a ſcore of fowling-pieces, do nothing but fire, charge their pieces, and murther the game around them, without addreſs, without

without honour, and almoſt without exerciſe. The pleaſure, therefore, is equally great, and the inconvenience much leſs, where one has no manor to protect, no poacher to puniſh, nor poor people to torment. So that this is a good reaſon for preferring ſuch a ſituation: for, do what you will, mankind are not to be continually oppreſſed with impunity; the conſtant curſes of a neighbourhood rendering the game, purchaſed at that rate, ſooner or later very dear.

Once more I repeat it, excluſive pleaſures are deſtructive to all pleaſure. Genuine amuſements are thoſe which we partake of in common with others: thoſe we are deſirous of enjoying alone, are no longer to be enjoyed. If the walls which I build round my park, form a dull and melancholy encloſure, I have only been at a great expenſe to deprive myſelf of the pleaſure of a proſpect, which I am obliged to ſeek at a diſtance. The dæmon of property infects every thing he touches. A rich man is deſirous of poſſeſſing every thing, and conceives he ſhall be happy only where he is not; he is, therefore, conſtantly flying from himſelf. For my part, I ſhould act in this particular, were I rich, as I do being poor. At preſent I enjoy much more of the poſſeſſions of others than I ſhall ever do of my own; making myſelf maſter of every thing that pleaſes me in my neighbourhood; there is no conqueror more abſolute in this reſpect than I am; I even take the ſame liberty with the poſſeſſions of princes, and accommodate

date to my uſe every foot of land that lies open and pleaſes me, without diſtinction; I even give names to the ſeveral grounds and encloſures in my walks, calling the one my park, the other my terras, and look on myſelf as the maſter. I walk about them with impunity, I return often to maintain my poſſeſſion; and wear out the ſoil as much as I pleaſe with walking; and you will never be able to perſuade me, that the owner of the lands which I thus appropriate, makes any more uſe of the money they produce him, than I do of his eſtate. If at any time my walks are interrupted by a hedge, a ditch, or other new encloſures it concerns me but little, as I can eaſily remove my park to ſome other ſpot; there is room enough in the adjacent fields, and I may pillage my neighbours a long time, before I ſhall be at a loſs for an aſylum.

Thus have I given a ſpecimen of true taſte in the choice of agreeable amuſements, and of the ſpirit of their enjoyment; all the reſt is only illuſion, chimera, and ridiculous vanity. Whoever departs from theſe rules, however rich he may be, will only ſquander away his wealth, without ever knowing the value of life.

It will doubtleſs be objected to me that ſuch amuſements as I have been deſcribing are equally within the reach of all men, and that no one need be rich in order to enjoy them. This is preciſely the point I have been aiming it. True pleaſure is always in our power, if we will enjoy it; it is prejudice alone that makes every thing difficult,

difficult, and drives happineſs from us; it being an hundred times eaſier to be happy than to appear ſo to others. The man of taſte and real voluptuary hath nothing to do with wealth; it is ſufficient for him to be free and independent. Whoſoever enjoys health and the neceſſaries of life, let him but caſt aſide the imaginary conveniences of opinion, and he is rich enough: this is the *aurea mediocritas* of Horace. Look out, therefore, ye poſſeſſors of ſtrong coffers, for ſome other employment for your wealth; it is uſeleſs to the purchaſe of pleaſure. Emilius doth not know this better than I do; but, having a leſs corrupted heart he will be more feelingly ſenſible of it, and all the obſervations he will make in the world will only ſerve to confirm him in it.

In thus ſpending our time, we are ſtill conſtantly in ſearch of Sophia, but as yet cannot find her. It was of conſequence that ſhe ſhould not be found ſo ſoon, and, therefore, we have been looking for her where I was very ſure ſhe was not to be found.

At length, however, it is time to look for her in good earneſt, leſt my youth ſhould find one he miſtakes for her, and ſhould diſcover his errour too late. Farewell then to Paris, the city of noiſe, ſmoke, and dirt, where the women are become deſtitute of honour, and the men of virtue. Paris, adieu! we are in ſearch of love, happineſs, and innocence; we can never, therefore, be too far from thy walls.

BOOK V.

WE are now come to the laſt act of the drama, but not as yet to the unravelling of the plot.

It is not good for man to be alone; and Emilius is now a man: we have promiſed him alſo a companion, who muſt, therefore, now be given him. This companion is Sophia. But, in what aſylum is ſhe to be found? To diſcover where ſhe is, it is neceſſary ſhe ſhould firſt be known. When we are made acquainted with her character, we ſhall be the better able to judge of her habitation: not that when we have found her our taſk is at an end. Mr. Locke cloſes his treatiſe on education with obſerving, that, as his young gentleman is fit to be married, it is time to leave him with his miſtreſs. For my own part, as I have not the honour to educate a gentleman, I ſhall beware of imitating Mr. Locke in this particular.

SOPHIA.

SOPHIA ſhould be ſuch a woman as Emilius is a man; that is, ſhe ſhould poſſeſs every thing requiſite in the conſtitution of her ſpecies and ſex, to fill her place in the phyſical and

and moral order of things. To know whether ſhe be ſo qualified, we ſhall enter firſt on an examination into the various inſtances of conformity and difference between her ſex and our's.

In every thing which does not regard the ſex woman is the ſame as man; ſhe has the ſame organs, the ſame neceſſities, the ſame faculties: the corporeal machine is conſtructed in the ſame manner, its component parts are alike, their operation the ſame, and the figure ſimilar in both; in whatever light we regard them, they differ from each other only in degree.

On the other hand, in every thing immediately reſpecting ſex, the woman differs entirely from the man; the difficulty of comparing them together, lying in our inability to determine what are thoſe particulars in the conſtitution of each that immediately relate to the ſex. From their comparative anatomy, and even from ſimple inſpection, we perceive ſome general diſtinctions between them that do not appear to relate to ſex; and yet there can be no doubt that they do, although we are not capable of tracing their modes of relation. Indeed, we know not how far the difference of ſex may extend. All that we know, of a certainty, is that whatever is common to both is only characteriſtick of their ſpecies; and that every thing in which they differ, is diſtinctive of their ſex. Under this twofold conſideration, we find ſo much reſemblance and diſſimilitude that it appears even miraculous, that nature ſhould form two beings ſo much alike,

alike, and, at the ſame time, ſo very different.

This difference and ſimilitude muſt neceſſarily have an influence over their moral character: ſuch an influence is, indeed, obvious, and perfectly agreeable to experience; clearly demonſtrating the vanity of the diſputes that have been held concerning the ſuperiority or equality of the ſexes; as if, in anſwering the different ends for which nature deſigned them, both were not more perfect than they would be in more nearly reſembling each other. In thoſe particulars which are common to both, they are equal; and as to thoſe wherein they differ no compariſon is to be made between them. A perfect man and a complete woman ſhould no more reſemble each other in mind than in feature; nor is their perfection reducible to any common ſtandard.

In the union of the ſexes, both purſue one common object, but not in the ſame manner. From their diverſity in this particular, ariſes the firſt determinate difference between the moral relations of each. The one ſhould be active and ſtrong, the other paſſive and weak: it is neceſſary the one ſhould have both the power and the will, and that the other ſhould make little reſiſtance.

This principle being eſtabliſhed, it follows that woman is expreſsly formed to pleaſe the man: if the obligation be reciprocal alſo, and the man ought to pleaſe in his turn, it is not ſo immediately neceſſary: his great merit lies in his

power,

power, and he pleaſes merely becauſe he is ſtrong. This, I muſt confeſs, is not one of the refined maxims of love; it is, however, one of the laws of nature, prior to love itſelf.

If woman be formed to pleaſe and be ſubjected to man, it is her place doubtleſs to render herſelf agreeable to him, inſtead of challenging his paſſion. The violence of his deſires depends on her charms; it is by means of theſe ſhe ſhould urge him to the exertion of thoſe powers which nature hath given him. The moſt ſucceſsful method of exciting them is, to render ſuch exertion neceſſary by her reſiſtance; as in that caſe ſelf-love is added to deſire, and the one triumphs in the victory which the other obliged him to acquire. Hence ariſe the various modes of attack and defenſe between the ſexes, the boldneſs of one ſex and the timidity of the other; and, in a word, that baſhfulneſs and modeſty with which nature hath armed the weak, in order to ſubdue the ſtrong.

Can it ever be thought that ſhe had dictated indifferently the ſame advances to one as the other, and that the firſt to form deſires ſhould be alſo the firſt to diſplay them? What a ſtrange miſtake in judgement muſt be ſuch a concluſion! Their intercourſe being productive of conſequences ſo very different to each, can it be natural for both to engage in the mutual conflict with the ſame readineſs and intrepidity? Is it not very evident that from their unequal waſte in the encounter, if reſerve did not impoſe on one the

ſame

ſame moderation as nature impoſes on the other, the conſequence would ſoon be fatal to both, and that the human race would be brought to deſtruction by the very means eſtabliſhed by nature for its preſervation? Conſidering the influence of women over the paſſions of men, and how readily they can affect even the remains of an almoſt exhauſted conſtitution, it is plain that, if there were an unhappy climate on earth, whence philoſophy had baniſhed all female reſerve, the men, ſubjected to the tyranny of the women, would be ſoon ſacrificed to their charms; particularly in hot countries, where are born more women than men, the latter would all be hurried preſently to their graves, without any poſſibility of helping themſelves.

That the females of animals have not the ſame modeſty and reſerve makes nothing againſt my argument; as their deſires are not, like thoſe of women, left without reſtriction. In the latter, their reſerve ſupplies the place of a phyſical reſtraint; while the former have no deſires but what ariſe from phyſical neceſſity. This being ſatisfied, their deſire ceaſes; they no longer repulſe the male in appearance*, but in reality; acting contrary to the daughter of Auguſtus, they receive no more paſſengers on board when the veſſel

* I have already remarked, that ſhyneſs and an affected averſion to the males are common to the females of every ſpecies of animals; and that even when they are moſt diſpoſed to admit their careſſes. One muſt have paid no attention to their actions to doubt of this.

veſſel hath completed its cargo. Even when they are ſalacious their time is ſhort and preſently over; inſtinct urges them on, and inſtinct reſtrains them. What ſubſtitute could be found for this negative inſtinct in women, if you deprive them of modeſty? To expect that they ſhould have no inclination towards the man, is to expect them to be good for nothing.

The Supreme Being intended in every caſe to do honour to the human ſpecies: in leaving the deſires of man unlimited, he gave him, at the ſame time, the law of reaſon for their regulation, in order that he might be free to command himſelf: in leaving the paſſions of woman alſo unreſtrained, he gave her modeſty to reſtrain them. To theſe he hath further added an actual recompenſe for the regular uſe of their reſpective faculties; to wit, the delight which is taken in modeſty, when ſuch is made the ſtandard of our actions. All this appears to me more than equivalent to inſtinct in brutes.

Whether the female, therefore, of our ſpecies, be inclined to gratify the deſires of the male or not, ſhe is by nature conſtantly coy, and betrays a ſeeming reluctance to yield to his embraces. She does not reſiſt or defend herſelf, however, always with the ſame reſolution, nor of courſe with the ſame ſucceſs. In order that the aſſailant ſhould be victorious, it is neceſſary that the aſſailed ſhould permit or direct the attack: for of how many artful means is not the latter poſſeſſed to compel the former to exert himſelf? The

moſt free and delightful of all actions admits not of any real violence; both nature and reaſon are againſt it: nature, in that ſhe hath provided the weakeſt part with ſufficient force to make an effectual reſiſtance, when ſhe pleaſes; and reaſon, in that real violence on ſuch an occaſion, is not only the moſt brutal of all actions, but the moſt contrary to its end and deſign; both becauſe that, by ſuch means, the man declares war againſt his companion, and thus auhoriſes her to ſtand up in defenſe of her perſon and liberty, even at the hazard of the life of the aggreſſor; and alſo becauſe, that the woman is the only proper judge of her own ſituation, and that a child would have no father, if every man were at liberty to uſurp the rights of a huſband.

Hence we deduce a third conſequence from the different conſtitutions of the ſexes; which is, that the ſtrongeſt ſhould be maſter in appearance, and be dependent in fact on the weakeſt; and that not from any frivolous practice of gallantry or vanity of protectorſhip, but from an invariable law of nature, which, furniſhing woman with a greater facility to excite deſires than ſhe has given man to ſatisfy them, makes the latter dependent on the good pleaſure of the former, and compels him to endeavour to pleaſe in his turn, in order to obtain her conſent that he ſhould be ſtrongeſt. On theſe occaſions, the moſt delightful circumſtance a man finds in his victory is, to doubt whether it was the woman's weakneſs that yielded to his ſuperior ſtrength, or whether

whether her inclinations ſpoke in his favour: the females are alſo generally artful enough to leave this matter in doubt. The underſtanding of women anſwers in this reſpect perfectly to their conſtitution: ſo far from being aſhamed of their weakneſs they glory in it; their tender muſcles make no reſiſtance; they affect to be incapable of lifting the ſmalleſt burthens, and would bluſh to be thought robuſt and ſtrong. To what purpoſe is all this? Not merely for the ſake of appearing delicate but through an artful precaution: it is thus they provide an excuſe beforehand, and a right to be feeble when they think it expedient.

The progreſs of our knowledge, increaſed by our vices, hath made the opinion of the moderns on this head very different from that of the ancients; and we hardly ever hear talk of rapes, as they are become ſo little neceſſary, and are no longer credited*: whereas they were very common in the earlieſt ages of the Greeks and Hebrews, becauſe ſuch notions were agreeable to the ſimplicity of nature, and are ſuch as experienced libertiniſm only can eradicate. If we have fewer inſtances, however, in modern times of ſuch acts of violence, it certainly is not becauſe men are leſs licentious, but becauſe they have leſs credu-

* There may happen, however, to be ſuch a diſproportion in the ſtrength and age of the parties, as to admit of an actual rape; but as I am here treating of the relative ſtate of the ſexes in the common courſe of nature, I do no not ſuppoſe any ſuch diſproportion.

lity; ſuch a repulſe, as would have intimidated the ſimple raviſher of former times, would in our's be diſregarded with a ſmile: a reſolute ſilence is now held to be the firmeſt reſiſtance. There is a law recorded in Deuteronomy, by which a young woman, when debauched, was condemned to ſuffer with her ſeducer, in caſe the crime was committed within the city; but if it happened in the fields, or other unfrequented place, the raviſher was puniſhed alone: *for* (ſays the law) *the damſel cried, and there was none to ſave her.* This favourable interpretation, doubtleſs, taught the young women to take care how they were ſurpriſed in places that were frequented.

The effect of this change of opinion on manners is very perceptible. Modern gallantry is one of its conſequences. The men, finding that their pleaſures depended more on the good-will of the fair ſex than they at firſt imagined, cultivated the art of captivating them by complaiſance.

Thus we ſee how phyſicks inſenſibly lead us to morals, and in what manner the groſſer union of the ſexes gave riſe, by degrees, to the more refined rules and ſofter maxims of love. The great influence of the women, therefore, is not owing to the voluntary ſubmiſſion of the men, but to the will of nature: they were poſſeſſed of it before they appeared to be ſo; that very Hercules, who violated the fifty daughters of Theſtius, was nevertheleſs compelled to wield the diſtaff

diſtaff by Omphale; and Sampſon himſelf, ſtrong as he was, was no match for Dalilah. This power of the fair ſex cannot be taken from them, even when they abuſe it; if ever they could loſe their influence, they would undoubtedly have loſt it long ago.

There is no parity between man and woman as to the conſequences of their ſex. The male is ſuch only at certain momentary intervals; the female feels the conſequences of her ſex all her life, at leaſt during youth; and, in order to anſwer the purpoſes of it, requires firſt a ſuitable conſtitution. She requires next careful management in her pregnancy, repoſe in child-bed, eaſe and a ſedentary life during the time of ſuckling her children, and, to bring them up, ſuch patience, good-humour, and affection as nothing can diſguſt: ſhe ſerves as the means of their connexion with their father; it is ſhe who makes him love them, and gives him the confidence to call them his own. What tenderneſs and ſollicitude ought ſhe not to be poſſeſſed of, in order to maintain the peace and unity of a whole family! Add to this, that her good qualities ſhould not be the effects of virtue, but of taſte and inclination, without which the human ſpecies would ſoon be extinct.

The relative duties of the two ſexes do not require an equally rigorous obſervance in both. When women complain, however, of this partiality as unjuſt, they are in the wrong: this inequality is not of human inſtitution, at leaſt it

is not the effect of prejudice, but of reaſon. It certainly belongs to that party which nature hath more immediately entruſted with the care of children, to be anſwerable for that charge to the other. Neither of them, indeed, is permitted to violate their mutual engagements; every faithleſs huſband, who deprives his wife of the only compenſation for the ſeverer duties of her ſex, being guilty of cruelty and injuſtice. A faithleſs woman, however, does ſtill more; ſhe diſſolves the union of her family, and breaks through all the ties of nature: in giving to a man children which are not of his begetting, ſhe betrays both, and adds perfidy to infidelity. Such an action is naturally productive of the worſt of crimes and diſorders. If there be a ſituation in life truely horrid, it is that of an unhappy father, who, placing no confidence in his wife, cannot indulge himſelf in the moſt delightful ſentiments of the heart; who doubts, while he is embracing his child, whether it be not the offspring of another, the pledge of his diſhonour, and the uſurper of the rights of his real children. What a ſcene doth a family in ſuch a caſe preſent to us! Nothing but a community of ſecret enemies, whom a guilty woman arms one againſt the other, by compelling them to pretences of reciprocal affection.

It is not only of conſequence, therefore, that a woman ſhould be faithful to her huſband, but alſo that he ſhould think her ſo. It is requiſite for her to be modeſt, circumſpect, and reſerved;

and that ſhe ſhould bear in the ſight of others, as well as in her own conſcience, the teſtimony of her virtue. If it be neceſſary for a father to love his children, it is firſt neceſſary for him to eſteem their mother. Such are the reaſons which place even the preſervation of appearances among the number of female duties, and render their honour and reputation no leſs indiſpenſible than chaſtity. From theſe principles is derived a new motive of obligation and convenience, which preſcribes peculiarly to women the moſt ſcrupulous circumſpection in their manners, conduct, and behaviour. To maintain indiſcriminately that the two ſexes are equal, and that their reciprocal duties and obligations are the ſame, is to indulge ourſelves in idle declamations unworthy of a ſerious anſwer.

It is certainly a very ſuperficial manner of reaſoning, that of bringing exceptions as proofs to invalidate general laws ſo well founded. Women, you ſay, do not always bear children. That is true; their ſex is, nevertheleſs, deſtined by nature to that end. What! becauſe there are an hundred great cities in the world, where the women, leading a licentious life, have few children, do you pretend that women are naturally barren? What would become of all your populous towns, if the diſtant countries, where the women live in greater chaſtity and ſimplicity, did not compenſate for the ſterility of your town-ladies? A woman who hath borne but four or five children, would, in many provinces, be far

from being eſteemed a fruitful breeder*. In a word, it is to no purpoſe, that ſome particular women bear but few children; women in general are not the leſs formed by nature to become mothers; and it is agreeable to general laws, that nature and manners operate to that end.

But were the intervals between the pregnancy of women ſo long as is ſuppoſed, is it poſſible for them to change ſo ſuddenly their manner of living, without hazard of life or health? Can a woman be one day a nurſe, and the next a ſoldier? Can ſhe vary her temperament and inclination as the cameleon doth its colours? Is it practicable to paſs, at once, from the ſecure encloſure of a cloiſter, and the buſineſs of domeſtick concerns, to brave the inclemencies of the weather, the labours, the fatigues, and the horrours of war? Can a woman be one day timid†, the next courageous; this hour delicate, and the next robuſt? If we ſee the young men of Paris hardly able to ſupport the profeſſion of arms, how can it be imagined that women, whoſe

* Were it not ſo, the ſpecies muſt neceſſarily periſh; its preſervation requiring that every woman, taking one with another, ſhould produce nearly four children: for of all the children that are born, almoſt the half die before the mothers can have any more: two, therefore, muſt remain to repreſent the father and mother. The propagation of the ſpecies in great cities is far from being in this proportion.

† The timidity of women is another natural inſtinct given them to prevent the double danger they run during pregnancy.

whoſe faces were never expoſed to the ſun, and who hardly know how to walk, ſhould ſupport it, after having ſpent fifty years in ſoftneſs and indolence? Can they take up this ſevere laborious employment at an age when the men uſually lay it down? There are ſome countries, I muſt own, where the women undergo but little pain in child birth, and bring up their offspring with very little trouble: in thoſe countries, however, the men go about in all ſeaſons half-naked, hardily encounter wild-beaſts, carry their canoes as they would a knap-ſack, go ſeven or eight hundred miles to hunt, ſleep on the bare ground in the open air, ſupport incredible fatigues, and paſs many whole days together without eating. Where the women are hardy and robuſt, the men are much more ſo; and when the men grow ſoft and effeminate, the women become tender and feeble; ſo that both changing equally, the difference between them remains the ſame.

Plato, I know, in his Republick, preſcribes to women the ſame exerciſes as the men. Having deprived his government of particular families, and being ignorant how to form women, he was reduced to the neceſſity of making them men. This great genius had ſuch powers of combination and foreſight, that he could make ſuch objections to his own ſyſtem as no one elſe would ever have thought of; he has but ill reſolved, however, ſome that have been actually made. I do not ſpeak of that pretended community of women, with which he hath been ſo

often reproached; a proof that thoſe who reproached him had never read his performance: what I mean is, the promiſcuous employment of both ſexes in the ſame kinds of buſineſs and amuſements; which could not fail of producing the moſt intolerable abuſes. I ſpeak of that ſubverſion of the order of things, when the moſt delightful of all natural ſenſations are ſacrificed to artificial ſentiments, which cannot exiſt without the former; as if the bonds of ſociety could be formed independent of nature; as if the affection we bear to our parents was not the ſource of our allegiance to the ſtate; as if it was not on account of our little country, our own family, that we attach ourſelves to the greater; and as if the good ſon, the good huſband, and the good father, did not conſtitute the good citizen.

It being once demonſtrated that man and woman are not, nor ought to be, conſtituted alike in temperament and character, it follows of courſe that they ſhould not be educated in the ſame manner. In purſuing the directions of nature, they ought indeed to act in concert, but they ſhould not be engaged in the ſame employments: the end of their purſuits ſhould be the ſame, but the means they ſhould take to accompliſh them, and of conſequence their taſtes and inclinations, ſhould be different. Having endeavoured to lay down the principles of a natural education for a man, let us trace, in the ſame manner, the methods to form a woman anſwerable to him.

Are

Are you deſirous of being always directed aright? Obſerve conſtantly the indications of nature. Whatever is characteriſtick of the ſex, ſhould be regarded as a circumſtance peculiarly eſtabliſhed. You are always complaining that women have certain defects and failings; your vanity deceives you: ſuch, indeed, would be defects and failings in you, but they are eſſential qualities in them, and women would be much worſe without them. You may prevent theſe pretended defects from growing worſe; but you ought to take great care not entirely to remove them.

The women, again, on their part, are conſtantly crying out, that we educate them to be vain and coquettiſh; that we conſtantly entertain them with puerilities, in order to maintain our authority over them; and attribute to us the failings for which we reproach them. What a ridiculous accuſation! How long is it that the men have troubled themſelves about the education of the women? What hinders mothers from bringing up their daughters juſt as they pleaſe? There are, to be ſure, no colleges and academies for girls: a ſad misfortune truely! Would to God there were none alſo for boys; they would be more ſenſibly and virtueuſly educated than they are. Who, ye mothers, compels your daughters to throw away their time in trifles? to ſpend half their lives, after your example, at the toilette? Who hinders you from inſtructing, or cauſing them to be inſtructed in

the manner you chooſe? Is it our fault that they charm us when they are pretty, that we are ſeduced by their affected airs, that the arts they learn of you attract and flatter us, that we love to ſee them becomingly dreſſed, and that we permit them to prepare at leiſure thoſe arms with which they ſubdue us to their pleaſure? Educate them, if you think proper, like the men; we ſhall readily conſent to it. The more they reſemble our ſex, the leſs power will they have over us; and when they once become like ourſelves, we ſhall then be truely their maſters.

The qualities common to both ſexes are not equally allotted to each; though taken all together they are equal in both: the woman is more perfect as a woman, and leſs as a man. In every caſe, where ſhe makes uſe of her own privileges, ſhe has the advantage over us; but where ſhe would uſurp our's ſhe becomes inferiour. The only reply to be made to this general truth is by bringing exceptions to it; the method of argumentation conſtantly uſed by the ſuperficial partizans of the fair ſex.

To cultivate in women, therefore, the qualifications of the men, and neglect thoſe which are peculiar to the ſex, would be acting to their prejudice: they ſee this very well, and are too artful to become the dupes of ſuch conduct: they endeavour, indeed, to uſurp our advantages, but they take care not to give up their own. By theſe means, however, it happens that, not being capable of both, becauſe they are incompatible,

tible, they fail of attaining the perfection of their own ſex, as well as of our's, and loſe half their merit. Let not the ſenſible mother, then, think of educating her daughter as a man, in contradiction to nature; but as a virtuous woman; and ſhe may be aſſured it will be much better both for her child and herſelf.

It does not hence follow, however, that ſhe ought to be educated in perfect ignorance, and confined merely to domeſtick concerns. Would a man make a ſervant of his companion, and deprive himſelf of the greateſt pleaſure of ſociety? To make her the more ſubmiſſive, would he prevent her from acquiring the leaſt judgement or knowledge? Would he reduce her to a mere automaton? Surely not! Nature hath dictated otherwiſe, in giving the ſex ſuch refined and agreeable talents: on the contrary, ſhe hath formed them for thought, for judgement, for love, and knowledge. They ſhould beſtow as much care on their underſtandings, therefore, as on their perſons, and add the charms of the one to the other, in order to ſupply their own want of ſtrength, and to direct our's. They ſhould, doubtleſs, learn many things, but only thoſe which it is proper for them to know.

Whether I conſider the peculiar deſtination of the ſex, obſerve their inclinations, or remark their duties, all things equally concur to point out the peculiar method of education beſt adapted to them. Woman and man were made for each other; but their mutual dependence is not the

ſame. The men depend on the women only on account of their deſires; the women on the men both on account of their deſires and their neceſſities: we could ſubſiſt better without them than they without us. Their very ſubſiſtence and rank in life depend on us, and the eſtimation in which we hold them, their charms and their merit. By the law of nature itſelf, both women and children lie at the mercy of the men: it is not enough they ſhould be really eſtimable, it is requiſite they ſhould be actually eſteemed; it is not enough they ſhould be beautiful, it is requiſite their charms ſhould pleaſe; it is not enough they ſhould be ſenſible and prudent, it is neceſſary they ſhould be acknowledged as ſuch: their glory lies not only in their conduct, but in their reputation; and it is impoſſible for any, who conſents to be accounted infamous, to be ever virtuous. A man, ſecure in his own good conduct, depends only on himſelf, and may brave the publick opinion; but a woman, in behaving well, performs but half her duty; as what is thought of her, is as important to her, as what ſhe really is. It follows hence, that the ſyſtem of a woman's education ſhould, in this reſpect, be directly contrary to that of our's. Opinion is the grave of virtue among the men; but its throne among the women.

On the good conſtitution of mothers depends originally that of their children; on the care of the women depends our earlieſt education; on the women alſo depend our manners, our paſ-

ſions,

ſions, our taſtes, our pleaſures, and even our happineſs itſelf. For this reaſon, the education of the women ſhould be always relative to the men. To pleaſe, to be uſeful to us, to make us love and eſteem them, to educate us when young, and take care of us when grown up, to adviſe, to conſole us, to render our lives eaſy and agreeable: theſe are the duties of women at all times, and what they ſhould be taught in their infancy. So long as we fail to recur to this principle, we run wide of the mark, and all the precepts which are given them contribute neither to their happineſs nor our own.

But although every woman is, and ought to be, deſirous of rendering herſelf pleaſing to the men, there is a wide difference between the deſire of being agreeable to a man of merit, a man truely amiable in himſelf, and the deſire of captivating thoſe affected pretty fellows, who are a diſgrace to their own ſex, as well as to that which they imitate. Neither nature nor reaſon induce a woman to admire thoſe qualities in a man which reſemble her own, nor is her copying their manners by any means the way to captivate their affections.

Whenever ſhe throws aſide, therefore, the reſerved and modeſt behaviour of the female, to aſſume the pert airs of a maſculine fop, ſhe renounces, inſtead of purſuing, the vocation of her ſex, and gives up thoſe rights ſhe means to uſurp: ſhe may think, indeed, ſhe could not otherwiſe be pleaſing to the men; but ſhe is greatly

greatly miſtaken. Fools only admire fools; and the deſire of captivating ſuch characters is a ſufficient indication of the taſte of ſuch as attempt it. Were there no frivolous and effeminate men, ſuch women would make them; and the follies of the former would be more owing to the latter than are now thoſe of the women to the men. The woman who loves real men, and is deſirous of pleaſing them, will take her meaſures accordingly. Woman is by her ſituation a coquette, but her coquetry changes its form and object according to her views: let us regulate theſe views, therefore, by thoſe of nature, and women will be properly educated.

Girls are from their earlieſt infancy fond of dreſs. Not content with being pretty, they are deſirous of being thought ſo; we ſee, by all their little airs, that this thought engages their attention; and they are hardly capable of underſtanding what is ſaid to them, before they are to be governed by talking to them of what people will think of their behaviour. The ſame motive, however, indiſcreetly made uſe of with boys, has not the ſame effect: provided they are left to purſue their amuſements at pleaſure, they care very little what people think of them. Time and pains are neceſſary to ſubject boys to this motive.

Whenceſoever girls derive this firſt leſſon, it is a very good one. As the body is born, in a manner before the ſoul, our firſt concern ſhould be to cultivate the former; this order is common

to both ſexes, but the object of that cultivation is different. In the one ſex it is the developement of corporeal powers; in the other, that of perſonal charms: not that either the quality of ſtrength or beauty ought to be confined excluſively to one ſex; but only that the order of the cultivation of both is in that reſpect reverſed. Women certainly require as much ſtrength as to enable them to move and act gracefully, and men as much addreſs as to qualify them to act with eaſe.

From the extreme effeminacy of the women ariſes that of the men. Women ought not to be robuſt like them, but for them, in order that the men born of them ſhould be robuſt alſo. In this reſpect, convents, where the boarders are coarſely dieted, but take much exercife in the gardens and open air, are preferable to home, where daughters are uſually more nicely fed and tenderly treated: here they are always either flattered or rebuked, and ſitting under the eye of their mother in a cloſe apartment, hardly ever venture to riſe up, walk about, talk, or breathe; they are not a moment at liberty, to play, run, romp about, and make a noiſe, agreeably to the natural petulance of their age. They are always treated at home with exceſſive indulgence, or ill-judged ſeverity; never according to the dictates of reaſon. Thus it is we ſpoil the perſons and the hearts of youth.

Among the Spartans, the girls uſed themſelves to military exercife, as well as the boys, not indeed

indeed to go to fight, but in order to be capable of bearing children able to undergo the fatigues of war. Not that I approve of their practice in this particular; it is not neceſſary for the women to carry a muſket and learn the Pruſſian exerciſe, in order to be capable of bearing robuſt children; what I would infer from this inſtance is, that the Greeks well underſtood the buſineſs of education. The young females appeared often in publick, not mixing promiſcuouſly among the boys, but in ſelect companies of their own ſex. There was hardly a ſingle feſtival, ſacrifice, or publick ceremony, at which the daughters of the principal citizens did not make their appearance, crowned with chaplets of flowers, ſinging hymns, dancing with their baſkets of oblations in their hands; and preſenting to the depraved ſenſes of the Greeks, a ſpectacle delightful in itſelf, and proper to counteract the bad effects of their indecent gymnaſtick. But whatever impreſſions this cuſtom might make on the hearts of the men, it was an excellent one, as well to form the conſtitution of the fair ſex by agreeable, moderate, and ſalutary exerciſe, as to refine the taſte, by cheriſhing in them a continual deſire to pleaſe without expoſing them to a corruption of manners.

No ſooner, however, were their females married, than they were ſecluded from publick view, and ſhut up in their houſes; their future concern relating entirely to the management of their families. Such is the manner

ner of life which both nature and reaſon preſcribe; and hence it was, that the Spartan mothers gave birth to the moſt healthy, robuſt, and well-made men in the world. Notwithſtanding the diſſolute character of ſome of the Grecian iſlands alſo, it is certain that the women of no people on earth, not excepting even the Romans, were at once more prudent and amiable than thoſe of ancient Greece.

It is well known, that a looſe and eaſy dreſs contributed much to give both ſexes thoſe fine proportions of body, that are obſervable in their ſtatues, and which ſerve as models to our preſent artiſts; nature being too much disfigured among us to afford them any ſuch. The Greeks knew nothing of thoſe Gothick ſhackles, that multiplicity of ligatures and bandages, with which our bodies are compreſſed. Their women were ignorant of the uſe of whalebone ſtays, by which our's diſtort their ſhape, inſtead of diſplaying it. I cannot but conceive, that this practice, carried to ſo great an exceſs as it is in England, muſt in time degenerate the ſpecies; and I will maintain it to be an inſtance of wretched taſte. Can it be a pleaſing ſight to behold a woman cut in two in the middle, as it were, like a waſp? On the contrary, it is as ſhocking to the eye, as it is painful to the imagination. A fine ſhape, like the limbs, hath its due ſize and proportion, a diminution of which is certainly a defect. Such a deformity alſo would be ſtriking in a naked figure;

figure; wherefore, then, ſhould it be eſteemed a beauty in one that is dreſſed?

I dare not be too explicit as to thoſe reaſons the women have for perſiſting to gird themſelves up in this manner: a falling breaſt, a riſing belly, &c. are, I confeſs, diſagreeable enough in a young woman of twenty; but theſe are no longer ſhocking when a woman is turned of thirty; and, indeed, ſuch defects at any age are leſs diſpleaſing than the ridiculous affectation of a little miſs of forty.

Every thing that confines and lays nature under a reſtraint is an inſtance of bad taſte: this is as true in regard to the ornaments of the body as to the embelliſhments of the mind. Life, health, reaſon, and convenience ought to be taken firſt into conſideration: gracefulneſs cannot ſubſiſt without eaſe; delicacy is not debility, nor muſt a woman be ſick in order to pleaſe. Infirmity and ſickneſs may excite our pity: but deſire and pleaſure require the bloom and vigour of health.

Children of both ſexes have a great many amuſements in common; and ſo they ought; have they not alſo many ſuch when they are grown up? Each ſex hath alſo its peculiar taſte to diſtinguiſh in this particular. Boys love ſports of noiſe and activity; to beat the drum, to whip the top, and to drag about their little carts: girls, on the other hand, are fonder of things of ſhow and ornament; ſuch as mirrours, trinkets, and dolls: the doll is the peculiar amuſement of the

the females; from whence we ſee their taſte plainly adapted to their deſtination. The phyſical part of the art of pleaſing lies in dreſs; and this is all which children are capacitated to cultivate of that art.

You ſhall ſee a little girl ſpend whole days about her waxen baby; be perpetually changing its clothes, dreſs and undreſs it an hundred times, and be for ever ſtudying new combinations of ornament; well or ill-ſorted, it is no matter: her fingers want dexterity, and her taſte is not yet formed; but her inclinations are ſufficiently evident. While thus occupied, her time ſlips inſenſibly away; ſhe forgets even her meals, and has more appetite to dreſs than to food. You will ſay, perhaps, that ſhe dreſſes up her baby, and not herſelf. Doubtleſs, it is her baby ſhe ſees, and not herſelf: ſhe can do nothing as yet about her own perſon, all her concerns centre in her doll, and in the management of this it is that ſhe diſplays all her coquetry. This, however, will not be always the caſe; the time approaches when ſhe will take the ſame pleaſure in ornamenting herſelf.

Here then we ſee a primary propenſity firmly eſtabliſhed, which you need only to purſue and regulate. The little creature will doubtleſs be very deſirous to know how to dreſs up her doll, to make its ſleeve-nots, its flounces, its head dreſs, &c. ſhe is obliged to have ſo much recourſe to the people about her, for their aſſiſtance in theſe articles, that it would be much more agreeable

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to her to owe them all to her own induſtry. Hence we have a good reaſon for the firſt leſſons that are uſually taught theſe young females: in which we do not appear to be ſetting them a taſk, but obliging them, by inſtructing them in what is immediately uſeful to themſelves. And, in fact, almoſt all of them learn with reluctance to read and write; but very readily apply themſelves to the uſe of their needles. They imagine themſelves already grown up, and think with pleaſure that ſuch qualifications will enable them to decorate themſelves.

The firſt path being laid open, it is very eaſy to purſue it: ſewing, embroidery, and lace making follow of courſe: tapeſtry, indeed, is not ſo much their taſte. Houſehold furniture is too far removed from their preſent thoughts; it does not immediately relate to their perſons, but is rendered intereſting by other conſiderations. The working of tapeſtry is an amuſement for grown women; girls never take much pleaſure in it.

Their voluntary progreſs in theſe employments may be eaſily extended to the art of drawing and deſign, which is by no means indifferent to ſuch as would dreſs themſelves with taſte and elegance. I would not have girls, however, apply themſelves to draw landſcapes, and ſtill leſs to hiſtory-pieces and figures. Foilage, fruits, flowers, drapery, and whatever may tend to enable them to give an elegance to dreſs, or to deſign themſelves a pattern for embroidery when they meet with none to their taſte, are ſufficient. If,

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in general, it behoves men to confine their ſtudies to uſeful knowledge, this is ſtill more neceſſary for the women; becauſe the lives of the latter, though leſs laborious, yet requiring greater aſſiduity, will not permit them to cultivate any talent, to the neglect of their duty.

Whatever may be ſometimes ſaid in raillery, good ſenſe is equally the property of both ſexes. Girls in general are more docile than boys, and, indeed, we ought to uſe more authority over them, as I obſerve hereafter; but it does not thence follow, that we ſhould require them to do any thing, of which they do not ſee the utility: it is the art of a mother to ſhow them the uſefulneſs of whatever they are ſet to do; and this is by ſo much the more eaſy, as the underſtanding ripens much ſooner in girls than boys. This rule frees their ſex, as well as our's, not only from thoſe indolent and uſeleſs ſtudies, which anſwer no good purpoſe, nor even render thoſe who cultivate them the more agreeable to others; but alſo all thoſe whoſe utility is not adapted to their preſent age, nor perceptible in a future one. If I am againſt compelling boys to learn to read, it is with ſtill greater reaſon that I oppoſe uſing any ſuch compulſion with girls, at leaſt till they are well inſtructed in the utility of reading: the manner, however, in which this utility is uſually inculcated, is much better adapted to our own notions of things than to their's. And, after all, where is the neceſſity for a girl's learning to read and write ſo early? Does ſhe ſo ſoon take on

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herſelf the management of a family? I am afraid there are but few who do not make rather a bad uſe than a good one of this fatal ſcience; and I am certain they have all ſo much curioſity as to learn it without compulſion, whenever they have leiſure and opportunity. Perhaps they ought to learn arithmetick, in preference to every thing elſe; for nothing can appear more uſeful at any time of life, nor requires longer practice, than the keeping accounts. If a little girl ſhould have no means of obtaining cherries or ſugar-plumbs, but by reſolving a queſtion in arithmetick, I will anſwer for it ſhe would ſoon learn to calculate for them.

I once knew a young a perſon who learned to write before ſhe learned to read, and began to write with her needle before ſhe could uſe a pen. At firſt, indeed, ſhe took it into her head to make no other letter than the O. This letter ſhe was conſtantly making of all ſizes, and always the wrong way. Unluckily, one day, as ſhe was intent on this employment, ſhe happened to ſee herſelf in the looking-glaſs; when, taking a diſlike to the conſtrained attitude in which ſhe ſat while writing, ſhe threw away her pen, like another Pallas, and determined againſt making the O any more. Her brother was alſo equally averſe to writing: it was the confinement, however, and not the conſtrained attitude, that moſt diſguſted him. A method was ſoon taken with the ſiſter to bring her back to her writing: being very nice, and not a little vain;

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ſhe did not chooſe that her ſiſters ſhould wear any of her linen; for this reaſon they uſed to be marked, a circumſtance which was now wilfully neglected: it became neceſſary for her, therefore, to mark them herſelf; which ſhe ſpeedily effected; and by that method, it will be readily conceived, ſoon learned to write.

Let there be propriety in all the injunctions you lay upon young girls, but take care always to impoſe on them ſomething to learn or to do. Indolence and indocility are two of the moſt dangerous ill qualities they are ſubject to, and what they are the moſt ſeldom cured of, when they have once contracted them. Girls ought to be active and diligent; nor is that all; they ſhould alſo be early ſubjected to reſtraint. This misfortune, if it really be one, is inſeparable from their ſex; nor do they ever throw it off but to ſuffer more cruel evils. They muſt be ſubject, all their lives, to the moſt conſtant and ſevere reſtraint, which is that of decorum: it is, therefore, neceſſary to accuſtom them early to ſuch confinement, that it may not afterwards coſt them too dear; and to the ſuppreſſion of their caprices, that they may the more readily ſubmit to the will of others. If, indeed, they are fond of being always at work, they ſhould be ſometimes compelled to lay it aſide. Diſſipation, levity and inconſtancy are faults that readily ſpring up from their firſt propenſities, when corrupted or perverted by too much indulgence. To prevent this abuſe, we ſhould learn them,

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above all things, to lay a due reſtraint on themſelves. The life of a modeſt woman is reduced, by our abſurd inſtitutions, to a perpetual conflict with herſelf: not but it is juſt that this ſex ſhould partake of the ſufferings which ariſe from thoſe evils it hath cauſed us.

You ſhould ever prevent your daughers from being fatigued and diſguſted with their employments, as well as from being too much delighted with their amuſements; which is conſtantly the caſe in the ordinary methods of education; wherein, as Fenelon obſerves, every thing that is diſagreeable is placed on one ſide, and every thing agreeable on the other. The firſt of theſe two inconveniencies cannot happen, if the preceding rules are obſerved, unleſs the perſons who are about them are diſagreeable. A child, who loves her mother or her nurſe, will ſit at work whole days by their ſide without reluctance: the mere pleaſure of prattling with them ſufficiently indemnifies her for the confinement. But, if ſhe diſlike her governeſs, ſhe will be diſguſted with every thing that is required to be done in her preſence. It is very rare that girls, who do not take more delight in being with their mother than with any other perſon in the world, turn out well. In order to judge of their real ſentiments, however, it is neceſſary to ſtudy them, and not to depend altogether on what they ſay; as they begin very young to diſguiſe their thoughts, and become early miſtreſſes of flattery and diſſimulation. They ought not, nevertheleſs, to be enjoined

enjoined to love their mother, as an obligation: affection does not follow duty, nor is it in this particular that conſtraint ſhould be uſed. The common attachment and regard of a mother, nay mere habit, will make her beloved by her children, if ſhe does nothing to incur their hate. Even the conſtraint ſhe lays them under, if well directed, will increaſe their affection, inſtead of leſſening it; becauſe a ſtate of dependence being natural to the ſex, they perceive themſelves formed for obedience.

For the ſame reaſon that they have, or ought to have, but little liberty, they are apt to indulge themſelves exceſſively in what is allowed them. Addicted in every thing to extremes, they are even more tranſported at their diverſions than boys: this is the ſecond inconvenience of which I ſpoke before. Theſe tranſports ought to be moderated; being the cauſe of many vices peculiar to the women; ſuch, among others, are the caprice and infatuation by which a woman is in raptures to-day with an object ſhe may regard with coldneſs and indifference to-morrow. The inconſtancy of their inclinations is as fatal to them as their exceſs; both one and the other alſo are derived from the ſame ſource. Deny them not the indulgence of their innocent mirth, their ſports and paſtimes; but ever prevent their ſating themſelves with one, to run to another; permit them not for a moment to perceive themſelves entirely freed from reſtraint. Uſe them to be interrupted in the midſt of their play, and

ſent to work, without murmuring. Habit alone is ſufficient to inure them to this, becauſe it is only confirming the operations of nature.

There reſults from this habitual reſtraint a tractableneſs which the women have occaſion for during their whole lives, as they conſtantly remain either under ſubjection to the men, or to the opinions of mankind; and are never permitted to ſet themſelves above thoſe opinions. The firſt and moſt important qualification in a woman is good nature or ſweetneſs of temper: formed to obey a being ſo imperfect as man, often full of vices, and always full of faults, ſhe ought to learn betimes even to ſuffer injuſtice, and to bear the inſults of a huſband without complaint; it is not for his ſake, but her own, that ſhe ſhould be of a mild diſpoſition. The perverſeneſs and ill-nature of the women only ſerve to aggravate their own misfortunes, and the miſconduct of their huſbands; they might plainly perceive that ſuch are not the arms by which they gain the ſuperiority. Heaven did not beſtow on them the powers of inſinuation and perſuaſion to make them perverſe and moroſe; it did not conſtitute them feeble to make them imperious; it did not give them ſo ſoft and agreeable a voice to vent abuſe, nor features ſo delicate and lovely to be diſfigured with anger. When they give way to rage, therefore, they forget themſelves; for, though they may often have reaſon to complain, they are always in the wrong to ſcold. Each ſex ſhould preſerve its peculiar

peculiar tone and manner; a meek huſband may make a wife impertinent; but mildneſs of diſpoſition on the woman's ſide will always bring a man back to reaſon, at leaſt if he be not abſolutely a brute, and will ſooner or later triumph over him.

Daughters ſhould be always ſubmiſſive; their mothers, however, ſhould not be inexorable. To make a young perſon tractable, ſhe ought not to be made unhappy; to make her modeſt ſhe ought not to be rendered ſtupid. On the contrary, I ſhould not be diſpleaſed at her being permitted to uſe ſome art, not to elude puniſhment in caſe of diſobedience, but to exempt herſelf from the neceſſity of obeying. It is not neceſſary to make her dependence burthenſome, but only to let her feel it. Subtilty is a talent natural to the ſex; and, as I am perſuaded, all our natural inclinations are right and good in themſelves, I am of opinion this ſhould be cultivated as well as the others: it is requiſite for us only to prevent its abuſe.

I appeal, for the truth of this remark, to every fair and candid obſerver. I would not have the examination, however, confined to the women themſelves; it is poſſible that our narrow ſcheme of educating them may have cramped their genius: but let us obſerve the children of both ſexes. If we compare little girls with boys of the ſame age, the latter will be found extremely dull and ſtupid in compariſon of the former, or I am greatly miſtaken. Of this I will take the

liberty to give an example, attended with the greateſt degree of puerile ſimplicity.

It is very common to forbid children aſking for any thing at table; always thinking it requiſite to lay them under ſome needleſs injunction; as if what they aſked for were not eaſily granted or refuſed them*, without our making a poor child uneaſy between deſire and expectation. Every body hath heard of the addreſs of the little boy, who, being thus prohibited to aſk, and ſeeing himſelf neglected, petitioned only for a little ſalt, by which means he obtained alſo ſome meat. It is here certain that he incurred, in ſome meaſure, the penalty of diſobedience in aſking directly for ſalt, and by ſo doing indirectly for meat; the neglect of him, however, was ſo cruel, that, though he had more openly tranſgreſſed this abſurd law, and ſaid in plain terms, I am hungry, I can hardly think any body could have found in their hearts to have puniſhed him.

But the method which I ſaw a little girl, of ſix years old, once take to gain her point, on a like occaſion, was ſtill more ſubtle and artful. Her ſituation was alſo more nice and critical; for being not only ſtrictly forbidden to aſk, either directly or indirectly, her diſobedience would have been more unpardonable, as ſhe had been already helped from every diſh on the table except

* A child will always be importunate when it finds its intereſt in it: but it will never aſk twice for the ſame thing, if the firſt denial is always irrevocable.

cept one, of which ſhe was extremely fond; and this had been forgotten.

To effect a reparation of this neglect, therefore, without being charged with diſobedience, ſhe began to number the diſhes on the table, pointing to each, and ſaying, "This I have eat of, and that I have eat of;" at the ſame time making a remarkable pauſe, and paſſing over in ſilence that which ſhe had not taſted; which ſomebody taking notice of, and ſaying, "And this; have you not eaten of this too?"—"Oh! no (replied the little epicure, very modeſtly) not yet." Compare theſe inſtances: the latter ſhows the fineſſe and cunning of a girl, the former that of a boy.

Whatever is, is right: nor can any general rule in nature be wrong. The ſuperiority of addreſs, peculiar to the female ſex, is a very equitable indemnification for their inferiority in point of ſtrength: without this, woman would not be the companion of man; but his ſlave: it is by her ſuperiour art and ingenuity that ſhe preſerves her equality, and governs him while ſhe affects to obey. Woman has every thing againſt her, as well our faults, as her own timidity and weakneſs; ſhe has nothing in her favour, but her ſubtilty and her beauty. Is it not very reaſonable, therefore, ſhe ſhould cultivate both? Beauty, indeed, is not very general; it is liable to be deſtroyed by accident, it loſes its power by habit, and its exiſtence by time. Woman's beſt reſource is in her intellectual talents; by which,

however, I do not mean thoſe which are uſually ſo much admired in the gay world, and contribute nothing to her happineſs; but ſuch as are adapted to her ſituation, and enable her to profit even by our advantages. It is hardly to be conceived how uſeful this addreſs in the women is to ourſelves; how much it adds to our ſocial pleaſures, reſtrains the petulance of children, corrects the brutality of huſbands, and preſerves that order in a family, which would without it be entirely deſtroyed. That artful and wicked women ſometimes make a bad uſe of this addreſs, is very certain; but what will not vice abuſe? Let us not deſtroy the inſtruments of our happineſs, becauſe the wicked ſometimes make uſe of them to our prejudice.

Dreſs may make a woman fine, but perſonal charms only make her pleaſe. Our clothes are not ourſelves: they often disfigure and are unbecoming, becauſe they are too remarkable: and thoſe which moſt diſtinguiſh the wearer, are often ſuch as are leaſt remarkable in themſelves. The uſual method of educating girls is, in this reſpect, quite abſurd: they are promiſed fine clothes, &c. by way of rewards, and are taught to admire affected modes of dreſs. Again, they are themſelves admired when finely dreſſed; whereas they ought to be given to underſtand, that ſo much care to deck them out is beſtowed on them only to hide their defects, and that the real triumph of beauty lies in the diſplay of its native charms. A fondneſs for faſhions is thus

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a proof of bad taſte, as the perſon and features do not change with the mode; what is becoming or unbecoming at one time, muſt therefore be always ſo.

Should I ſee a young lady ſtrutting about and priding herſelf in her fine clothes, and ſeem uneaſy about what people would think of her figure thus diſguiſed; ſhould, I ſay, theſe ornaments make her too fine; it is a pity; do you think ſhe is handſome enough to wear plainer clothes? To look well without this ſtomacher or that aigrette? She herſelf would very probably be the firſt to wiſh them laid aſide, that I might judge. I ſhould never pay her ſo many compliments as when ſhe might happen to be plainly dreſſed. Were ſhe once taught to regard dreſs as a ſupplement only to the charms of her perſon, and as a tacit confeſſion that they ſtood in need of ſuch aſſiſtance, ſhe would be no longer proud of dreſs, but humbled by it; ſo that ſhould any body admire her, when tricked out finer than ordinary, inſtead of being elated by the compliment, ſhe would be apt to bluſh for ſhame.

There are indeed ſome perſons, who require the aſſiſtance of dreſs to render them agreeable: there are none, however, that can require their apparel to be rich and tawdry. Such dreſſes are owing to the pride of rank, and not to perſonal vanity; being merely the effect of prejudice. Genuine coquetry is ſometimes affectedly elegant, but never affectedly rich: Juno was more

ſuperbly attired than Venus. "*As you could not make her beautiful, you have made her fine,*" ſaid Apelles, one day, to a wretched painter, who had drawn a picture of Helen, with very rich drapery. In fact, I have always obſerved, that the moſt pompous dreſſes have been worn by ordinary women: there cannot be a more abſurd piece of vanity than this. Furniſh a girl that hath taſte enough to deſpiſe the faſhion, with ribbands, gauze, muſlin, and flowers; and ſhe will preſently dreſs her head, without diamonds, pompons, or lace*, in a manner infinitely more agreeable than if ſhe had employed all the brilliant trumpery of the toy-ſhop and millener.

As what is once becoming, is always ſo, and it is expedient to appear ever as agreeable as poſſible, thoſe women who are good judges of dreſs, make choice of what is becoming, and keep to it: by which means, they are alſo leſs buſied about their apparel than ſuch as are perpetually changing. A true regard to dreſs requires not the labours of the toilette; young ladies have ſeldom that regular apparatus; their leſſons and work take up too much of their time, and yet they are in general as nicely dreſſed, the article of rouge excepted, as their mamas, and often in much better taſte. We are miſtaken concerning

* Women, whoſe complexions are ſo fair that they have no occaſion for lace, give great offence, nevertheleſs, to others, if they do not wear it. It is almoſt always the ugly people who ſet faſhions, which the handſome ones are, notwithſtanding, fooliſh enough to follow.

ing the abuſe of the toilette, it is owing more to liſtleſſneſs and diſguſt than to vanity. A woman of faſhion, who ſpends ſix hours at her toilette, is not ignorant that ſhe is no better dreſſed than another, who might ſpend only half an hour; but the hours thus ſpent, are ſo much deducted from the killing length of time, under which we labour; and it is thought more adviſeable to amuſe ourſelves with decorating our own perſons, than to remain diſcontented with every thing about us. Without the toilette, how would it be poſſible to fill up the hours between twelve at noon and nine in the evening? A woman of faſhion, in aſſembling her women about her on this occaſion, amuſes herſelf not a little in teiſing them; this is ſomething: by this method alſo ſhe avoids a diſagreeable *tête-à-tête* with her huſband, whom ſhe ſees at no other time; this is ſtill more: then come in the tradeſmen, the fine gentlemen, the fine writers, with their verſes, ſongs, and pamphlets; theſe things could never be ſo commodiouſly brought together without the toilette. The only real advantage of the toilette, however, is the pretext for a lady's diſplaying her charms a little more than when ſhe is full dreſſed; but this advantage is not ſo conſiderable as is generally imagined.

Scruple not to beſtow on women the education proper for their ſex; bring them up to love the occupations peculiar to it, to be modeſt, and to employ themſelves in the management of family concerns; the parade of the toilette will then

fall into neglect of itſelf, and the women will only be dreſſed in a better taſte.

The firſt thing which young perſons obſerve, as they grow up, is that all theſe foreign aids of dreſs are ſtill inſufficient, if they have no charms in their own perſons. Beauty cannot be acquired by dreſs, and coquetry is an art not ſo early and ſpeedily attained. While girls are yet young, however, they are in a capacity to ſtudy agreeable geſture, a pleaſing modulation of voice, an eaſy carriage and behaviour; as well as to take the advantage of gracefully adapting their looks and attitudes to time, place, and occaſion. Their application, therefore, ſhould not be ſolely confined to the arts of induſtry and the needle, when they come to diſplay other talents, whoſe utility is already apparent.

I know ſome perſons are ſo ſevere that they would not have girls taught ſinging, dancing, nor any of the agreeable arts. This ſeems to me, however, very abſurd and ridiculous. Pray on whom would they have theſe talents beſtowed? On the boys? Do theſe accompliſhments beſt become the men or the women? They will anſwer, perhaps, that they become neither; that profane ſongs are criminal; that dancing is the invention of the Devil; and that girls ought to have no other amuſements than their ſampler and their prayers. Strange amuſements, truely, for a girl of ten years of age! For my part, I am ſomewhat afraid that theſe little ſaints, in conſequence of being thus compelled to ſpend their

their childhood in praying to God, will be tempted to ſpend their youth in very different employment; and that they will endeavour to make up, when they are married, for the time they will conceive they loſt before-hand. It is in my opinion neceſſary to pay a regard to their age as well as their ſex: a little miſs ought not ſurely to lead the life of her grand-mother, but, on the contrary, to be indulged in her vivacity and childiſh amuſements; ſhe ſhould be permitted to ſing, to dance, to play about as much as ſhe pleaſed, and to enjoy all the innocent pleaſures of her age: the time will come but too ſoon, when ſhe muſt be more reſerved, and put on a more conſtrained behaviour.

But may we not aſk, if even the neceſſity of this change be real? Is this not alſo the effect of our prejudices? In ſubjecting modeſt women only to the more ſad and melancholy duties of life, we baniſh from the marriage-ſtate every thing that ſhould render it agreeable to the men. Need we be aſtoniſhed that the ſad ſolemnity, which uſually prevails at home, ſhould ſend them to ſeek diverſions abroad? Or that men ſhould be ſo little inclined to embrace ſo diſagreeable a ſtate? Chriſtianity, by carrying our duties to extremes, hath rendered them abſurd and impracticable; by prohibiting ſongs, dancings, and other worldly amuſements, to women, it makes them heavy, moroſe, factious, and inſupportable in their houſes. There is no other religion in the world, by which the duties of marriage are

rendered ſo ſevere, nor is ſo ſacred an engagement any where ſo much deſpiſed as among Chriſtians. So much pains is taken to prevent the women from being amiable, that huſbands are thereby rendered indifferent. I know very well that the latter are blameable in this; but I know alſo that it cannot be otherwiſe, as huſbands, though Chriſtians, are ſtill men. For my part, I would have a young Engliſhwoman cultivate her agreeable talents, in order to pleaſe her future huſband, with as much care and aſſiduity as a young Circaſſian cultivates her's, to fit her for the Harem of an Eaſtern baſhaw. It is ſaid that huſbands, in general, give themſelves little concern about ſuch talents in their wives; I can very eaſily believe it, as inſtead of their being employed in pleaſing them, they uſually ſerve only as a bait to allure a parcel of impudent young fellows to diſhonour them. But, can you imagine that an amiable and prudent woman, poſſeſſed of ſuch talents, and conſecrating them to the amuſement of her huſband, would not greatly add to the happineſs of his life, and prevent him, when leaving his cloſet with a mind fatigued with ſtudy, from going to ſeek recreation abroad? Are there no inſtances of happy families ſo united, that each can furniſh ſomething in itſelf for their common amuſement? And are not the confidence and familiarity ſubſiſting between them, the innocence and ſweetneſs of the pleaſures they experience, infinitely

infinitely ſuperiour to the riotous pleaſures of publick entertainments?

The agreeable talents are too much confined to method. They are rendered too abſtracted by being reduced to maxims and precepts; and hence thoſe things which ſhould conſtitute the amuſement of young people, are made diſguſting to them, as the ſtudy of an art. I cannot conceive any thing more ridiculous, than to ſee an old ſinging or dancing-maſter, approach a young, lively, giggling girl, with a frigid and formal air; and aſſume, in teaching his frivolous ſcience, a more pedantick and magiſterial tone, than if he were teaching her the catechiſm. Is it that the art of ſinging, for inſtance, depends on the knowledge of written muſick? Is it not poſſible to acquire a juſt command of voice, to learn to ſing with taſte, and even to accompany an inſtrument, without knowing a ſingle note? Is the ſame manner of ſinging adapted to all voices? Doth the ſame method of teaching ſuit equally every genius? It is impoſſible to make me believe, that the ſame attitudes, the ſame ſteps, the ſame motions and geſtures, or even the ſame dances, are equally proper for a little, lively, ſharp-eyed brunette, and a tall beauty with languiſhing eyes and flaxen hair. When I ſee a dancing-maſter give the ſame leſſon, therefore, indiſcriminately to both, I ſay to myſelf, this man follows the cuſtoms of his profeſſion, but he underſtands nothing of his art.

It is queried whether girls ſhould be educated under preceptors or governants. For my part, I know not which is beſt; but I could wiſh they had no occaſion for either one or the other; but that they might be permitted to learn of their own accord what they have ſo great an inclination to know; and that we did not ſee ſuch a number of laced-coated dancers running perpetually about our ſtreets. I can hardly believe that the communication held with this ſort of people, is leſs hurtful to their ſcholars, than their leſſons are uſeful to them; or that their tone, jargon, and manner, give their ſcholars the firſt taſte for trifles ſo important to their teachers, whoſe examples they follow in making them afterwards their only occupation.

As to thoſe arts, whoſe object it is merely to pleaſe, young perſons might learn them every where and of every perſon; of their father, mother, brothers, ſiſters, friends, governeſſes, of their looking-glaſs, and particularly from their own taſte. We ſhould never be ſollicitous to give them leſſons of this kind; but let them be the firſt to require them: we ought never to make a taſk of what is in itſelf a recompence, it being in this ſort of ſtudies particularly, that the firſt ſtep to ſucceed is to be deſirous of it. But, if it be abſolutely neceſſary for them to be inſtructed in form, I ſhall not determine from which ſex it is moſt proper for them to receive their leſſons. I know not whether it be neceſſary for a dancing-maſter to take his young

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ſcholar by her ſoft hand, to make her hold up her petticoat, diſplay her fine arms, hold back her head, and raiſe her heaving breaſt; but I know that I would not, for all the world, be that maſter.

Induſtry and talents form the taſte; by means of taſte alſo it is that the mind inſenſibly acquires ideas of the truely beautiful, and in time, of moral relations, which depend thereon. This is, perhaps, one of the reaſons why the ſentiments of modeſty and decency take riſe earlier in girls than boys: for to imagine that notions ſo premature are the effect of the leſſons of the governeſs, argues but little acquaintance with the nature of thoſe leſſons, and the progreſs of the human mind. The talent of ſpeaking holds the firſt rank in the art of pleaſing; it is that alone which can give new attractions to thoſe charms which have loſt their power over the ſenſes by habit. It is the mind which not only animates the body, but in ſome ſenſe gives it a new form; it is by the ſucceſſion of its ſentiments and ideas, that it enlivens and diverſifies the countenance; it is by the diſcourſe it inſpires, that attention is kept on the ſtretch, and preſerves for any long time the ſame regard for the ſame object. I conceive, it is, for all theſe reaſons that girls ſo early acquire an agreeable mode of prattle, that they are emphatick in their diſcourſe, even before they well know what they ſay, and that men amuſe themſelves by liſtening to their talk, even before they can underſtand them.

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The tongues of women are very voluble; they ſpeak earlier, more readily and more agreeably than the men; they are accuſed alſo of ſpeaking much more: but ſo it ought to be, and I ſhould be very ready to convert this reproach into a compliment; their lips and eyes have the ſame activity, and for the ſame reaſon. A man ſpeaks of what he knows, a woman of what pleaſes her; the one requires knowledge, the other taſte; the principal object of a man's diſcourſe ſhould be what is uſeful, that of a woman's what is agreeable. There ought to be nothing in common between their different converſation but truth.

We ought not, therefore, to reſtrain the prattle of girls, in the ſame manner as we ſhould that of boys with that ſevere queſtion; *To what purpoſe are you talking?* but by another, which is not leſs difficult to anſwer, *How will your diſcourſe be received?* In infancy, while they are as yet incapable to diſcern good from evil, they ought to obſerve it, as a law, never to ſay any thing diſagreeable to thoſe whom they are ſpeaking to: what will render the practice of this rule alſo the more difficult, is, that it muſt ever be ſubordinate to the former, of never ſpeaking falſely or telling an untruth.

There are indeed many other difficulties attending the practice of this rule: but they belong to a more advanced age. At preſent, the only pains it will coſt girls to be ſincere, is to avoid at the ſame time being rude; and as rude-

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neſs is what they are naturally averſe to, they may be ſoon taught by education to avoid it. I have obſerved from my experience, in the world, that in general the politeneſs of the men is more officious, and that of the women more obliging. The men appear more deſirous to ſerve you, and the women to pleaſe you. It hence follows, that, notwithſtanding it be ſomething characteriſtical in the women, their politeneſs is leſs inſincere than our's; in them it is only a diffuſion of their natural inſtinct; but when a man pretends to prefer my intereſt to his own, whatever demonſtrations he may make to varniſh over the falſehood, I am very certain it is one. It coſts the women, therefore, no trouble to be polite, nor, of conſequence, girls to become ſo. Their firſt leſſon is inculcated by nature; art only ſeconds her deſigns, and determines the manner in which they are to be carried into execution. With regard to the politeneſs of women among each other it is a different thing. They mix with it ſuch an air of conſtraint, and are ſo cold in their civilities, that as the reſtraint is mutual, they give themſelves little trouble to hide it, and appear ever ſincere in their diſſimulation by never ſtriving to conceal it. Not but that young females are ſometimes frank and earneſt in their friendſhips. At their age, chearfulneſs ſupplies the place of a good diſpoſition, and, being ſatisfied with themſelves, are ſatisfied with all the world. It is, however, certain that they ſalute and careſs each other more heartily, and with a better

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grace in the preſence of the men; taking a pleaſure as it where, in whetting the deſires of the latter, by tantalizing them with the ſhadow of thoſe favours which they know ſo well how to make them envy.

If boys ought not to be indulged in aſking indiſcreet queſtions, much leſs ſhould girls; whoſe curioſity, either ſatisfied or imprudently evaded, is of much greater conſequence, on account of their penetration to foreſee the myſteries which are concealed from them, and their addreſs in diſcovering them. But, without permitting them to aſk queſtions, I would have them be continually interrogated themſelves; and excited to prattle, in order to accuſtom them to a fluency of ſpeech, to make them quick at reply, and to refine their wit and their tongue, as much as poſſible, without danger. Such converſations, being always accompanied with gaiety, but managed with art and diſcretion, would be an amuſement adapted to their years, and might be made the means of inculcating, in the innocent minds of ſuch young perſons, the firſt, and perhaps the moſt uſeful leſſons of morality they may ever receive; teaching them, under the appearance of pleaſure and vanity, what are the qualities for which men truely hold them in eſteem, and in what conſiſt the glory and happineſs of a modeſt woman.

It is eaſy to be conceived, that if male children are not in a capacity to form any true notions of religion, thoſe ideas muſt be greatly above the conception

conception of the females: it is for this very reaſon, I would begin to ſpeak to them the earlier on this ſubject; for if we were to wait till they were in a capacity to diſcuſs methodically ſuch profound queſtions, we ſhould run a riſk of never ſpeaking to them on this ſubject as long as they lived. Reaſon in women is a practical reaſon, capacitating them artfully to diſcover the means of attaining a known end, but which would never enable them to diſcover that end itſelf. The ſocial relations of the ſexes are indeed truly admirable: from their union there reſults a moral perſon, of which woman may be termed the eyes and man the hand, with this dependence on each other, that it is from the man that the woman is to learn what ſhe is to ſee, and it is of the woman that man is to learn what he ought to do. If woman could recur to the firſt principles of things as well as man, and man was capacitated to enter into their *minutiæ* as well as woman, always independent of each other, they would live in perpetual diſcord, and their union could not ſubſiſt. But in the preſent harmony which naturally ſubſiſts between them, their different faculties tend to one common end; it is difficult to ſay which of them conduces the moſt to it: each follows the impulſe of the other; each is obedient and both are maſters.

As the conduct of a woman is ſubſervient to the publick opinion, her faith in matters of religion ſhould for that very reaſon be ſubject to authority. Every daughter ought to be of the

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ſame religion as her mother, and every wife to be of the religion of her huſband: for, though ſuch religion ſhould be falſe, that docility which induces the mother and daughter to ſubmit to the order of nature, takes away, in the ſight of God, the criminality of their errour. As they are not in a capacity to judge for themſelves, they ought to abide by the deciſion of their fathers and huſbands as confidently as by that of the church.

Women, being incapable of forming articles of faith for themſelves, cannot confine them within the limits of evidence and reaſon; but permitting themſelves to be led aſtray by a thouſand foreign impulſes, are always wide of the mark of truth. Always in extremes, they are either libertines or devotees: none of them being capable of uniting wiſdom and piety.

As authority ought to regulate the religion of the women, it is not ſo needful to explain to them the reaſons for their belief, as to lay down preciſely the tenets they are to believe: for the creed, which preſents only obſcure ideas to the mind, is the ſource of fanaticiſm; and that which preſents abſurdities, leads to infidelity. I know not whether our preſent catechiſms tend moſt to make people impious or fanatical; but I know they tend neceſſarily to one or the other.

In order to teach religion to young girls, we ought, in the firſt place, never to make it an object of ſadneſs or reſtraint, never to impoſe it as a taſk or a duty: of courſe we ſhould never oblige them to get any thing by heart not even

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their prayers. Content yourſelf with regularly performing your devotions in their preſence, without ever requiring them, however, to join with you. Let your prayers be ſhort, after the example of Jeſus Chriſt. Repeat them with proper ſolemnity and reverence; remembering that when we require the attention of the Supreme Being, we certainly ought ourſelves to pay the utmoſt attention to what we ſay.

It is of leſs conſequence that girls ſhould be early, than that they ſhould be fully and clearly, inſtructed in the articles of their religion, and particularly that they ſhould be induced to take a delight in them. When you render them burthenſome; when you repreſent God as always incenſed at them; when you impoſe on them, in his name a number of diſagreeable duties, which they ſee you give yourſelf no trouble to diſcharge; what can they think but that learning their catechiſm, and praying to God, are the duties only of little girls, and therefore they long to grow up, in order to be exempted, as you appear to be, from ſuch diſagreeable injunctions? —Example! It is example, without which nothing is to be done with children.

When you would explain to them the articles of their faith, let it be by direct inſtruction, and not in the way of queſtion and anſwer. They ought never to reply otherwiſe than as they think; and not in terms dictated to them. All the anſwers in our catechiſms are perverted; it is there the ſcholar who inſtructs the maſter: they are

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even ſo many falſehoods in the mouths of children, becauſe they thus take on them to explain what they do not underſtand, and affirm what they are in no capacity to believe. Nay, I ſhould be glad to find thoſe among the moſt intelligent of mankind, who do not lie abominably in ſaying their catechiſm.

The firſt queſtion that preſents itſelf in our catechiſm is this; *Who made you, and brought you into the world?* To which the child, though ſhe believes all the while it was her mother, anſwers without heſitation, *God.* The only thing ſhe finds in all this is, a queſtion ſhe can hardly underſtand, to which ſhe makes an anſwer which ſhe does not underſtand at all.

I could wiſh that ſome able perſon, who is well acquainted with the progreſs of the underſtanding in children, would write a proper catechiſm for them. It would be, perhaps, the moſt uſeful book that ever was penned, nor would it in my opinion be leſs to the honour of its author. This is very certain, that ſuch a catechiſm, well executed, would very little reſemble our's.

Such a deſign, however, would not be properly effected, unleſs the replies were ſuch as a child might make to the queſtions propoſed, without being verbally taught them. At the ſame time, it muſt be underſtood, that the child ſhould find itſelf ſometimes in a capacity to interrogate in its turn. To make the reader underſtand perfectly what I mean, it may not be improper to

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give ſomething of a ſpecimen: I perceive, indeed, the difficulty of it; but ſhall try, at leaſt, to trace a ſlight ſketch of what I propoſe on this head.

I conceive, then, to begin with the firſt queſtion of our catechiſm, it ſhould commence nearly thus:

Nurſe.—Do you remember, my dear, when your mama was a little girl.

Child.—No.

Nurſe.—No! How ſo? You that have ſo good a memory!

Child.—I was not then come into the world.

Nurſe.—Then you have not lived always in the world.

Child.—No.

Nurſe.—And ſhall you always live here?

Child.—Yes.

Nurſe.—Are you young or old?

Child.—I am young.

Nurſe.—And your grand-mama, is ſhe old or young?

Child.—She is old.

Nurſe.—Was ſhe ever young?

Child.—Yes.

Nurſe.—And why is ſhe not ſo ſtill?

Child.—Becauſe ſhe is grown old.

Nurſe.—Shall you grow old like her?

Child.—I don't know*.

Nurſe.—

* Wherever I have made the child anſwer, *I don't know*, ſhould ſhe give a different anſwer, we ſhould diſtruſt what ſhe ſaid, and make her carefully explain herſelf.

Nurſe.—Where is the robe you wore laſt year?

Child.—I have laid it aſide.

Nurſe.—And why laid it aſide.

Child.—Becauſe it was too little for me.

Nurſe.—And why was it too little for you?

Child.—Becauſe I am grown bigger.

Nurſe.—Shall you ſtill grow bigger?

Child.—Oh! yes.

Nurſe.—And what do great girls come to?

Child.—They come to be women.

Nurſe.—And what do they become then?

Child.—They become mothers.

Nurſe.—And what do mothers grow?

Child.—They grow old.

Nurſe.—You, then, will grow old.

Child.—Yes, when I ſhall be a mother.

Nurſe.—And what becomes of people when they are old?

Child.—I don't know.

Nurſe.—Why what is become of your grandpapa?

Child.—He is dead*.

Nurſe.—

* The child might make this anſwer, becauſe ſhe had heard it ſo ſaid; but it would be neceſſary to ſee whether ſhe entertained any clear idea of death; for this idea is not ſo ſimple, nor ſo much within the capacity of children as might be imagined. In the poem of Abel, there is given an example of the method that ſhould be taken to communicate this idea to the minds of children. This charming piece breathes a delightful ſimplicity, which cannot be too much imitated in our converſations with children.

Nurſe.—And why did he die?

Child.—Becauſe he was old.

Nurſe.—You ſee then what becomes of people when they are old.

Child.—Yes, they die.

Nurſe.—And you, when you grow old, muſt—

Child, interrupting her.—Oh! no, nurſe; I will not die.

Nurſe.—Nobody, child, is willing to die, and yet every body muſt.

Child.—What! muſt my mama die too?

Nurſe.—Certainly, as well as every body elſe. Women grow old as well as men; and old age brings on death.

Child.—What muſt one do to make it a long time before one grows old.

Nurſe.—Live prudently while one is young.

Child.—Then I will be always prudent, nurſe.

Nurſe.—So much the better; but after all, can you expect to live for ever?

Child.—When I am grown very, very old—

Nurſe.—Well, what then?

Child.—Why, when one is ſo very old, you ſay one muſt die.

Nurſe.—You, therefore, will die ſome time or other?

Child.—Ah! yes.

Nurſe.—Who were they that lived before you?

Child.—My father and mother.

Nurſe.—And who lived before them?

Child.—Their father and mother.

Nurſe.—Who will live after you?

Child.—My children.

Nurſe.—Who after them?

Child.—Their children, &c.

In purſuing this method, we trace out, by ſenſible inductions, a beginning and end of the human race; that is to ſay, we come by degrees to a father and mother who had neither father nor mother, and to children that will have no children.

It requires a long ſeries of ſimilar queſtions to prepare a child for underſtanding the firſt queſtion in our common catechiſms. But to paſs on from that to the ſecond anſwer, which is in a manner a definition of the divine eſſence; what a tranſition! When will the intermediate ſpace be filled up! *God is a ſpirit!* And what is a ſpirit? ſhall I lead an infant into thoſe metaphyſical obſcurities, from which men have taken ſo much pains to extricate themſelves? It is not for a little girl to reſolve ſuch queſtions, it is even the utmoſt ſhe can do to aſk them; in which caſe I ſhould anſwer her very ſimply: You aſk me what is God? that queſtion is not eaſy to reſolve. God is not to be ſeen, heard, or felt; he is to be known only by his works. To form a judgement of what he is, wait till you know what he hath done.

If our tenets are all equally true, they are not all, for that reaſon, of equal importance. It is very indifferent to the glory of God, that it ſhould be known to us in every circumſtance; but

but it is of great conſequence to every member of ſociety, that every man ſhould know, and diſcharge, thoſe obligations which are impoſed on him by the laws of God reſpecting his neighbour and himſelf. Theſe are what we ought conſtantly to teach each other; and are thoſe in which fathers and mothers are bound, above all things, to inſtruct their children. That a virgin ſhould become the mother of her Creator, and give birth to God, or only to a man united to the Divine Nature; that the ſubſtance of the Father and of the Son ſhould be the ſame, or only ſimilar; that the Holy Ghoſt ſhould proceed from one of theſe two, or both conjointly; I do not ſee that the ſolution of theſe difficulties, however eſſential in appearance, are of any greater conſequence to mankind, than it is to know what day of the moon we ought to celebrate Eaſter; whether we ought to feaſt or faſt, ſpeak Latin or French in church, adorn the walls with images, ſay or hear maſs, marry, or have no woman of one's own. Let every one think of theſe matters as he pleaſes, I know not that it is of any conſequence to others; at leaſt, I am ſure it is of no conſequence to me. But what I am, indeed, intereſted in, as well as every individual of the human ſpecies, is, that every one ſhould know that there exiſts a Supreme Arbiter over the deſtiny of all mankind, who commands us all to be juſt, to love each other, to be benevolent, merciful, and to fulfil our engagements with the world, and even with our

enemies, as well as with his; that the apparent happineſs of this life is nothing; that there will be another life after this, in which the Supreme Being will reward the good and puniſh the wicked. Theſe tenets, and others of the like import, are thoſe which it is incumbent on us to teach youth, and to eſpouſe on all occaſions among our fellow-citizens.

Whoever oppoſes ſuch ſentiments as theſe deſerves undoubtedly to be puniſhed, as a diſturber of the peace and an enemy to ſociety. Whoever ſets theſe aſide, and would ſubject us to his own opinions, though he ſhould purpoſe to arrive at the ſame point by different means, diſturbs the peace alſo, in order to eſtabliſh it in his own manner: he undertakes, with great preſumption, to be the interpreter of the Deity, and exacts, in his name, the homage and reſpect of mankind; he erects himſelf, as far as he is able, into a Deity, or aſſumes the place of God. Such a one ought to be puniſhed for his ſacrilege, if not as a perſecutor.

Diſregard, therefore, all thoſe myſterious tenets, which conſiſt only of words without ideas; all thoſe whimſical doctrines, which uſurp the place of morals in thoſe who adopt them, and ſerve rather to make men vain than virtuous. Confine your children ever within the narrow circle of thoſe doctrines, which relate to morality. Let them be well perſuaded that there is nothing neceſſary for them to know, but that which teaches them to act aright. Make not

your

your daughters theologiſts nor diſputants; teach them nothing about the things of Heaven, but what relates to the cultivation of human prudence. Accuſtom them to think themſelves always in the ſight of the Deity; to reflect that he is conſtantly a witneſs of their actions, their thoughts, their pleaſures; uſe them to do good without oſtentation, becauſe it is pleaſing to God; to ſuffer without murmuring, becauſe he will recompence them; and, in ſhort, to be, during every hour of their lives, ſuch as they could wiſh to be in that hour when they ſhall all appear before him in judgement. Such is the true religion; ſuch is that only which is not capable of being abuſed, and admits neither of impiety nor fanaticiſm. Let others preach up a religion more ſublime; for my part, I ſhall acknowledge none but this.

As for the reſt, it is proper to obſerve, that till girls arrive at the age, when their enlightened reaſon or growing ſentiment gives uſe to the dictates of conſcience, they ſhould be governed in their notions of good and evil entirely by the deciſions of thoſe who are about them. Whatever they are commanded to do, ſhould be thought right, and what they are forbidden to do, wrong: they ought at preſent to know nothing farther than this: hence we ſee of how much greater importance it is, that we ſhould be careful in the choice of perſons to educate girls, than we are of thoſe who take the charge of boys. At length, however, the time will come when even girls

will begin to judge for themſelves, and when it will be neceſſary to diverſify our plan of education.

I have, indeed, hitherto, perhaps, ſaid too much. How low ſhould we reduce the women, if we gave them no other laws than thoſe of publick opinion? Let us not ſo far diſparage that ſex, which governs and doth honour to our's, when we do not debaſe it. There exiſts for the whole ſpecies, a rule prior to opinion. It is to the fixed and certain direction of that rule we ſhould ſubject all others; it is the judge of prejudice itſelf, and it is not that the eſteem in which men hold it agrees therewith, ſo much as that ſuch eſteem ought to give it authority with them.

This rule is that of innate ſentiment. I ſhall not repeat what I have already ſaid on that ſubject: it is ſufficient to obſerve here, that, if theſe two rules do not concur in the education of women, it will be always defective. Sentiment, without regard to opinion, will not give them that delicacy of mind, which adds to virtue the approbation of the world; and a regard to opinion, without ſentiment, will only make them falſe and deceitful, placing the appearances of virtue in the room of virtue itſelf.

It is of conſequence to them, therefore, to cultivate a faculty which ſerves as an umpire between the two guides, preventing the miſtakes of conſcience, and correcting the errours of prejudice. This faculty is reaſon: but how many queries

queries offer themſelves at that word! Are women capable of ſolid reaſoning? Is it of any uſe for them to cultivate their reaſon? Can they do it with any ſucceſs? Is that cultivation expedient to the functions impoſed on them? Is it compatible with that ſimplicity of manners which becomes the ſex?

The various methods of comprehending and reſolving theſe queſtions, occaſion us to give into contrary extremes: ſome perſons confining women to the buſineſs of knitting and needle-work among their domeſticks, making them only upper ſervants of their huſbands; while others, not content with confirming them in their own rights, excite them to uſurp our's; for to permit them to be inferiour to us in thoſe qualities which are more peculiar to their own ſex, and to make them our equals in the qualities common to both, what is this but to transfer to women that ſuperiority which nature hath given their huſbands?

The motives which lead a man to the knowledge of his various duties is not very complicated; that which directs a woman to the knowledge of her duties is ſtill more ſimple. That obedience and fidelity which ſhe owes to her huſband, that care and tenderneſs which is due to her children, are ſuch natural and affecting conſequences of her ſituation, that unleſs ſhe is abandoned to an habitual depravity, ſhe cannot revolt from thoſe internal principles which influence her conduct, nor miſtake her duty, while

ſhe retains that propenſity which nature has implanted in her boſom.

I would not indiſcriminately condemn the practice of confining a woman ſolely to the occupations of her ſex, and leaving her in profound ignorance with reſpect to all other concerns: but in ſuch caſe it is neceſſary that the publick morals ſhould be very pure and ſimple, or that her manner of living ſhould be extremely retired. In large cities, and in the midſt of licentious men, ſuch a woman would be eaſily ſeduced; her virtue would, on many occaſions, be merely accidental; but this philoſophick age requires a virtue which is at all times a proof againſt temptation. A woman ought to be ſenſible beforehand what may be ſaid to her, and in what light it becomes her to conſider it.

Beſides, being ſubject to the opinion of men, ſhe ſhould ſtudy to merit their eſteem: and ſhe ought to be particularly anxious to acquire that of her huſband; ſhe ſhould not only endeavour to make him love her perſon, but engage him to approve her conduct; ſhe ought, in the eyes of the world, to juſtify the choice he has made, and derive honour to her huſband, in conſequence of the reſpect which is paid to his wife. But how ſhould ſhe accompliſh theſe ends, if ſhe is a ſtranger to our inſtitutions, if ſhe is ignorant of our cuſtoms and rules of decorum, if ſhe is not acquainted with the ſources of human judgement, nor with the paſſions by which it is determined? When ſhe becomes ſenſible that ſhe muſt

muſt depend both on the dictates of her own conſcience, and on the opinion of others, it is neceſſary that ſhe ſhould learn to compare theſe two rules of action, to reconcile them, and never to prefer the former but when they ſtand in oppoſition to each other. From hence ſhe becomes a judge over her judges; ſhe determines within herſelf when ſhe ought to ſubmit to them, and when ſhe ought to reject their authority. Before ſhe adopts or rejects their prejudices, ſhe conſiders their weight; ſhe learns to recur to their firſt ſource, to obviate them, and render them favourable to her principles: ſhe is cautious never to incur cenſure, when her duty will allow her to avoid it. Theſe purpoſes cannot be effected without enlarging her mind, and cultivating her reaſon.

By recurring conſtantly to firſt principles, I am furniſhed with a ſolution for every difficulty; I examine things as they are, I trace their cauſes, and in the end I find that whatever is, is right. I viſit families, where the maſter and miſtreſs jointly do the honours of the houſe. Both have had the ſame education, both equally polite, both endowed with the ſame taſte and ſpirit, both inſpired with the ſame deſire to make their friends welcome, and to ſend every body away ſatisfied with their reception. The huſband is aſſiduous, and attentive to every minute circumſtance: he goes about to every one, and pays his reſpects to all. The lady keeps her ſeat; a little circle gathers around her, and

ſeems to conceal the reſt of the company from her obſervation; nevertheleſs, nothing eſcapes her notice; no one departs to whom ſhe has not addreſſed herſelf; ſhe has omitted no pains to engage every one; ſhe has ſaid nothing to any individual but what is agreeable, and without breaking into the rules of decorum, the meaneſt of the company paſſes no more unnoticed than the higheſt. Dinner is brought up, and the company take their ſeats; the maſter, who knows his gueſts, will place them according to their ranks; the wife, though a ſtranger to them, will not miſtake their quality. She will diſcover from their very looks, and their comportment, what is ſuitable to their ſtation; and every one will be ſeated in the place he would himſelf chooſe. I will not ſay that no one is overlooked at table. Perhaps the maſter of the houſe, in making his round, may have remembered every one. But his wife gueſſes what you look at with pleaſure, and preſents it to you; even whilſt ſhe is ſpeaking to the perſon who ſits next to her, her eye is directed to the bottom of the table; ſhe diſcerns thoſe who do not eat becauſe they have no appetite, and thoſe who are afraid to help themſelves, or to deſire others to help them, becauſe they are either aukward or baſhful. When the cloth is taken away, every one imagines that all her attention has been paid to him; no one ſuppoſes that ſhe has had time to eat a ſingle morſel herſelf: whereas, in truth, ſhe has eaten heartier than any one in the company.

When the gueſts are departed, and the diſcourſe turns on the occurrences which have paſſed, the huſband relates what has been ſaid to him, and what they have ſaid and done with whom he has converſed. If the wife is not always moſt exact in theſe particulars, yet on her ſide ſhe has obſerved what was whiſpered at the other end of the ſalloon; ſhe knows what ſuch a one thought, and conjectures the meaning of ſuch a diſcourſe, or ſuch a geſture; ſcarce any expreſſive emotion has been diſcovered, which ſhe does not interpret, and generally with an exact conformity to truth.

The ſame turn of mind which makes woman of faſhion excel in the art of entertaining company, makes a coquette expert in the art of amuſing a number of admirers. It even requires a more exquiſite diſcernment to excel in coquettry, than in politeneſs; for if a well-bred woman behaves politely to every one, ſhe has done all that is required of her; but a coquette would ſoon loſe her dominion by ſuch an aukward uniformity. By endeavouring to oblige all her lovers ſhe would offend them all. In company, an obliging behaviour to all never fails to pleaſe every one; as no one nicely ſcrutinizes to whom the preference has been given: but in love, a favour which is not excluſive is conſidered in the ſame light as a real injury. A man of ſenſibility had rather a hundred times be the only perſon ill-treated, than to be carreſſed with the crowd; for the moſt mortifying circumſtance is not to

be diſtinguiſhed. A woman, therefore, who would retain a number of lovers, ſhould have the art to perſuade every individual that ſhe gives him the preference; and to perſuade him into this opinion in the preſence of all the reſt, to whom ſhe likewiſe inſinuates the ſame perſuaſion, in his preſence.

Would you behold a man utterly embarraſſed? place him between two women, with each of whom he has a ſecret connexion, and then obſerve what a ridiculous appearance he will make. Place a woman under the ſame circumſtances between two men (and the inſtance certainly is not more uncommon) you will be aſtoniſhed with what addreſs ſhe will delude each, and make them in their turn, laugh at one another. But if this woman expreſſed the ſame confidence in each, and treated both with the ſame familiarity, how could they for a moment be duped by her artifice? By behaving equally to both, would ſhe not diſcover that both had equal pretenſions to her? But how much more artfully does ſhe conduct herſelf! Far from uſing them alike, ſhe affects to make a diſtinction between them; ſhe manages ſo ſkilfully, that he whom ſhe flatters thinks it proceeds from affection; and that he whom ſhe ſlights imagines that he is diſregarded out of affectation. Thus each, content with his lot, imagines her conſtantly attentive to him, while, in fact, ſhe is wholly taken up with herſelf.

The deſire of pleaſing every one ſuggeſts theſe expedients to coquettes; whoſe caprices would diſguſt if they were not ſkilfully managed; and it is by this artful conduct that they rivet the chains of their admiring ſlaves.

Uſa ogn'arte la donna, onde ſia colto
Nella ſua rete alcun novello amante;
Ne con tutti, nè ſempre un ſteſſo volto
Serba, ma cangia a tempo atto e ſembiante.

How is this art acquired, but by nice and conſtant obſervation, which every moment diſcovers to them what paſſes in men's boſoms, and enables them to apply to every ſecret feeling, ſufficient power to ſuſpend or accelerate the emotion? Is this art to be learned? No: it is born with women; they are all miſtreſſes of it, and the men never poſſeſs it to ſo high a degree. This is one of the diſtinguiſhing characteriſticks of the ſex. A preſence of mind, penetration, and acuteneſs of obſervation, conſtitute the ſcience in which women excel; and the addreſs, with which they make their advantage of theſe excellencies, is their peculiar talent.

This is the real caſe, and we have ſeen why it ſhould be ſo. Is it ſaid that women are deceitful? Their proper talent is addreſs, not deceit. If you attend to the natural propenſities of their ſex, you will find that, even while they utter untruths, they are not deceitful. Why do you conſult their lips, when it is not through them that nature ſpeaks. Examine their eyes, their complexion, their ſwelling boſoms, their timid air,

their faint reſiſtance: this is the language with which nature furniſhes them. With their lips, they always ſay, No! as they ought; but they do not always pronounce that negative with the ſame accent; and the accent never deceives you. Have not women the ſame deſires with men, without having the ſame right to expreſs them? Their lot would be very hard, if they could not intimate their lawful deſires by a kind of language full as ſignificant as that which they dare not utter? Muſt their modeſty render them unhappy? Is it not neceſſary that they ſhould have the art of diſcovering their inclinations without expreſſing them? What ſkill is requiſite to engage a man to raviſh the favour, which they are ardent to grant? Of what conſequence is it to them, to affect the hearts of men, without ſeeming to beſtow a thought upon them? How beautifully expreſſive was the incident of Galathea's apple, and her affected flight? What could ſhe ſay more? Should ſhe have deſired the ſhepherd to follow her among the willows, and have declared that ſhe only ran away, with a view to be purſued? Had ſhe ſaid ſo ſhe had deceived herſelf; for in that caſe, ſhe would not have engaged him to follow her. The more reſerved a woman is, the more addreſs ſhe ſhould be miſtreſs of, even with her huſband. Yes, I will maintain, that by preſerving coquettry within due bounds, it becomes both modeſt and ſincere.

Virtue

Virtue is ſimple and uniform, one of my opponents has well obſerved; it cannot be decompounded to admit one part and reject another. When we love, we love in all its purity; and when we can avoid it, we do not ſuffer our hearts, and never our lips, to avow ſentiments which we ought not to entertain. Moral truth is not what is, but what is proper; that which is evil, ought not to be, and ſhould not be avowed, eſpecially when the confeſſion gives it an effect which it would not otherwiſe have had. If I were tempted to turn robber, and by confeſſing my propenſity, I attempted to perſuade another to be my accomplice, by declaring to him the temptation I am under, do not I in fact yield to it? Wherefore do you inſiſt that modeſty renders women deceitful? Are thoſe who poſſeſs that virtue leaſt, more friends to truth than the reſt? Far from it; they are a thouſand times more falſe. They do not arrive to that degree of depravity, but in conſequence of vices which are common to them all, and which only triumph under the maſk of intrigue and falſehood*. On the

* I know that thoſe women who have publickly avowed their conduct on a certain delicate occaſion, pretend to value themſelves for their frankneſs, and proteſt that they are endowed with every eſtimable quality, that one excepted; but I know alſo, that they have never been able to perſuade any but ideots into this opinion. When they have broken looſe from the greateſt reſtraint on their ſex, what further remains to check them; and what virtue will they retain, when they have forfeited that, which is their peculiar characteriſtick? When once they have given ſcope

the contrary, they who are not yet loſt to ſhame, who are not vain of their foibles, who know how to conceal their deſires, even from thoſe who inſpire them, they, from whom confeſſions of this delicate nature are extorted with the greateſt difficulty, are always the beſt friends to truth, ſincerity, and integrity in all their connexions, and are thoſe on whoſe fidelity we may in general moſt ſurely rely.

I know but one inſtance in contradiction to theſe obſervations, which is Madame de l'Enclos. And Madame de l'Enclos has always been conſidered as a prodigy. Though ſhe deſpiſed the virtues of her own ſex, it is ſaid that ſhe preſerved all the good qualities of our's; they boaſt of her ſincerity, her integrity, the conſtancy of her attachments, and her fidelity in point of friendſhip. In ſhort, to crown her reputation, they ſay that ſhe became a perfect man: Be it ſo. But with all her vaſt reputation, I would no more chooſe ſuch a man for my friend, than for my miſtreſs.

All this is not ſo foreign from the purpoſe as it appears to be. I ſee to what end the maxims of this modern philoſophy tend, while it turns into deriſion the modeſty and pretended deceit of the ſex; and I perceive the infallible conſequence of this philoſophy, which would deprive the women

to their paſſions, they have no longer any intereſt in reſiſting them, *Nec fœmina amiſſa pudicitia alia abnuerit.* No one was ever better acquainted with the human heart in both ſexes than the author of this ſentiment.

men of our age of that little ſhare of virtue which they have left.

From theſe conſiderations, I believe, we may, in general be able to determine what kind of culture is moſt ſuitable to female minds, and upon what objects we ought to turn their reflexions during their infancy.

I have already obſerved, that the duties of their ſex are more eaſily known than practiſed. The firſt thing they ſhould learn, is to be in love with their duty from a principle of intereſt; which is the only means to render it eaſy. Every ſtation and every age has its peculiar duties. We are eaſily acquainted with them, provided we do but love them. Reſpect your condition as a woman, and whatever ſtation Providence thinks proper to allot you, you will always be a woman of virtue. The eſſential point is to be what nature formed us, we are always too propenſe to be what the world would wiſh us.

Reſearches into abſtract and ſpeculative truths, the principles and axioms of ſciences, in ſhort, every thing which tends to generalize our ideas, is not the proper province of women; their ſtudies ſhould be relative to points of practice; it belongs to them to apply thoſe principles which men have diſcovered; and it is their part to make obſervations, which direct men to the eſtabliſhment of general principles. All the ideas of women, which have not the immediate tendency to points of duty, ſhould be directed to the ſtudy

of

of men, and to the attainment of thoſe agreeable accompliſhments which have taſte for their object; for as to works of genius, they are beyond their capacity: neither have they ſufficient preciſion or power of attention to ſucceed in ſciences which require accuracy: and as to phyſical knowledge, it belongs to thoſe only who are moſt active, moſt inquiſitive; who comprehend the greateſt variety of objects; in ſhort, it belongs to thoſe who have the ſtrongeſt powers, and who exerciſe them moſt, to judge of the relations between ſenſible beings and the laws of nature. A woman who is naturally weak, and does not carry her ideas to any great extent, knows how to judge and make a proper eſtimate of thoſe movements which ſhe ſets to work, in order to aid her weakneſs; and theſe movements are the paſſions of men. The mechaniſm ſhe employs is much more powerful than our's; for all her levers move the human heart. She muſt have the ſkill to incline us to do every thing which her ſex will not enable her to do of herſelf, and which is neceſſary or agreeable to her; therefore ſhe ought to ſtudy the mind of man thoroughly, not the mind of man in general, abſtractedly, but the diſpoſition of the men about her, the diſpoſition of thoſe men to whom ſhe is ſubject, either by the laws of her country, or by the force of opinion. She ſhould learn to penetrate into their real ſentiments from their converſation, their actions, their looks and geſtures. She ſhould alſo have the art, by her own converſation,

ſation, actions, looks, and geſtures, to communicate thoſe ſentiments which are agreeable to them, without ſeeming to intend it. Men will argue more philoſophically about the human heart; but women will read the heart of man better than they. It belongs to women, if I may be allowed the expreſſion, to form an experimental morality, and to reduce the ſtudy of man to a ſyſtem. Women have moſt wit, men have moſt genius; women obſerve, men reaſon; from the concurrence of both we derive the cleareſt light and the moſt perfect knowledge, which the human mind is, of itſelf, capable of attaining: in one word, from hence we acquire the moſt intimate acquaintance both with ourſelves and others, of which our nature is capable; and it is thus that art has a conſtant tendency to perfect thoſe endowments which nature has beſtowed.

The world is the book of women; if they do not read well it is their own fault, or ſome paſſion blinds them. Nevertheleſs, a true miſtreſs of a family, is not leſs a recluſe in her own houſe, than a nun in her convent. Therefore before a young virgin is married, we ought to act with regard to her, as they do, or at leaſt ought to do, towards thoſe who are to be confined in nunneries; that is, we ſhould ſhow them the pleaſures they are to quit, before we ſuffer them to renounce them, leſt the falſe idea of pleaſures to which they are ſtrangers, ſhould miſlead their minds, and interrupt the felicity of their retirement. In France, young ladies

live

live in nunneries, and wives go abroad in the world. Among the ancients it was juſt the reverſe; the maidens, as I have obſerved, were indulged with entertainments and publick feſtivals; but wives lived retired. This cuſtom was more rational, and had a better tendency to preſerve morals. A kind of coquettry is allowed to young girls who are unmarried; their grand concern is to amuſe themſelves. But wives have other employment at home, and they are no longer in purſuit of huſbands; but ſuch a reformation would not be for their intereſt, and unhappily they lead the faſhion. Mothers, however, make companions of your daughters! cultivate in them a juſt underſtanding and an honeſt heart, and then hide nothing from them which a chaſte eye may view without offenſe. Balls, entertainments, publick ſights, even theatres; every thing which, ſeen improperly, delights indiſcreet youth, may without danger be preſented to the eye of prudence. The more they are converſant with theſe tumultuous pleaſures, the ſooner they will be diſguſted with them.

But I hear the clamour ariſing againſt me! What girl is capable of reſiſting ſuch dangerous examples? They have no ſooner ſeen the world, than their heads are turned with every object; not one of them will reſolve to quit it. Perhaps this may be the caſe; but before you have ſhown them this deceitful picture, have you prepared them to view it without emotion? Have you acquainted them beforehand with

with the objects it represents? Have you described them such as they really are? Have you armed them against the illusions of vanity? Have you inculcated into their tender minds a relish for true pleasures, which are not to be found in these tumultuous scenes? What measures, what precautions have you used to preserve them from that false taste which misleads them? So far from having opposed any principles against the prevalence of publick prejudices, you have rather nourished them. You have previously made them enamoured with those frivolous amusements they meet with. You make them more in love with them, by affording them an opportunity of devoting themselves to them. Young girls, at their first entrance into the world, have seldom any other governess than their mother, who is often more silly than they, and who cannot show them objects in any other light, than such in which they behold them themselves. Her example, more efficacious than reason itself, justifies them in their own eyes; and the authority of a mother is an unanswerable plea for a daughter. When I propose that a mother should introduce her daughter to the world, it is upon the supposition that she will represent it to her such as it is.

The evil begins still earlier. Convents are, in fact, schools of coquettry; not of that honest coquettry of which I have just spoken, but of that which produces all the extravagancies in women, and makes them the most ridiculous of all

all coquettes. When they quit the convents, to enter all at once into mixed aſſemblies, young girls find themſelves where they could wiſh. They have been educated for ſuch ſociety, and is it to be wondered that they are fond of it? I am cautious of advancing what I am going to ſay, for fear I ſhould miſtake a prejudice for an obſervation; but it ſeems to me, that, generally ſpeaking, in proteſtant countries, women have ſtronger attachments to their families, make more amiable wives and more tender mothers than in catholick countries; and if this be the caſe, there is no doubt but that the difference in part ariſes from the education at convents.

To love a tranquil and domeſtick life, we ought to be well acquainted with it; we ſhould have experienced the ſweets of it from our infancy. It is in the houſe of our parents that we muſt contract a reliſh for our own family, and every woman who has not been educated by her mother, will not chooſe to bring up her own children. Unhappily private education is baniſhed from great cities. Society is become ſo general, and ſo intermixed, that there is no aſylum left for retirement, and we even live in publick at our own houſes. In conſequence of aſſociating with all the world, we have no longer any family, and we ſcarce know our relations; we ſee them as ſtrangers; and the ſimplicity of domeſtick manners is loſt, together with that agreeable familiarity which conſtitutes its principal charm. Thus we imbibe with our very milk

a reliſh

reliſh for the pleaſures of the age, and of the maxims which prevail in the world.

Parents impoſe an outward reſtraint on their daughters, in hopes to meet with dupes who will marry them from their appearance. But examine theſe young girls attentively for a moment. Under an affected air of conſtraint, they do but ill diſguiſe the eager deſires which prey upon them; and you may already read in their eyes their violent inclination to imitate their mothers. But they do not covet a huſband; they only long for the licenſe of matrimony. What occaſion can they have for a huſband, when they may have ſo many lovers? But they ſtand in need of a huſband as a cover to their intrigues*. Modeſty is in their looks, but licentiouſneſs in their hearts: That affected modeſty is a ſymptom of it. They affect it only to get rid of it the ſooner. Ladies of Paris and London, pardon me, I entreat you. Miracles are not excepted in any place, but for my own part I am not acquainted with any; and if there be a ſingle individual among you who has a mind thoroughly virtuous, then I am a ſtranger to the manners of the times.

All our different modes of education equally give young people a reliſh for the pleaſures of high life, and foment the paſſions which reſult from that taſte. In great cities, depravity is coeval

* The way of a man in his youth, was one of the four things which the wiſe Solomon could not comprehend: the fifth was the impudence of an adultereſs, Quæ comedit, & tergens os ſuum, dicit; non feci operata malum. PROV. xxx. 20.

coeval with exiſtence, and it begins in infants before the dawn of reaſon. Young country girls, who are taught to deſpiſe the happy ſimplicity of a rural life, are eager to viſit Paris, and to partake of our depravity. The acquirement of vices under the ſpecious name of accompliſhments, is the ſole object of their journey; and being aſhamed, on their arrival, to find themſelves ſo far behind the town ladies in point of boundleſs licentiouſneſs, they make great haſte to diſtinguiſh themſelves in their turn. Where, in your opinion, does the evil commence? In the place where it was firſt projected, or in that where it was put in execution?

I do not ſay that a diſcreet mother ſhould bring her daughter out of the country, on purpoſe to ſhow her theſe ſcenes which are ſo pernicious to many; but I ſay that if ſhe were to bring her to town, yet the girl muſt have been very indifferently educated, or there will be very little danger in her beholding theſe ſcenes. To thoſe who are endowed with taſte, good ſenſe, and a love of virtue, they are not ſo attractive, as they are to ſuch as ſuffer themſelves to be captivated with them. One may ſee at Paris, young giddy creatures, who come thither in haſte to catch the manner of the place, and to put themſelves in the faſhion for ſix months, in order to become deſpicable the reſt of their lives; but few people take notice of thoſe, who, diſguſted with this noiſy empty ſhow, return into the country, well ſatisfied with their condition,

after

ter, having compared it with that which is ſo much envied by others. How many young ladies have I known brought up to town by tender mothers, and at liberty to fix their abode here, who have declined it themſelves, have gone back much more willingly than they came; and, at taking leave of the town, have pathetically ſaid; Oh! let us return to our little cot! We live much happier there, than in palaces here! No one knows how many good girls there are ſtill, who have not bowed the knee before the idol, and who deſpiſe the ſenſeleſs adoration paid to it. Fools only chooſe to be talked of, diſcreet women to paſs unobſerved.

But if, notwithſtanding the general depravity, notwithſtanding the reigning prejudices, notwithſtanding the improper education of girls, there are yet ſome who preſerve a ſound underſtanding, what a figure would they make if that underſtanding was cultivated by ſuitable inſtructions, or, to ſpeak more properly, if their good underſtanding was not corrupted by bad inſtructions; for every thing conſiſts in preſerving or reſtoring the natural affections? It is not requiſite for this purpoſe to tire young girls with tedious ſermons, nor to read them dry leſſons of morality. Dull moral diſcourſes are, in both ſexes, the bane of all good education. Melancholy precepts naturally excite their averſion, both againſt thoſe who inculcate them, and againſt every thing they ſay. There is no need, in giving inſtruction to youth, to make them

afraid of what is their duty, nor to add weight to that yoke which nature has impoſed. In explaining their duty to them, our manner ſhould be clear and familiar; we ought not to make them imagine that there is any trouble in diſcharging their duty; nor ſhould we put on a moroſe and auſtere countenance. Every ſenſation the heart may entertain, ſhould have free vent; their moral catechiſm ſhould be as clear and as conciſe as their religious catechiſm, but it ought not to be quite ſo ſolemn. Show them that the ſource of all their pleaſures, and the foundation of all their rights, is derived from the diſcharge of their duties. Is there any hardſhip in loving, in order to conciliate affection; in endeavouring to render ourſelves amiable, in order to be happy; in endeavouring to procure eſteem, in order to be obeyed; in reſpecting ourſelves, in order to acquire reſpect? How delightful are theſe privileges! how reſpectable they are! how cordially do men prize them, when a woman knows how to render them eſtimable! She need not wait for years, nor expect old age before ſhe attains the enjoyment of them. Her empire is attendant on her virtues; her charms no ſooner diſplay themſelves, than ſhe reigns triumphant in the gentleneſs of her diſpoſition, and her modeſty renders her ſway abſolute. What man, however brutal and inſenſible, does not abate his ferocity, and affect more engaging manners, when he finds himſelf in company with a young girl of ſixteen, who is amiable and diſcreet; who

ſays

ſays little, but is attentive; who preſerves decency in her deportment, and decorum in her converſation; whoſe beauty does not make her unmindful of her ſex nor of her youth; who, by her baſhfulneſs, intereſts every one in her favour, and draws that reſpect to herſelf which ſhe pays to the company.

Theſe effects, though external, are by no means frivolous; they do not reſult altogether from the charms of ſenſe; they proceed from an inward conviction that women are the natural judges of the merit of men. Who would chooſe that women ſhould deſpiſe him? No one whatever; not even he, who has determined to renounce them. And do you imagine that even I, who tell them ſuch ſevere truths, am indifferent about their opinion? No, Readers, you, who are often more effeminate than they, I prefer their judgement to your's. While I deſpiſe their manners, I will yet do honour to their juſtice: their reſentment does not affect me, if I can but obtain their eſteem.

What great things might be accompliſhed from this principle, if we knew how to enforce it! Woe be to the age, wherein women loſe their influence, and their judgements are diſregarded by men! It is the laſt ſtage of depravity. All civilized people, have paid due regard to women. Reflect on Sparta, reflect on the Germans, reflect on Rome; Rome, the ſeat of glory and of virtue, if ever they had place on earth. It was there, that the women ho-

noured the exploits of the renowned generals, that they publickly wept over the fathers of their country, that their vows or lamentations were held ſacred, as the moſt ſolemn judgements of the republick. All the grand revolutions were brought about by women: through a woman Rome obtained liberty; through a woman, the Plebeians acquired the conſulſhip; a woman put an end to the tyranny of the Decemvirs; by means of women, Rome, when on the brink of deſtruction, was ſkreened from the reſentment of an enraged and victorious outlaw. Ye French gallants, what would you have ſaid had you beheld that proceſſion, ſo ridiculous in the eyes of you men of raillery? You would have held it in deriſion. With what different eyes we regard the ſame objects! And perhaps we are all in the right. For let the train be compoſed of French women, and I can conceive nothing more indecent: let it be made up of Roman ladies, and we ſhould all have the eyes of the Volſci, and the heart of Coriolanus.

I will go farther, and maintain that virtue is not leſs favourable to love, than to the other rights of nature, and that it ſtrengthens the influence of a miſtreſs, as much as that of a wife or a mother. There is no true love without enthuſiaſm, and no enthuſiaſm without an object of perfection either real or imaginary. What can tranſport thoſe lovers, who have no idea of this perfection, and who regard the object of their affections only with an eye of ſenſuality? No,

it

it is not by ſuch conſiderations that the ſoul is tranſported, and devoted to thoſe ſublime raptures which make lovers delirious, and render their paſſion enchanting. Love, I confeſs, is all illuſion; but the ſentiment of true beauty with which it inſpires us, and makes us enamoured, is real. This beauty is not in the object we doat on; it is the offspring of our own deluſion. Be it ſo. What then? Are we leſs forward to ſacrifice every ungenerous ſentiment to this ideal model of perfection? Do the virtues we attribute to the beloved object, make the leſs impreſſion on our minds? Do we endeavour the leſs to detach ourſelves from the mean ſelfiſhneſs of human nature? Where is the true lover, who is not ready to ſacrifice his life to his miſtreſs? and how can the man who would even reſign his life, entertain a groſs and ſenſual paſſion? We make a jeſt of knights errant! becauſe they had a true ſenſe of love, and we are ſlaves to ſenſuality. When theſe romantick principles firſt became ridiculous, the ridicule was not ſo much the reſult of reaſon as of depravity.

In all ages, the natural relations of things remain the ſame; the agreement or diſagreement which reſult from them are the ſame; prejudices, under the ſpecious title of reaſon, only alter their appearance. It will always be great and noble to have a command of ourſelves, though it is only in obedience to fantaſtick notions; and the real motives of honour will always affect the

mind of a diſcreet woman, who knows how to make her condition inſtrumental to the happineſs of life. Chaſtity muſt be a delightful virtue in the eſtimation of a fine woman, who has any elevation of ſoul. While ſhe beholds all the world at her feet, ſhe triumphs over all, and over herſelf; ſhe erects a throne in her own breaſt, at which all the world pays adoration; the affectionate or jealous, though yet reſpectful, ſentiments of the two ſexes, the general eſteem of others, and her own ſelf-approbation, inceſſantly furniſh her with the tribute of glory, in recompence of a few momentary conflicts. Her ſelf-denials are but tranſitory, the reward of them is permanent; what enjoyment muſt the pride of virtue, joined with that of beauty, afford to a generous mind! Suppoſe a heroine in romance to be a real character, and ſhe would taſte more exquiſite delights than Lais or Cleopatra; and when her beauty fades, her glory and delight will ſtill remain: ſuch an one alone is capable of enjoying the time paſt.

The more difficult and arduous our duties are, the more powerful and perſuaſive the arguments ought to be on which they are founded. There is a certain ſolemn ſtile, with which we conſtantly din the ears of youth, on the moſt ſerious ſubjects, without producing any perſuaſion in their minds. From this language ſo unſuitable to their ideas, and from the little regard they pay to it in private, ariſes that facility with which they give way to their inclinations, for want of being

being furniſhed with reaſons to reſiſt them, drawn from the nature of things themſelves. A girl, prudently and religiouſly educated, is undoubtedly furniſhed with powerful weapons againſt temptations; but one whoſe mind, or rather whoſe ears, are only peſtered with a myſterious jargon, will infallibly fall a prey to the firſt ingenious ſeducer who attempts to delude her. A young and beautiful creature will never deſpiſe her perſon; ſhe will never be ſincerely afflicted on account of the great crimes which her beauty may give birth to; ſhe will never ſeriouſly, and in the face of Heaven, lament that ſhe is an object of deſire; ſhe will never be perſuaded in her own mind, that the moſt tender feeling of the heart is an invention of the devil. Furniſh her with other reaſons, which may ſink deep in her mind, and which may affect herſelf; for thoſe I have juſt now enumerated will make no impreſſion on her. The effect will be ſtill worſe, if, as is generally the caſe, we perplex her with contradictory ideas; and after having mortified her, by depreciating her perſon and her charms as ſo many ſinful blemiſhes, we afterwards attempt to make her reſpect that very perſon, which we have endeavoured to render contemptible, as the temple of Jeſus Chriſt. Ideas too ſublime or too low are equally inſufficient, and can never aſſociate: we ought to uſe arguments better adapted to their ſex and to their age. The conſideration of duty has no longer any

influence, than while it is accompanied with motives which induce us to diſcharge it.

Quæ quia non liceat non facit, illa facit.

No one can be at a loſs to know that it is Ovid who pronounces this ſevere judgement.

Would you inſpire young girls with a love of morality? Inſtead of telling them continually, "Be diſcreet," ſhow them that it is their intereſt to be ſo; make them acquainted with the value of diſcretion, and you will make them in love with it. It is not ſufficient, however, to preſent this intereſt to their view at a diſtance; convince them of their preſent advantage, with regard to the circumſtances of their age, and with reſpect to the characters of their lovers. Deſcribe to them the man of worth, the man of merit; teach them to know him, to love him, and to love him for their own ſakes; perſuade them that ſuch a man alone is capable of making them happy, either as friends, wives, or miſtreſſes. Introduce virtue under the guidance of reaſon; make them ſenſible that the dominion of their ſex, and all their prerogatives, do not depend entirely on their own good conduct, their own morals, but likewiſe on thoſe of the men; that they can have no ſure dependence on mean and groveling ſouls, and that a man is only qualified to oblige his miſtreſs, in proportion as he is ſubſervient to virtue. Take care likewiſe that in deſcribing the manners of the preſent age, you at the ſame time inſpire your daughter with a ſincere

a ſincere averſion to them: by giving her a true deſcription of our modiſh people you will teach her to deſpiſe them; you will render her averſe to their maxims, give her a diſlike to their ſentiments, and a contempt for their idle gallantries; you will excite in her a more noble ambition, that of reigning over ſtrong and vigorous minds, that which inſpired the women of Sparta, who boaſted that they ruled over *men*. A forward, audacious, and intriguing woman, who knows no other method of alluring lovers, but by coquetry, nor of preſerving them but by repeated favours, makes them obey her like lacqueys on trifling and ſervile occaſions, but in ſerious and weighty matters ſhe has no authority over them. But a woman who is virtuous, amiable, and diſcreet, who obliges her lovers to reſpect her, one who has reſerve and modeſty, in a word, one who ſupports love by eſteem, will, by a ſingle motion, ſend them to the fartheſt part of the world, to battle, to glory, to death, in ſhort, wherever ſhe pleaſes: ſuch an empire in my opinion is glorious, and is well worth the pains of purchaſing*.

* Brantome tells us, that, in the time of Francis the Firſt, a young lady who was troubled with a prating lover, impoſed upon him an abſolute and unlimited ſilence, which he obſerved ſo religiouſly for two years together, that every one concluded that he had loſt his ſpeech by ſome diſtemper. One day, at a crouded aſſembly, his miſtreſs, who in thoſe days, when love was made in private, was not known as ſuch, boaſted that ſhe would cure him inſtantly, and effected it by this ſingle word, *ſpeak*. Is there

It is with this turn of mind, that Sophia has been educated, with great attention but without trouble, and rather by indulging her taſte than by reſtraining it. Let us now give a ſhort deſcription of her perſon, according to the picture I gave Emilius, and according to what he himſelf conceives of the woman who alone can make him happy.

I cannot too often repeat that I do not deal in prodigies. Emilius is not one, neither is Sophia. Emilius is a man, and Sophia is a woman; this is all their glory. Amidſt the confuſion of ſexes which prevails at preſent, it is almoſt a prodigy to be of that which Nature has formed us.

Sophia is a woman of family, and of a good diſpoſition; ſhe has a heart eaſily affected, and her exquiſite ſenſibility ſometimes gives her a ſprightlineſs of imagination which is difficult to be controlled. Her underſtanding is leſs judicious than acute; her temper eaſy, but nevertheleſs unequal; her figure nothing extraordinary, but agreeable: ſhe has a countenance which gives earneſt of a ſoul, and does not deceive you. You may accoſt her with indifference, but you cannot leave her without emotion. Others are endowed with good qualities in which ſhe is deficient; others poſſeſs thoſe which ſhe is miſtreſs of,

not ſomething great and heroick in ſuch a paſſion? What could the Pythagorean philoſophy, with all its parade, do more? What woman in theſe times could command ſuch a ſilence for a ſingle day, though ſhe were to pay ever ſo dear for it?

of, in greater perfection; but none have qualities better blended to form a complete character. She knows how to make her defects turn to her advantage, and if ſhe was more perfect ſhe would be much leſs agreeable.

Sophia is not beautiful; but when the men are near her, they neglect the handſome women, and the beauties are diſſatisfied with themſelves. She is ſcarce tolerable at firſt ſight, but the more you ſee her, the more lovely ſhe appears; ſhe improves by that which impairs others, and what ſhe gains, ſhe never loſes. Many may boaſt finer eyes, handſomer mouth, a more commanding figure; but no one can have a better turned ſhape, a fairer complexion, a whiter hand, a more delicate foot, a more benign aſpect, a more bewitching countenance. Without dazzling ſhe engages, ſhe charms, and no one can tell how.

Sophia loves dreſs, and underſtands it; her mother has no waiting woman but her; ſhe has a fine taſte in diſplaying herſelf to advantage, but ſhe has an averſion to rich clothes. In her dreſs, you always ſee ſimplicity united with elegance; ſhe is not fond of what glitters, but of what is becoming. She is a ſtranger to what colours are in faſhion, but ſhe knows exactly what ſuit her complexion. No young lady ſeems to have beſtowed leſs thought about dreſs, and yet there is no one whoſe apparel is more ſtudied; not a part of her attire is taken at random, and yet art is no where conſpicuous. Her dreſs is extremely

modeſt in appearance, and yet very coquettiſh in fact: ſhe does not make a diſplay of her charms, ſhe conceals them; but in concealing them, ſhe knows how to affect your imagination. Every one who ſees her, will ſay, There is a modeſt and diſcreet girl; but while you are near her, your eyes and affections wander all over her perſon, ſo that you cannot withdraw them; and you would conclude, that every part of her dreſs, ſimple as it ſeems, was only put in its proper order to be taken to pieces by the imagination.

Sophia has fine natural talents; ſhe is conſcious of them, and has not neglected them; but not having had it in her power to cultivate them with any extraordinary art, ſhe contents herſelf with exerciſing her ſweet voice in ſinging with juſtneſs and taſte, and with uſing her little feet in walking gently and gracefully, and in making her compliments in every attitude without conſtraint or awkwardneſs. Nevertheleſs, ſhe has had no ſinging-maſter but her father, no one to inſtruct her in dancing but her mother, and an organiſt in the neighbourhood has given her ſome leſſons on the harpſichord, which ſhe has improved by her own genius. At firſt ſhe only thought of diſplaying her hand to advantage on thoſe black keys; afterwards ſhe found that the ſharp tone of the harpſichord rendered her voice more mellow, till at length ſhe acquired a ſenſe of harmony. As ſhe grew up, ſhe became ſuſceptible of the charms of expreſſion, and to love muſick

muſick for itſelf. But it is rather her taſte than her talent; ſhe does not know how to decypher a ſingle tune by the notes.

That in which Sophia excels moſt, and in which ſhe has been moſt carefully inſtructed, is the proper occupation of her ſex, but ſuch as one would not think of, that is, cutting out and making up her clothes. There is not any kind of needle-work in which ſhe is not well ſkilled, and in which ſhe does not take delight; but the work which ſhe prefers to all others is making of lace, becauſe there is no other which throws the perſon into ſuch an agreeable attitude, and where the fingers are employed with more grace and activity. She has likewiſe applied herſelf to all the branches of houſe-keeping; ſhe attends the kitchen and the pantry; ſhe knows the price of goods, and is a judge of their quality; ſhe underſtands keeping of accounts very well, and ſerves her mother by way of houſe-ſteward. Being deſtined to become the mother of a family herſelf, in managing her father's houſe ſhe learns to take care of her own; ſhe knows how to ſupply the duties of the ſeveral domeſticks, and does it with chearfulneſs. No one can properly give orders about concerns of which they are ignorant themſelves; it is for this reaſon that her mother employs her thus. As for Sophia, ſhe does not extend her views ſo far. Her principal duty is that of a daughter, and it is the only one at preſent which ſhe thinks of fulfilling. Her ſole view is to be ſerviceable to her mother, and

to relieve her from part of her fatigue. It is true, nevertheleſs, that ſhe does not perform all her duties with the ſame pleaſure. For example, though ſhe is a little epicure, ſhe is not fond of the kitchen; ſhe always finds ſomething in it which offends her neatneſs. Her delicacy in theſe points is extreme; and ſhe has carried it to ſuch exceſs, that it is become one of her defects: ſhe had rather let the dinner fall into the fire, than ſoil her ruffle. She would never ſuperintend the garden for the ſame reaſon; the ſoil appears to her too dirty, and ſhe is offended at the ſmell of a dunghill.

This failing ariſes from her mother's inſtructions. According to her, neatneſs is one of the principal perfections of a woman; a particular and indiſpenſable duty enjoined by nature: there cannot be a more diſguſting object than a ſlatternly woman, and a huſband cannot be blamed for diſliking her. She has ſo continually preached up this duty to her daughter from her very infancy; ſhe has required ſo much neatneſs about her perſon, about her clothes, her apartment, her work, her toilet, that this attention, being grown into a habit, takes up a great part of her time, and is always uppermoſt in every thing ſhe does; ſo that with her, doing things well, is but a ſecondary concern; her principal concern is to do them neatly.

Nevertheleſs, this foible has not degenerated into a ridiculous effeminacy or vain affectation; ſhe does not admit any of the refinements of

luxury. Nothing but plain water ever enters her apartment; ſhe is a ſtranger to all perfumes but flowers, and her huſband will never find any thing more fragrant than her breath. But the attention ſhe beſtows on her perſon, does not make her forget that her life ſhould be devoted to more noble employment. She is not acquainted with, or ſhe deſpiſes, that extravagant delicacy of perſon which ſullies the mind. Sophia is more than neat, ſhe is ſpotleſs.

I have ſaid that Sophia was a little epicure. She was ſo naturally; but by habit ſhe is grown temperate, which habit is now become a confirmed virtue. It is not with girls as it is with boys, who may, to a certain degree, be governed by their voracious appetites. Such a propenſity is of conſequence to women, and is of too dangerous a nature not to be oppoſed. When Sophia was in her childhood, if ſhe could get alone into her mother's cloſet, ſhe never returned empty, for ſhe was not proof againſt ſugar-plumbs and ſweetmeats. Her mother diſcovered her, reprimanded her, puniſhed her, and made her faſt. She perſuaded her at laſt that ſweetmeats ſpoiled the teeth, and that eating too much would make her clumſy. Thus Sophia corrected herſelf. As ſhe grew up, ſhe contracted a taſte for other things, which diverted her from that groveling appetite. In women, as well as men, when once the mind is actuated, gluttony has no longer any aſcendancy. Sophia has preſerved a taſte moſt ſuitable to her ſex; ſhe is fond of milk-

milk-meats, paſtry, and little dainties, but ſcarce eats any meat; and ſhe has never taſted wine or any ſtrong liquors. Moreover, ſhe eats very ſparingly; her ſex, not being ſo laborious as our's, has leſs need of refreſhment. She loves what is good of the kind, and knows how to reliſh it; but ſhe can diſpenſe with what is not quite ſo nice, without being uneaſy.

Sophia has an underſtanding which is agreeable without being brilliant, and ſolid without being profound; an underſtanding which no one takes particular notice of, becauſe none obſerve her to have more or leſs than themſelves. She has always the art of pleaſing thoſe who converſe with her, though her converſation is not embelliſhed according to the idea we form of an accompliſhed woman; for her ideas are not acquired by reading, but by converſing with her father and mother, by her own obſervations, and by the remarks ſhe has made in the little company ſhe has ſeen. Sophia has a natural gaiety; ſhe was even a romp in her childhood; but her mother took care to reſtrain her giddineſs, by degrees, leſt ſhe ſhould happen to fail of receiving timely notice when its total ſuppreſſion ſhould become neceſſary. She, therefore, became modeſt and reſerved, before it was requiſite for her to be miſtreſs of thoſe qualities; and now that the time is come, it is eaſier for her to practiſe the habit ſhe has contracted, than it would be for her to acquire it, without expoſing the reaſon for ſuch an alteration in her behaviour.

viour. It is pleaſant to obſerve her ſometimes give way to the vivacity of her youth, and then of a ſudden recollect herſelf, become ſilent, look down, and bluſh. The intermediate ſpace between childhood and womanhood ſhould partake of the diſpoſition of each.

Sophia has too exquiſite a ſenſibility to be always even tempered; but ſhe has too much gentleneſs to let her ſenſibility be troubleſome to others; it is herſelf only that ſhe makes uneaſy. If you ſay a word to vex her, ſhe never pouts, but her heart ſwells; and ſhe withdraws, in order to vent her tears. But if her father or mother call to her in the midſt of her weeping, and ſay but a ſingle word, ſhe endeavours in an inſtant to ſtifle her ſobbing, ſhe dries her eyes, and comes in ſmiling and chearful.

Neither is Sophia altogether free from caprice. Her humour, when carried too far, degenerates into obſtinacy, and then ſhe is apt to forget herſelf; but give her time to recollect, and her manner of atoning for her foible renders it almoſt a merit. If ſhe is puniſhed, ſhe is docile and ſubmiſſive, and you may perceive that her ſhame ariſes not from the ſenſe of correction, but of her fault. If you take no notice of her foibles, ſhe never fails to correct them herſelf; but with ſo much ingenuity, and with ſuch a good grace, that it is impoſſible to harbour any reſentment againſt her. She would aſk pardon of the meaneſt domeſtick, without being mortified by her humility; and when ſhe is forgiven, the joy

joy ſhe diſcovers, and the careſſes ſhe beſtows, ſhow from what a weight her tender heart is relieved. In a word, ſhe patiently endures the injuries ſhe receives, and is ready to repair thoſe ſhe undeſignedly offers. Such is the amiable diſpoſition of the ſex before we have corrupted it. Woman was formed to yield to man, and even to bear with his injuſtice. You will never bring boys to ſuch a ſubmiſſion. In them, an inward ſentiment ſwells, and revolts againſt injuſtice; Nature did not form them to endure it.

——————— *gravem*
Pelidæ ſtomachum cedere neſcii.

Sophia is religious, but her religion is ſimple and rational, burthened with few of the dogmas, and leſs with the ceremonies of devotion; or rather being a ſtranger to any eſſential point of practice but morality, ſhe entirely devotes her life to the ſervice of God, by doing good. In all the inſtructions which her parents have given her on this ſubject, they have always accuſtomed her to a reſpectful ſubmiſſion, by ſaying to her, "My dear, theſe are points of knowledge not ſuitable to your age; your huſband will inſtruct you in good time." In ſhort, inſtead of holding long pious diſcourſes, they have been content to make their own example ſerve her as leſſons, and that example is deeply imprinted in her mind.

Sophia is enamoured of virtue; that love is become her reigning paſſion. She is fond of it becauſe there is nothing ſo lovely as virtue; ſhe

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is fond of it becauſe virtue conſtitutes the glory of a woman, and that a woman of virtue, in her eſtimation, is equal to an angel; ſhe loves virtue as the only road to true felicity, and becauſe ſhe ſees nothing but miſery, misfortune, and ignominy, in the life of an abandoned woman. In a word, ſhe loves virtue as it is dear to her honoured father, to her worthy and affectionate mother. Not content with the happineſs they derive from their own virtue, they wiſh for an increaſe of felicity from the virtues of their daughter, and her prime felicity conſiſts in the hope of making them happy. Theſe ſentiments inſpire her with an enthuſiaſm which exalts her mind, and keep all meaner propenſities in ſubjection to ſo noble a paſſion. Sophia will be chaſte and virtuous to her lateſt breath: ſhe has made the vow from the bottom of her heart; ſhe made it at a time when ſhe already felt how much it would coſt her to preſerve it inviolable; ſhe made it at a time when ſhe might be tempted to revoke the engagement, if ſhe had been formed to live under the dominion of the paſſions.

Sophia is not like one of thoſe lovely French damſels, who are cold by conſtitution, and coquettiſh through vanity; who are more deſirous of being brilliant than agreeable; and are more ſtudious of amuſement than pleaſure. The want of an object on which to fix her affections preys upon her mind; it diſturbs and makes her uneaſy in the midſt of amuſements; ſhe

ſhe has loſt her wonted ſprightlineſs; innocent paſtimes no longer pleaſe her; far from dreading the gloom of ſolitude, ſhe courts it: there her imagination paints the man who alone can render it delightful. Perſons that are indifferent are diſpleaſing to her; ſhe does not deſire admirers, but wiſhes for a lover: ſhe had rather pleaſe one worthy man, and be always agreeable to him, than to be a reigning toaſt to-day, and be deſpiſed to-morrow.

The underſtanding of women ſooner arrives at perfection than that of men; acting upon the defenſive, almoſt from their infancy, and being entruſted with a charge difficult to be preſerved, they gain an earlier acquaintance with good and evil. Sophia, whoſe natural conſtitution makes her forward in every thing, has likewiſe a riper judgement than is common to girls of her age. There is nothing extraordinary in this: the age of maturity is not in all perſons the ſame.

Sophia is acquainted with the duties and prerogatives of her own ſex and of our's: ſhe knows the failings of men, and the vices of women; neither is ſhe a ſtranger to their qualities and oppoſite virtues, and ſhe has them all imprinted in her mind. It is impoſſible to have a higher conception of a virtuous woman, than ſhe has formed to herſelf, and yet the idea does not alarm her: but ſhe reflects with greater complacency on the honeſt man, and the man of merit; ſhe is ſenſible that ſhe is formed for ſuch a man, that ſhe is worthy of him, that ſhe can repay him the felicity

felicity ſhe may receive from him; ſhe is perſuaded that ſhe knows how to diſcern ſuch an one; ſhe only wiſhes to find him out.

Women are the proper judges of merit in men, as we are of merit in them: it is the reciprocal privilege of the ſexes, and each is ſenſible of it. Sophia knows and uſes her prerogative, but with a modeſty becoming her age, her inexperience, and her ſituation: ſhe does not judge of things beyond her capacity; and ſhe never offers her judgement, but when it is neceſſary to explain ſome uſeful maxim. She never ſpeaks of abſent perſons but with great circumſpection, eſpecially of her own ſex. She is of opinion that women become ſatyrical and detracting, by talking about each other: while they confine themſelves to ſpeak of the men, they do us juſtice. Sophia, therefore, is ſilent with regard to the women, of whom ſhe never ſpeaks, but to publiſh ſomething to their advantage; it is a reſpect which ſhe thinks due to her ſex: and as for thoſe of whom ſhe can ſay no good, ſhe ſays but little, and her reſerve is underſtood.

Sophia is not much acquainted with the world; but ſhe is obliging, and does every thing with a good grace. A happy diſpoſition ſupplies the place of a great deal of art. She is miſtreſs of a kind of politeneſs, which does not conſiſt in ceremony, which does not depend on faſhions, nor change with them; which is not regulated by cuſtom, but proceeds from a ſincere deſire of pleaſing, and is always agreeable. She

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is a ſtranger to frivolous compliments, and does not ſtudy mere formal ones. She will not tell you, that ſhe is infinitely obliged—that you do her a great deal of honour—ſhe will not deſire you not to take the trouble, &c. Much leſs is ſhe ſtudious of giving fine turns to her expreſſions. To the common forms of civility, ſhe replies only by a courteſy, or by ſimply ſaying, *I thank you:* but ſuch a reply from her is an encouragement to pay further attention to her. If you do her a real ſervice, ſhe thanks you from her heart, and does not eſteem it a mere compliment. She has never ſuffered the French faſhion to ſubject her to the power of grimace; ſuch as preſenting her hand, in paſſing from one room to another, to an old man of ſixty, whom ſhe would rather ſupport. When a perfumed gallant offers her ſuch an impertinent ſervice, ſhe rejects the offer of his officious arm, and tells him ſhe is not a cripple. In fact, though ſhe is not tall, ſhe would never wear high heels; her feet are ſmall enough to diſpenſe with them.

She not only maintains a decent ſilence and reſpect among women, but likewiſe among married men, or ſuch as are older than herſelf; ſhe will never ſeat herſelf above them, but out of obedience; and takes her place below them, as ſoon as ſhe has an opportunity; for ſhe is ſenſible, that the privileges of age are beyond thoſe of ſex, as having the preſumption of wiſdom in their favour, which ought to be reſpected above every thing.

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Among young people of her own age, her behaviour is otherwiſe: a different air is requiſite to engage reſpect; and ſhe knows how to aſſume it, without departing from that modeſty which becomes her. If her company is modeſt and reſerved, ſhe will readily entertain them with the agreeable familiarity of youth; their innocent diſcourſe will be frivolous, but decent: if the converſation takes a ſerious turn, ſhe would have it tend to ſome real uſe; if it grows inſipid, ſhe will ſoon put an end to it; for above all things ſhe deſpiſes the prattle of gallantry, as an affront to her ſex. She is ſenſible, that the man whom ſhe would prefer would be above ſuch jargon, and ſhe never willingly endures that behaviour in any one, which would not become the man whoſe character ſhe has imprinted deeply in her mind. The high notion ſhe has of the prerogatives of her ſex, that haughtineſs of mind which ſhe derives from the purity of her ſentiments, that energy of virtue which ſhe feels in her heart, and which renders her reſpectable in her own opinion, incline her to receive with indignation thoſe whining love-tales, with which many think to amuſe her: ſhe does not indeed receive them with any apparent reſentment, but with an ironical approbation, which diſconcerts her gallants, and with an indifference they never expected. Let a young fop diſplay his witticiſms, let him ſhow his vivacity in applauding her *bon mots*, in commending her beauty, her graces, in expatiating on the ineſtimable happineſs

neſs of being agreeable to her, ſhe would interrupt him with this polite reprimand: "Sir, I fancy that I am better acquainted with theſe matters than you are; if we have nothing more intereſting to talk of, I believe we may cloſe the converſation here." It is nothing to her, to accompany ſuch a reprimand with a low courteſy, and thus in an inſtant to get rid of her admirer. Aſk any of your ſmart fellows, whether it is an eaſy matter to diſplay their talents to a girl of ſo perverſe a turn?

We muſt not ſuppoſe, nevertheleſs, that ſhe is not fond of being praiſed, provided that the commendation is ſincere, and that ſhe is perſuaded you really think as well as you ſpeak of her. To appear affected with her merit, it is neceſſary to diſplay your knowledge of it. Encomiums founded on eſteem may flatter her proud ſpirit, but ſhe always rejects the empty compliments of a gallant. Sophia is not an object on which to exerciſe the paltry talents of a fop.

With ſuch maturity of underſtanding, and in every reſpect as forward as a woman of twenty, Sophia, though but fifteen, will not be treated by her parents as a child. They no ſooner perceive in her the firſt emotions of youth than they are earneſt to provide againſt them before they make any progreſs: and they will endeavour to affect her mind by rational and tender diſcourſe. Tender and rational converſation is ſuited to her age and character. Suppoſing this character to be ſuch as I conceive it, why ſhould

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not her father addreſs her in the following terms—

" My dear Sophy, you are grown a great girl, and you are not arrived to this maturity, to continue a maiden for ever. We wiſh to ſee you happy; we deſire it for our own ſakes; for our happineſs depends on your's. The greateſt felicity of a virtuous girl is that of making ſome worthy man happy: you muſt, therefore, think of being married. You ſhould think of it betimes, for the lot of your whole life depends on matrimony, and you cannot have too much time to reflect on it.

" Nothing is more nice than the choice of a good huſband, unleſs perhaps it be that of a good wife. Sophy, we truſt that you will be that uncommon character, that you will be the glory of our life, and a bleſſing to our old age: but of whatever merit you are poſſeſſed, there are not wanting men in the world, who excel you. There are none, who will not do themſelves honour in obtaining you; but there are many who will do you ſtill greater honour. Among the number of theſe it is your buſineſs to fix upon one who is ſuitable to you, to make yourſelf acquainted with him, and to make him really acquainted with you.

" The moſt complete happineſs of matrimony depends on ſo many concurring circumſtances, that it is a folly to expect them all to be united. We muſt, therefore, make ſure of thoſe which are moſt important; if the reſt concur, ſo much

the better: if not, we muſt diſpenſe with them. Perfect felicity is not to be attained on earth; but the greateſt of all misfortunes, and which we may always avoid, is that of being miſerable through our own indiſcretion.

"There are ſome natural conveniencies, ſome merely of cuſtom, and ſome which depend entirely on fancy. Parents are the beſt judges of the two laſt, children only are the proper judges of the firſt. In marriages which are concluded by the authority of parents, they are guided ſolely by rules of policy and cuſtom: they do not unite perſons, but conditions and fortunes. But theſe are of a fluctuating nature; the perſons alone remain the ſame, and attend them in every change, in ſpite of fortune: it is only from perſonal attachments, that matrimony can be happy or miſerable.

"Your mother was a woman of family; I was wealthy: theſe were the ſole motives which induced our parents to unite us. I have loſt my fortune, ſhe has loſt her name: forſaken by her family, of what conſequence is it to her that ſhe was born a woman of faſhion? In all our misfortunes the union of our affections hath always been our comfort. The conformity of our inclinations induced us to chooſe this retirement; we live here happy in our poverty, and are all the world to each other. Sophia is our common treaſure; we thank Heaven for having given us this comfort, though it has deprived us of all others. You ſee, my child, whither Pro-

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vidence has conducted us! The motives which induced our friends to conſent to our union exiſt no longer, and we derive all our happineſs from thoſe circumſtances which had no weight with them.

"It belongs to the young couple to chooſe for themſelves. Mutual inclination ſhould be the principal attachment: their eyes, their hearts ſhould firſt direct their choice; for as it is their firſt duty, when they are married, to love each other, and as our affections do not depend upon ourſelves, this duty naturally involves another, which is, to begin to love before they are married. This is the right of nature, which nothing can abrogate; they who have attempted to reſtrain it by ſo many political inſtitutions, have had more regard to an appearance of order, than to the happineſs of the marriage ſtate, or to the morals of the citizens. You ſee, my Sophy, that we do not inculcate any ſevere leſſon of morality. All we ſay tends to make you miſtreſs of yourſelf, and therefore we refer to you the proper choice of a huſband.

"Having thus given you our reaſons for leaving you entirely at your own diſpoſal, it is but juſt that we recommend it to you to uſe your judgement with diſcretion. My dear, you are rational and diſcreet, you poſſeſs integrity and piety, you are miſtreſs of talents which become a woman of virtue, and you are not deſtitute of charms; but you are poor: you have thoſe qualifications which are moſt truely eſtimable, and you

want thoſe which are moſt commonly eſteemed. Therefore do not aſpire beyond what you are able to attain; regulate your ambition, not by the meaſure of your own judgement or of our's, but by the common opinion of mankind. If equality of merit alone was in queſtion, I don't know what bounds you might ſet to your expectations; but do not raiſe them above your condition, and remember that your fortune ſtands in the loweſt degree. Should a man who deſerves you be generous enough to conſider this inequality as no obſtacle, you ſhould have the ſpirit to do that which his paſſion will not let him do. Sophia in that caſe ſhould imitate her mother, and not enter into a family who do not think themſelves honoured by the alliance. You have never known our ſplendour; you was born during our poverty; you render it agreeable to us, and partake of it chearfully. Take my advice, Sophy, do not covet riches, which we thank Providence for having deprived us of; we never taſted happineſs till we loſt our wealth.

"You are too amiable not to be agreeable to any one, and you are not ſo unfortunate that any worthy man need think you an incumbrance. You will be courted, and perhaps by ſuch as are not worthy of you. If they appear to you ſuch as they really are, you will eſteem them according to their true worth; all their parade will not long impoſe upon you. But though your judgement is good, and you are no ſtranger to your own merit, yet you want experience,

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and you do not know how far men can play the counterfeit. An ingenious impoſtor may ſtudy your taſte, in order to delude you, and in your preſence may carry the appearance of virtues, to which his heart is a ſtranger. He might ruin you, Sophy, before you would perceive it; and you would become ſenſible of your errour only to lament it. The moſt fatal of all ſnares, and the only one which reaſon can avoid, is that which is ſpread by our paſſions; if ever you ſhould have the misfortune to fall into this ſnare, you would perceive nothing but chimeras and illuſions, your eyes would be faſcinated, your judgement perplexed, your deſires corrupted, your very errours would be dear to you, and if you was able to diſcover them, you would not correct them. My dear Sophy, I leave you to the guidance of your reaſon; I do not abandon you to the dictates of your heart. So long as you continue indifferent to any particular object, judge for yourſelf; but if you happen to fall in love, let your mother have the care of you.

"I propoſe an agreement which teſtifies our confidence in you, and confirms the order of nature between us. Parents generally chooſe huſbands for their daughters, and only conſult them out of form; ſuch is the cuſtom. We will act the reverſe; you ſhall chooſe for yourſelf, and conſult us. Uſe your privilege, Sophy; uſe it freely and diſcreetly: the huſband you like muſt be of your own choice, not of our's; but it is our part to judge whether you do not deceive

yourſelf with reſpect to particular circumſtances, and act quite otherwiſe than you intend to do. Birth, riches, rank, and the opinion of the world will have no weight with us. Chooſe a worthy man, whoſe perſon is agreeable to you and whoſe character pleaſes you; whatever he may be in other reſpects, we ſhall willingly receive him for a ſon-in-law. His fortune will always be large enough if he is a moral and induſtrious man, and loves his family. His rank will be ſufficiently illuſtrious, if he enobles it by virtue. Though all the world ſhould cenſure our conduct, we care not; we do not ſeek publick approbation; we have nothing in view but your happineſs."

I don't know what effect ſuch a diſcourſe would have upon girls educated in the modern way; but Sophia would not be able to utter a word in anſwer to it. Her baſhfulneſs and tender emotion, would not allow her to give utterance to her thoughts; but I am perſuaded that it would be engraved in her mind as long as ſhe lives; and if there is any dependence on human reſolution, that ſhe would behave ſo as to make herſelf worthy of the confidence her parents place in her.

Suppoſe the worſt to happen, and that ſhe is of ſuch a warm conſtitution, as to make her impatient till the wiſhed for time arrives; yet I am perſuaded that her judgement, her knowledge, her taſte, her delicacy, and above all the ſentiments which have been inculcated into her mind from her very infancy, will counterpoize the impetuoſity

petuoſity of her paſſions, and enable her to overcome them, at leaſt to reſiſt them for a long time. She would rather die a martyr to her impatience, than to afflict her parents, by eſpouſing a worthleſs man, and expoſing herſelf to all the misfortunes of an indiſcreet marriage. The liberty which has been allowed her only ſerves to increaſe her natural elevation of mind, and to make her more difficult in the choice of a huſband. With the conſtitution of an Italian, and the ſenſibility of an Engliſhwoman, ſhe will be able to reſtrain her deſires and affections, for ſhe has the pride of a Spaniſh Donna, who, in chooſing a lover, does not readily meet with one whom ſhe thinks worthy of her.

Every one is not ſenſible what reſources the mind derives from a love of integrity, and what power a woman feels within her, when ſhe is ſincerely virtuous. There are people to whom every thing great appears chimerical, and whoſe mean and groveling ideas can never conceive what influence the enthuſiaſm of virtue has over the human paſſions. There is no addreſſing ſuch people, but by means of example: ſo much the worſe for them if they will not profit by them. If I was to tell them that Sophia is not an ideal being, that her name alone is of my own invention, that her education, her manners, her character, and her figure have had a real exiſtence, and that a worthy family ſtill deplore her loſs, they certainly would not believe me: but after all, why might I not proceed to give the real hi-

ſtory of a girl ſo like Sophia, that it would be no matter of ſurpriſe ſhould it be miſtaken for her's. It is of little conſequence whether the reader ſuppoſes it real or not; let him ſuppoſe it all a fiction, it will ſerve to illuſtrate my plan, and will anſwer my purpoſe.

The young woman, together with the conſtitution which I have attributed to Sophia, was miſtreſs of every other circumſtance beſides, which would give her a right to that name, and I leave her in poſſeſſion of it. After the converſation I have juſt now related, her father and mother being ſenſible that ſhe was not likely to meet with a ſuitable offer in the little hamlet they lived in, ſent her to paſs a winter in town, under the care of an aunt, whom they made acquainted with their deſign in ſending her thither. For the haughty Sophia had ſuch a pride of ſoul, that ſhe would triumph over herſelf, and however earneſtly ſhe might deſire a huſband, ſhe would rather have died a maiden than have determined to go in queſt of one.

To facilitate the deſign of her parents, her aunt introduced her into company, carried her to the aſſemblies and all publick places; ſhe ſhowed her the world, or rather forced her to ſee it, for Sophia paid little attention to all the buſtle. It was obſerved, however, that ſhe did not avoid young fellows of an agreeable perſon, who appeared to be modeſt and diſcreet. Her reſerve was even an allurement to them; and it appeared ſomewhat like coquettry; but after having been

been two or three times in their company, ſhe diſliked them. At length, inſtead of that haughty air, which ſeems to expect homage, ſhe aſſumed a more affable carriage, and a more diſtant politeneſs. Always attentive to her own concerns ſhe never gave them an opportunity of conferring on her the leaſt obligation: which was a ſufficient intimation that ſhe did not mean to receive their addreſſes.

Minds of nice ſenſibility are never fond of publick pleaſures, the vain and fruitleſs felicity of thoſe who have no delicate ſenſations, and who think that they enjoy life while they diſſipate it. Sophia, not finding what ſhe expected, and deſpairing to meet with it, grew tired of the town. She had a tender affection for her parents, nothing could ſupply their place, nothing could make her forget them; ſhe returned to them a long while before the time fixed for her departure from town.

She had no ſooner reſumed her offices at home, than they perceived, that though her behaviour was the ſame, her temper was altered. She was inattentive, impatient, thoughtful, and melancholy, and often hid herſelf to give vent to her tears. They concluded that ſhe was in love, and that ſhe was aſhamed of her paſſion; they charged her with it, and ſhe denied it. She proteſted that ſhe had never ſeen any one who had made the leaſt impreſſion on her, and ſhe declared the truth.

Nevertheleſs, her languor increaſed, and her health began to be impaired. Her mother, affected by this alteration, determined to know the cauſe of it. She took her aſide, and addreſſed her with that inſinuating language, and with thoſe irreſiſtible careſſes, of which maternal tenderneſs alone is capable. "My dear child! pour forth your ſecrets into your mother's boſom. What ſecrets can you have which are not proper to be truſted with me? Who feels for your uneaſineſs? Who ſhares it with you? Who wiſhes to aſſuage it, but your father and mother? Ah! my dear Sophy, muſt your uneaſineſs be the death of me? Shall not I be acquainted with the cauſe?"

So far from concealing her inquietude from her mother, the tender Sophia deſired nothing more than to place entire confidence in her, and to have the benefit of her conſolation. But ſhame prevented her diſcloſing her ſenſations; her modeſty could not deſcribe thoſe emotions which in ſpite of her reſolutions agitated her boſom. At length, her confuſion ſuggeſted her ſituation to her mother, and ſhe extorted from her the mortifying confeſſion. Far from making her uneaſy by unjuſt reproaches, ſhe comforted, pitied, and wept over her; ſhe had too much diſcretion, to conſtrue that evil into a crime, which her virtue alone rendered inſupportable. But why ſhould ſhe unneceſſarily endure an evil, when the remedy was ſo obvious and juſtifiable? Why was ſhe afraid to make uſe of the liberty

which

which had been allowed her? Why did ſhe not accept a huſband; why not make choice of one? Did not ſhe know that her deſtiny depended entirely on herſelf, and that whatever choice ſhe made, it would be approved, as ſhe was incapable of making a bad one? She had been ſent to town, ſhe would not ſtay there; ſeveral had made their addreſſes, ſhe had rejected them all. What did ſhe expect? What would ſhe have? What a ſtrange contradiction!

The anſwer was ſimple. If ſhe had only wanted a companion for her youth, ſhe might quickly have made her election: but a maſter for life is not to be choſen ſo readily; and as theſe two elections are inſeparable, it is neceſſary for a young woman to wait, and ſometimes to wear out her youth, before ſhe can meet with a man with whom ſhe would chooſe to paſs her whole life. This was the caſe with Sophia: ſhe wanted a lover, but that lover muſt be a huſband; and conſidering the union of affections which ſhe required, the one was almoſt as difficult to be found as the other.

All the ſmart, gay fellows ſhe had ſeen, ſuited her only in point of age; in every other reſpect they were deficient; their ſuperficial underſtanding, their vanity, their frivolous jargon, their irregular morals, their affectation gave her an averſion to them. She wanted to meet with a man, and could find none but apes.

"How unhappy am I! (ſaid ſhe to her mother) I would willingly fix my affections, and I can

find no object worthy of them. A liking not founded on eſteem can never be laſting. It is not merely an huſband that your Sophy wiſhes for! but one whoſe charming image has been long ſince imprinted in her mind. She can love him alone, ſhe can make none but him happy; ſhe can be happy herſelf with no other. She had rather pine and ſtruggle with herſelf continually, ſhe had rather die ſingle, than live with a man whom ſhe could not love, and whom ſhe ſhould only make miſerable; it is better not to be, than to exiſt only to be unhappy."

Struck with the ſingularity of theſe expreſſions, her mother thought them ſo extraordinary, that ſhe ſuſpected ſome myſtery at the bottom. Sophia was neither prudiſh nor coquettiſh. How could this exceſſive delicacy be conſiſtent with her character, who from her infancy had only learned to be content with her condition, and to make a virtue of neceſſity? This picture of an amiable man with which ſhe was ſo enamoured, and which ſhe ſo often mentioned in her diſcourſe, made her mother conjecture that this caprice had ſome other foundation, which ſhe had not diſcovered, and that Sophia had not confeſſed all. The poor girl, oppreſſed with her ſecret inquietude, only longed to diſburthen her mind. Her mother preſſed her; ſhe heſitated. At laſt overcome, and retiring without ſaying a word, ſhe returned preſently with a book in her hand. "Bewail your unhappy daughter (ſaid ſhe) her melancholy is incurable, her tears will never be dried

dried up. You preſſed me to know the cauſe: there it is," ſaid ſhe, throwing the book on the table. Her mother took it up and opened it: it was the Adventures of Telemachus. She could not ſolve this riddle: at length, by frequent interrogations and obſcure anſwers, ſhe underſtood, with a ſurpriſe eaſily to be imagined, that her daughter was the rival of Eucharis.

Sophia was in love with Telemachus, and ſhe loved him with a paſſion which nothing could abate. As ſoon as her father and mother diſcovered her frenzy, they laughed, and thought to bring her to herſelf by dint of reaſon. They were miſtaken: they had not all the reaſon on their ſide; Sophia had ſome ſhare on her part, and knew how to make uſe of it. How often has ſhe ſilenced them by uſing their own arguments; by ſhowing them that they had done the miſchief themſelves; that they had not educated her ſuitably for a man of the preſent age; that it would be neceſſary for her to adopt her huſband's way of thinking, or incline him to adopt her's; that they had rendered the firſt impracticable by the education they had given her, and that the latter was the very thing ſhe required! "Give me (ſays ſhe) a man endowed with my principles, or one into whom I can inſpire them, and I will marry him; but till then, how can you blame me? Pity me! I am unhappy, but not frantick. Does the heart depend on the will? Has not my father anſwered this queſtion? Am I to blame if I love what does not exiſt?

exiſt? I am no viſionary; I do not long for a prince, I do not want Telemachus, I know that he is a feigned character; I wiſh for ſome one who reſembles him; and why ſhould not ſuch an one have exiſtence, ſince I exiſt, who find my heart ſympathize with his? No, do not let us debaſe human nature; do not let us ſuppoſe that an amiable and virtuous man is an ideal character. He exiſts, he breathes, perhaps he is in ſearch of me; perhaps he wiſhes for one who has a mind capable of loving him. But what is he? Where is he? I know not; he is not among thoſe I have ſeen; and certainly is not one of thoſe whom I ever ſhall ſee. O my parents! why have you made me ſo enamoured of virtue? If I can entertain no other paſſion, the fault is leſs mine than your's."

Shall I draw this melancholy detail to a cataſtrophe? Shall I relate the tedious diſcourſe which preceded it? Shall I deſcribe an impatient mother, who changed her firſt careſſes into ſeverities? Shall I repreſent an enraged father, forgetting his former promiſes, and treating the moſt virtuous of girls as a creature diſtracted? Shall I picture the unfortunate Sophy, more ſtrongly attached to her chimera by the perſecution ſhe underwent, pining, drooping, making ſlow approaches towards death, and deſcending into the tomb, at a time when they thought to have led her to the altar? No, I will baniſh theſe mournful images. I need not go ſo far to prove by ſuch an affecting inſtance, that notwithſtanding

withſtanding the prejudices which reſult from the manners of the age, the enthuſiaſm of honour and virtue is no more a ſtranger to the breaſt of women than to that of men; and that there is nothing, which, under the guidance of nature, they are not capable of, as well as ourſelves.

Some, perhaps, will ſtop me here, to enquire whether nature enjoins us to take ſo much pains to ſuppreſs our deſires? I anſwer, No; but I add that we do not derive our inordinate deſires from nature. Therefore, whatever is not conſentaneous to nature is againſt it; I have proved this a thouſand times.

Let us now join Emilius to his Sophia; let us revive that lovely girl; let us curb the ſallies of her imagination, and render her deſtiny more happy. In deſcribing a woman of common capacity, while I have endeavoured to elevate her mind, I have almoſt perverted her underſtanding. In this I have been miſled myſelf.—To return, therefore, to the point we ſet out from. Sophia has a good diſpoſition, with a mind not above the common rank; ſo that whenever ſhe excels others, it is the effect of her education.

I Propoſed in this book, to ſay every thing which might be offered, and to leave every one to adopt ſuch ſentiments as might be moſt conformable to his own judgement. I intended at firſt to have begun very early in forming the conſort

conſort of Emilius, and to have educated them for each other, and with each other. But on recollection, I found that all theſe previous arrangements were improper, and that it was abſurd to deſtine two children for each other, before we know whether ſuch an union is agreeable to the order of nature, and whether they will poſſeſs the neceſſary requiſites to complete it. We muſt not confound what is natural to the ſavage ſtate of mankind, with what is natural to a ſtate of civil ſociety. In the firſt caſe, every woman is ſuitable to every man, becauſe neither the one or the other have any diſtinction more than their common and primitive formation: in the ſecond inſtance, every particular character being formed by means of civil inſtitutions, and every mind having received its peculiar and determined bent, not only from education, but from an aſſociation, either well or ill combined, of their natural diſpoſitions with that education, it is impoſſible to unite them properly, without preſenting them to each other, in order to diſcover whether all circumſtances are ſuitable, or at leaſt to prefer that choice in which the greater number of eſſential requiſites concur.

The miſchief is, that the ſocial ſtate, at the ſame time that it diſcriminates characters, makes a diſtinction of rank alſo; and one rank being very unequal to another, the greater the difference of ſtations, the greater is the confuſion of characters. From hence ariſe diſproportionate

marriages, and all the diſorders which reſult from them; from whence it is evident, that, by a neceſſary conſequence, the natural inclinations are perverted, in proportion as the diſparity is more or leſs unequal: the greater diſtance there is eſtabliſhed between high and low, the more the conjugal tie is relaxed; the more rich and poor there are, the fewer fathers and huſbands will be found. Neither the maſter nor the ſervant have, ſtrictly ſpeaking, any family connexions; they regard only thoſe of their reſpective ſituations.

Would you prevent theſe abuſes, and render the marriage ſtate happy, ſtifle all prejudices, lay aſide human inſtitutions, and conſult nature. Do not unite young people who are ſuited to each other only in rank and fortune, and who will never agree, when their circumſtances alter; but aſſociate thoſe only who will agree in every ſituation of life, in every country whatever, and in every condition in which fortune may place them. I do not maintain that equality of condition is abſolutely indifferent in matrimony; but I inſiſt that the influence of natural requiſites is ſo much ſuperiour, that the happineſs of life depends on them alone; and that there is a certain conformity of taſte, humour, inclination, and character, which ſhould engage a diſcreet father, though he ſhould be a prince or a monarch, to beſtow his ſon without heſitation upon a girl of a congenial turn, though ſhe ſhould chance to be born of a mean family, and ſhould even be the daughter of a beggar.

Yes,

Yes, I maintain it, that let all the misfortunes we can imagine light upon a pair cemented by mutual affection, that they will enjoy more real happineſs on mingling their tears, than they would feel in the higheſt ſtation on earth, embittered by a diſagreement of affections.

Therefore, inſtead of having thought of a wife to Emilius from his infancy, I waited to know what kind of a woman would ſuit him. It is not I who make choice for him, it is nature; my buſineſs is only to diſcover what election ſhe has made. My buſineſs; I ſay mine, and not his father's; for in committing his ſon to my care, he reſigns his place to me, and ſubſtitutes my right in the room of his own: I am the true father of Emilius; it is I who have formed him a man. I would have declined the care of educating him, if I had not been at liberty to marry him agreeably to his inclination: that is, to my own. Nothing but the pleaſure of rendering a human being happy can make amends for the trouble it coſts to fix him in ſuch a ſituation.

Do not imagine, nevertheleſs, that I waited to find a wife for Emilius, till I had prompted him to chooſe one for himſelf. The ſearch I directed him to make was only with a view to make him acquainted with women, that he might know their true value. Sophia has been diſcovered ſome time; perhaps Emilius has ſeen her already; but he will not be acquainted with her till the proper time.

Though

Though equality of condition is not eſſential to matrimony, yet when this equality concurs with other requiſites, it gives it an additional value; it is not to be balanced by any other conſideration, but where every thing elſe is equal it turns the ſcale.

A man, unleſs he is a ſovereign, cannot chooſe a wife out of every rank; for though he may be above prejudices, others may not; and perhaps a girl might ſuit him, whom, nevertheleſs, he may not be able to obtain. There are prudential maxims, therefore, which ought to limit the views of a diſcreet father. He ſhould not endeavour to advance his ſon to a condition above his rank; for it may not be in his power to effect it. Admitting it was, he ought not to attempt it; for of what conſequence is rank to a young man, at leaſt to my pupil? And at the ſame time, in aiming at preferment, he expoſes himſelf to a thouſand real misfortunes, which he will feel all his life. I even inſiſt that we ought not to endeavour to ſet advantages of different kinds in competition with each other; as thoſe of nobility and wealth; becauſe we can never agree upon a common ſtandard: and the preference which every one gives to his own poſſeſſion lays the foundation of diſcord between families, and often between huſband and wife.

There is a material difference, however, whether a man marries above or beneath himſelf. The firſt is abſolutely repugnant to reaſon, the latter

latter is more conformable to it. As a family is allied to ſociety by its head, the condition of the maſter governs that of the whole family. When he enters into an alliance with a woman of inferiour rank, he does not debaſe himſelf, he exalts his wife; on the contrary, by marrying a woman above him, he demeans her, without raiſing himſelf: thus, in the firſt inſtance, there is an advantage without any inconvenience; and in the ſecond, an inconvenience without any advantage. Beſides, it is agreeable to the order of nature, that a woman ſhould obey her huſband. Therefore, when he chooſes one of an inferiour rank, the order of nature and of ſociety concur, and every thing is right. It is quite the reverſe when he matches above himſelf; a man expoſes himſelf to the alternative of being either deſpiſed or ungrateful. In that caſe, the woman, gaining the aſcendancy, becomes a tyrant over her maſter; and the maſter becoming a ſlave, finds himſelf the moſt miſerable and ridiculous of all beings. Such are thoſe unhappy favourites, whom the monarchs of Aſia honour and torture by their alliance; and who, it is ſaid, are obliged to creep in at the feet of the bed to get to their wives.

I expect that many readers, who may have recollected that I ſuppoſe women to have a natural talent of governing men, will accuſe me of contradiction here; but they are miſtaken. There is a great deal of difference between uſurping a right of empire, and governing him who commands.

mands. A woman's empire is an empire of gentleneſs, addreſs, and complacency; her orders are careſſes, and her menaces are tears. She ought to rule in her family, as a prime miniſter in the ſtate, by having the art to dictate thoſe orders ſhe would wiſh to receive. In this ſenſe, it is certain, that the beſt regulated families are thoſe where the wife has the moſt influence. But when ſhe pays no regard to what her huſband ſays, when ſhe uſurps his prerogative, and would rule of herſelf, diſorder and miſery, ſhame and diſhonour, are the conſequence.

Suppoſing the choice to remain between equals and inferiours, I believe that we muſt ſtill make ſome reſtrictions with regard to the latter; for it is difficult to meet with a woman, among the dregs of the people, capable of making a worthy man happy: not that people in the loweſt ſtation are more vicious than thoſe in the higheſt, but becauſe they have leſs idea of what is good and virtuous, and becauſe the oppreſſion they undergo from others, ſeems, in their opinion, to render their very vices juſtifiable.

Man naturally ſpeculates but little. Reflexion is an art which is acquired like all others, but with moſt difficulty. I know but two claſſes of each ſex, which are eſſentially different; the one, of thoſe who reflect; the other, of thoſe who have no reflexion: and this difference proceeds entirely from education. A man of the firſt claſs ought not to form an alliance with a woman of the latter; for he loſes one of the greateſt

greateſt bleſſings of ſociety, to a reflecting mind, when his wife can bear no part in his reflexions. They who paſs their whole lives in working for their daily bread, have no ideas beyond their buſineſs or their intereſt, and all their underſtanding ſeems to lie in their fingers ends. This ignorance is neither prejudicial to their integrity nor their morals; it is often of ſervice to them. Sometimes by means of reflexion, we are led to compound with our duty, and we conclude by ſubſtituting a jargon of words, in the room of things. Our own conſcience is the moſt enlightened philoſopher. There is no need to be acquainted with Tully's Offices, to make a man of probity: and perhaps the moſt virtuous woman in the world, is the leaſt acquainted with the definition of virtue. But it is no leſs true, that an improved underſtanding can only render ſociety agreeable; and it is a melancholly thing for a father of a family, who is fond of home, to be obliged to be always wrapped up in himſelf, and to have nobody about him to whom he can impart his ſentiments.

Beſides, how ſhould a woman void of reflexion be capable of educating her children? How ſhould ſhe diſcern what is proper for them? How ſhould ſhe incline them to thoſe virtues ſhe is unacquainted with, or to that merit of which ſhe has no idea? She can only ſoothe or chide them; render them inſolent or timid; ſhe will make them formal coxcombs, or ignorant blockheads;

heads; but will never make them ſenſible or amiable.

It is not proper, therefore, for a man of education to take a woman without any, nor conſequently to chooſe one in a ſtation of life which deprives her of that benefit. But I had rather a hundred times have a ſimple girl, meanly educated, than a learned and witty lady, who ſhould come into my family to erect a literary tribunal, of which herſelf is preſident. A witty wife is a ſcourge to her huſband, her children, her friends, her ſervants, and to all the world. Her ſublime elevation of genius makes her deſpiſe all the duties of a wife; and ſhe always affects, like Madame de l'Enclos, to diſplay the ſenſe and knowledge of a man. Abroad ſhe is always ridiculous, and juſtly cenſured; becauſe it is impoſſible to avoid ridicule and cenſure, when we ſtart from our condition, and are not formed for that which we aſſume. Theſe women of genius never impoſe upon any but fools. We always know what artiſt or what friend held the pen or the pencil in all their works. We know what man of letters was the oracle they privately conſulted. All this impoſture is unbecoming a prudent woman. Even if ſhe had real talents, her pretenſions would debaſe them. On the contrary, it is her pride to paſs unnoticed; her glory conſiſts in the eſteem of her huſband; her pleaſure is centered in the happineſs of her family. Reader, I appeal to you; be ſincere: which is it that

gives you the beſt opinion of a woman, which makes you accoſt her with the greateſt reſpect, the ſeeing her employed in the occupations of her ſex, in the cares of her family, ſurrounded with her children; or the finding her buſy in ſcribbling verſes at her toilet, encompaſſed with pamphlets, trifling billets, and meſſage-cards? Every learned lady would remain a virgin for life, if there were none but ſenſible men in the world.

Quæris cur nolim te ducere, Galla? Diſerta es.

Next to theſe conſiderations comes that of perſon. This is the firſt thing which makes an impreſſion, and the laſt which we ought to regard; yet it ought not to be entirely overlooked. Extraordinary beauty ought rather, in my opinion, to be avoided, than deſired in matrimony. Beauty ſoon palls by fruition; at the end of ſix weeks it is of no value to him who enjoys it, but its inconveniences are as laſting as itſelf. If a beautiful woman is any thing leſs than an angel, her huſband muſt be the moſt unhappy of men; and admitting ſhe were an angel, how will ſhe ſecure him from being ſurrounded with rivals? If extreme deformity were not diſguſtful, I ſhould prefer it to exceſſive beauty; for, in a ſhort time, either becoming indifferent to the huſband, beauty is an inconvenience, and deformity an advantage; but that degree of uglineſs

which

which produces diſguſt is the worſt of all misfortunes; the idea, inſtead of being effaced by time, continually increaſes, till it grows into confirmed antipathy: ſuch a marriage muſt be truely miſerable: even death itſelf would be preferable.

A mediuſt is deſirable in every thing, not excepting beauty. An agreeable and graceful figure, which does not inſpire love but eſteem, is moſt to be preferred: it is of no prejudice to the huſband, and the advantage turns to the mutual intereſt of both huſband and wife. Graces do not faſe, like beauty; they are laſting, they are continually renewing, and a virtuous woman, who has attractions, will, thirty years after marriage, be as agreeable to her huſband as ſhe was on her wedding-day.

Such are the conſiderations which determined me in the choice of Sophia: a diſciple of nature's, as well as Emilius. She will ſuit him better than any other; ſhe will behave to him as a wife ought to behave to her huſband. She is his equal in birth and merit, though his inferiour in point of fortune. She is not ſtriking at firſt ſight, but ſhe grows more agreeable every day. Her greateſt charm operates by degrees, it does not diſplay itſelf but upon intimate acquaintance, and her huſband will be more ſenſible of it than any other than himſelf: her education is not extraordinary, neither has it been neglected; ſhe has taſte without application, talents without

art, judgement without knowledge. Her underſtanding is not inſtructed, but it is cultivated for information; it is a ſoil well prepared, which only wants ſowing, to yield a plenteous harveſt. She has read few books beſide Telemachus, which fell into her hands by chance. But can a girl capable of being enamoured with Telemachus have a heart without affections, and an underſtanding without refinement? O how lovely is her ignorance! Happy is he who is deſtined to inſtruct her! She will never pretend to be the tutor of her huſband, but will be content to be his pupil. Far from attempting to ſubject him to her taſte, ſhe will accommodate herſelf to his. She will be more eſtimable to him, than if ſhe was learned: he will have a pleaſure in inſtructing her.—It is time they ſhould be introduced to each other: let us make haſte to bring them together.

We quitted Paris without the leaſt regret. That trifling place is not to our taſte. Emilius turned an eye of contempt towards the city, and ſaid with concern—"How many days have we loſt in a fruitleſs ſearch! It is not there I am to look for a wife: my friend, you knew that ſhe was not to be found there; but my time is no loſs to you, and my misfortunes occaſion you no ſollicitude." I looked at him attentively, and aſked him, without emotion, "Emilius, do you really think what you ſay?" On this, in an inſtant he flew into my arms, embracing me tenderly,